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Despite North Korea’s increasing asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile 
capabilities, what explains South Korea’s restraint in armaments in the ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
capabilities? Unlike how the ability to detect, prevent, preempt, or at least ‘hit-to-
kill’ incoming threats in advance have made both BMD and ISR highly 
interrelated and critical armaments in other US allies’ response to asymmetric 
threats, South Korea has retained heavy reliance on the US’s security provisions 
and stationing of advanced weapons system.  
While existing literatures lended little room for comprehensive 
comparative analysis, portraying South Korea's alliance-reliant defense system 
more or less rational, structural, and/or path-dependent continuity from the US's 
ii 
military presence and the ROK-US combined defense system – the distinctive 
attributes of the ROK-US alliance – this study finds that South Korea retains 
intriguing resilience in restraining autonomous defense capabilities in the BMD 
and ISR capabilities.  
Bringing neoclassical realism as major theoretical underpinnings, this 
study argues that South Korea’s relative restraint in autonomous armaments in the 
BMD and ISR capabilities arises from policy leaders’ accumulated state-strategies 
in reinforcing the alliance-reliance in the state-of-the-art weapons system. As 
North Korea’s emergence as de facto nuclear power aggravated South Korea’s 
reliance on asymmetric division of force structure with the US (alliance structure), 
the vacillating threat perception on North Korea and armament priorities in 
lower-cost offensive strike capabilities in both progressive and conservative 
regimes reinforced South Korea’s confinement to alliance-reliant armaments in 
the BMD and ISR.   
Stripped to the essence, neoclassical realism is what Ira Katznelson, Barry 
R. Weingast (2005), and Park Cheol Hee (1998) would call a ‘situated rationalist’ 
approach to states’ armaments, in which variation in states’ arming becomes more 
conditional to how external threats become filtered through policy leaders’ 
perception and their domestic contexts (Rose 1998; Schweller 2004; 2006; 
Taliaferro 2006). While systemic imperatives remain primary forces in driving 
states’ arms build-up, states’ armaments can be inflated and/or abated, ‘situational’ 
iii 
to policy leaders’ perceived realities in neoclassical realism than in unilateral 
pursuit for power-maximization.  
Chapter III, in application of the theory, focuses on attenuating previous 
literatures’ deterministic or exceptionalist inclination in constructing 
understanding on South Korea’s armaments. Putting forth a cross-national 
framework to contextualize South Korean case among other US allies, including 
Japan, Taiwan, UK, and Germany, this study argues that while the structural 
forces arising from the level of asymmetric threats and alliance structure with the 
US are primary in shaping overall trajectories of the US allies’ armaments in the 
BMD and ISR, variations under similar exogenous influences arise from how the 
policy leaders perceive and respond to the given asymmetric threats (policy 
leaders’ threat perception) within their geopolitical context, and to the extent that 
they seek and mobilize resources for self-reliant or alliance-reliant armaments.  
In the latter half of the dissertation, Chapter IV, this study further 
elaborates on South Korea’s ‘accumulated’ restraint or ambivalence from cross-
regime comparisons on South Korea’s armaments in the BMD and ISR 
capabilities. This study disconfirms the conventional view that the so-called 
“progressive-conservative split” among policy leaders has been at the heart of 
South Korea’s limited armaments, particularly when it comes to the state-of-the-
art BMD and ISR weapons system. While progressive regimes have been deemed 
more reconciliatory to North Korea and seek more autonomous policy towards 
iv 
armament and alliance-reliance, when conservatives were seen as more hardlined 
to North Korea, favorable to pro-alliance armaments as means for security, 
ideological divide mattered less when it came to the BMD and ISR capabilities. 
Although policy and ideological divergence have appeared to cause variations in 
the outset of each administration from President Kim Dae-jung to Park Geun-hye 
(1998-2017), both progressive and conservative regimes have recurred to 
alliance-reliance in the BMD and ISR under the existing division of labor under 
the ROK-US combined defense system.  
Although progressive regimes under Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh 
Moo-hyun (2003-2008) administrations have taken more reconciliatory approach 
to North Korea’s asymmetric threats and emphasis on self-reliance in armaments, 
the progressive regimes have been situationally induced, however “reluctant,” to 
resume to alliance-reliant armaments in the BMD and ISR capabilities. When 
power transferred back to conservative regimes under Lee Myung-bak (2008-
2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) administrations, North Korea’s rapid 
increases in asymmetric threats have restored pro-alliance or alliance-reliant 
proclivity in armaments, reinforcing South Korea’s restrained armament in 
autonomous BMD and ISR capabilities. Punctuated with economic crisis, ebb and 
flow in North Korea’s asymmetric provocations, caught in between the 
increasingly contentious US-China rivalry in the region, continuity than change 
can be found in arming in the lower-cost, possibly homegrown, offensive missiles 
v 
and conventional strike capabilities. Neither progressive and conservative 
governments have pursued armaments beyond the structural influences from 
asymmetric capability gap with North Korea and resilient asymmetric division of 
force structure with the US.  
 This study concludes in Chapter V with discussions on the progressive 
Moon Jae-in administration and implications of the study.  
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A NOTE ON CONVENTIONS 
 
Korean names throughout the text are presented in Korean form, in which the 
surname precedes the given name, in reverse order of Western standard. In-text 





1. Puzzle: South Korea’s Restraint in Armaments 
 
Since the first test-launch of Scud-based short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) in 
1984, North Korea’s pursuit of asymmetric nuclear deterrent has emerged as the 
predominant security threat on the Korean Peninsula. Notwithstanding diverse 
international, regional, and bilateral efforts over the last two decades to halt North 
Korea’s bid to acquire asymmetric capabilities, North Korea has accumulated to a 
total of 117 ballistic missile tests and six nuclear tests (The CNS North Korea Missile 
Test Database),1 becoming capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear-
tipped ballistic missiles to South Korea, Japan, the Pacific Theater, and now the US 
mainland.2  
While rivaling powers’ increasing asymmetric capabilities have impelled 
other US allies to seek arms build-up in the ballistic missile defense (BMD) and 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as interrelated 
conventional means to detect, prevent, preempt, or at least ‘hit-to-kill’ incoming 
                                           
1 SRBMs and MRBMs, ranging from Hwasong-6 (Scud-C), Hwasong-5 (Scud-B), Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER, 
Extended Range), Hwasong-7 (Nodong, Scud-D), recent Scud-C (KN-18) and Scud-B (KN-21) variants 
with maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV), as well as Soviet’s Tochka-derived Hwasong-11 (KN-02 or 
Toksa); Taepodong and Musudan IRBMs; KH-35 and KN-01 cruise missiles. Seven tests in the 1980s 
(1984: 3 success, 3 fail; 1986: 1 unknown), nine in the 1990s (1990: 1 success, 1 fail; 1991: 1 success; 
1992: 1 fail; 1993: 3 success, 1 unknown; 1998: 1 fail), fifteen in the 2000s (6 successful, 1 failed in 
2006; 7 successful, 1 failed in 2009), and eighty-six in the 2010s, accumulating to a total of 117 tests. See, 
the CNS North Korea Missile Test Database. 
2 With the latest test-launch of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Hwasong-15 (KN-22) in 2017, see, 
US Office of the Secretary of Defense (2014: 10); Montgomery (2018: 30). 
2 
threats in advance, South Korea has shown intriguing level of restraint in 
autonomous armaments in both BMD and ISR. In the realms of BMD, South Korea 
has been constrained to the low-end, lower-tier variants such as ground-based Patriot 
Advanced Capability-2s (PAC-2), some PAC-3 upgraded PAC-2s, and sea-based 
Standard Missile-2s (SM-2), mostly without the so-called “hit-to-kill” technology 
that is critical for intercepting incoming targets directly before hitting the ground. 
With continued postponements in plans for advanced military satellites and 
reconnaissance aircrafts, South Korea’s ISR capabilities have also continued to be 
the “most essential but vulnerable field for the ROK armed forces” (Ministry of 
National Defense, ROK, 1994: 106). Rather than autonomous armaments in the 
BMD and ISR capabilities, South Korea retained instead its overarching reliance on 
the US’s provision of extended nuclear deterrence and stationing of advanced BMD 
and ISR weapons system (US Forces Korea, USFK). 
Although existing studies on South Korea’s armaments inclined to treat 
South Korea’s restraint more or less rational, structural, and/or path-dependent 
continuity from the US’s military presence and the ROK-US combined defense 
system – the unique attributes of the ROK-US alliance – this study finds a revisit to 
the phenomenon critical. Other than North Korea’s emergence as de facto nuclear 
power, attention should be drawn to the sheer number of South Korea’s arms 
spending. In terms of military expenditures, South Korea has emerged as the top 
tenth largest spender as of 2018 with $43.1 billion. From 1990 to 2018, South Korea 
has spent a total of $746.1 billion, exceeding the amount spent by other US allies in 
3 
the respective period, such as Australia ($509 billion), Israel ($425.5 billion), and 
Taiwan (Republic of China, PRC, $300.5 billion). South Korea has been also the 
third largest importer of the US’s weapons system from 2008 to 2017. According to 
data released by the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the largest 
destination of the US’s armaments from 2008 to 2017 went to Saudi Arabia ($10.6 
billion), followed by Australia ($7.3 billion), and South Korea ($6.7 billion). 
Although the existing literatures’ implicit or explicit emphasis on the distinctiveness 
of the ROK-US alliance lended little room for comprehensive comparative analysis, 
this dissertation finds that South Korea’s restraint in autonomous BMD and ISR 
capabilities is, as this dissertation calls, an intriguing “complacency” for autonomous 
defense capabilities.  
South Korea’s relative restraint in autonomous armaments becomes most 
explicit when juxtaposed to another US ally like Japan in the region that has shown 
active armaments in both BMD and ISR, even to the extent that the armaments have 
become “useful redundancy” to the US-stationed weapons system under US Forces 
Japan (USFJ).3 The comparison becomes most explicit from how South Korea and 
Japan diverged in their responses to North Korea’s first Taepodong-launch in 1998 
(intermediate-range ballistic missile, IRBM). When the Taepodong overflew Japan 
and landed in the Pacific Ocean, South Korea’s first formal response entailed its 
announcement in 1999 that South Korea will not acquire nor join the US-led BMD 
systems (then, Theater Missile Defense, TMD). While South Korea denied BMD, 
                                           
3 US Deputy Commander of the Space & Missile Defense Command, General John Seward, January 2008. 
4 
ostensibly for inadequate “economic and technological capacity,”4 Japan in the same 
year has signed the agreement to join joint research and development program 
(Cronin 2002) for BMD technology with the US.5 Coupled with growing concerns 
on China’s military advancements, Japanese cabinet announced its decision in 2003 
to acquire autonomous multi-tier BMD system including the ground-based PAC-3 for 
lower-tier and ship-based SM-3 (Block IA) for upper-tier defense (Japan Ministry of 
Defense 2017: 328; Mizokami 2017; Takahashi 2012: 7; Japan Ministry of Defense 
2008).  
When North Korea resumed to consecutive ballistic missile tests and 
launched its first underground nuclear test in October 2006, South Korea continued 
to restrain its acquisitions to low-end missile defense capabilities such as the second-
hand ground-based PAC-2 from Germany and ship-based SM-2. Capping the 
acquisitions to low-end and lower-tier assets as interim choices, South Korea insisted 
on building indigenously produced Korea Air Missile Defense (KAMD) system. 
Japan, in contrary, expedited its original plans for acquiring autonomous BMD 
capabilities. Also, since 2006, as notably “enthusiastic partner” for US’s BMD 
architecture in East Asia (Roehrig 2017), Japan welcomed US’s deployment of BMD 
assets including the PAC-3, X-band radar, aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3s 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2006). By 2007, just a year after South Korea’s 
acquisition of second-hand PAC-2s from Germany, Japan began to field its first batch 
                                           
4 Statement by then Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek, March 5, 1999. 
5 Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Japan-US Joint Technological Research on Ballistic Missile 
Defense, December 25, 1998.  
5 
of PAC-3 and launched its first test-flight of SM-3 on their aegis destroyers (Japan 
Ministry of Defense 2008; Takahashi 2012: 11). By 2010s, Japan has been operating 
seventeen PAC-3 batteries (more than twenty including PAC-2s), six aegis destroyers 
with SM-3 interceptors, as well as engaging in the co-production deal with the US for 
upgraded SM-3 Block IIA interceptors (Hoff 2015). Although South Korea has seen 
incremental pursuit for missile defense capabilities since North Korea’s first nuclear 
test in October 2006, the bottom line is that South Korea’s BMD acquisitions have 
been belated and capped to lower-end defense articles than other US allies under 
similar asymmetric threats. South Korea’s decision to acquire the advanced ground-
based PAC-3 has been seven years behind Japan’s first deployment of PAC-3 in 2007. 
As another exemplary case, resource-constrained country like Taiwan, which 
spends about a quarter of South Korea’s arms procurement budget, has already 
fielded three lower-end PAC-2 in 1997 and 2001 (later upgrade to PAC-3s), and 
placed four additional PAC-3s in 2009 (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance 2018) to 
arm against China’s continued advancements in nuclear and ballistic missiles. Israel, 
which enjoys “unprecedented”6 level of “special” (Little 1993; Bard and Pipes 1997; 
Mearsheimer and Walt 2008) alliance ties with the US, even steering tacit support for 
its indigenous nuclear capabilities (Cohen 2010; Mattson 2016; Freilich 2013),7 has 
also fielded multiple-layers of homegrown BMD assets to defend against frequent 
cross-border contingencies and regional asymmetric threats from Iran’s Shahaab 
                                           
6 See statement issued by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on September 17, 2012 – 
e.g. “deepened America’s support for Israel” and US-Israel security relations at “unprecedented levels.”  
7 Israel’s nuclear capabilities are estimated to about 80 nuclear warheads and up to 200 fissile materials, 
according to Arms Control Association (Davenport and Reif 2018). 
6 
missiles: David’s Sling and Iron Dome for lower-tier, Arrow-2s in replacement of 
PAC-2s, and Arrow-3 working as equivalent upper-tier, exo-atmospheric role as the 
SM-3. 
While the US’s close allies under imminent asymmetric threats have spent 
on BMD even at the “expense of other capabilities” as in case of Taiwan (Thim and 
Liao 2017), South Korea’s BMD acquisitions have remained stagnant. With delays in 
both South Korea’s independent KAMD and deployment of BMD assets from the US, 
South Korea’s autonomous BMD capabilities are, as of 2019, limited to the so-called 
‘non-hit-to-kill’ PAC-2s, SM-2s, and some PAC-3 interceptors. For advanced BMD 
capabilities, South Korea rests on the upgraded PAC-3s under USFK, recently added 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in 2017, and SM-3 equipped aegis 
destroyers stationed outside of South Korean waters.  
Alike in the case of the BMD, South Korea’s autonomous armaments in the 
ISR have centered on the lower-end ‘tactical’ weapons systems including 
reconnaissance aircrafts and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) that provide limited 
detection range beyond the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).8 Plans to acquire advanced 
ISR assets including the military satellites and high-altitude UAV (HUAV) Global 
Hawk have been postponed repeatedly as South Korean government spat over the 
                                           
8 The ‘Baekdu’ (Hawker-800SIG) signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft, ‘Kumkang’ (Hawker-800RA) 
image intelligence (IMINT) aircraft, and the RF-16 IMINT (replacing the old fleets of RF-5As in 
operation since 1972; and RF-4Cs in operation since 1990), as exemplary have been limited to observing 
100 kilometers range into North Korea beyond the Military Demarcation Line (MDL); RF-5As (in 
operation since 1972) and RF-4Cs (in operation since 1990) have been decommissioned completely in 
year 2007 and 2014, respectively. 
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budget.9 Although South Korean government announced in August 2017 to resume 
its plans to field five military satellites to be operable by 2023 – the “425 Project” 
(Yonhap News 2017), the program has seen continuous delays. Given the situation, 
the limited detection range of existing fixed-wings has kept the US forces 
indispensable in garnering information and surveillance on North Korea’s major 
nuclear and missile test sites, including Tongchang-ri (missile launch site), Punggye-
ri (nuclear test site), Sinpo (Submarine-launched ballistic missile test-launch and 
submarine base), and the Pukchang Airfield (major launch sites of Hwasong-12 and -
14 ballistic missiles) (Pinkston 2014). Without “cross-referencing to information 
collected by” the US’s military satellites (Keyhole Satellites, Defense Support 
Program Satellites) and stationing of advanced reconnaissance aircrafts (U-2S 
stationed at Osan base, RC-7 at Pyeongtaek Humphreys), as well as the RC-135 
reconnaissance aircraft stationed at Japanese Okinawa-Kadena air base, information 
collected from South Korea’s existing ISR assets are allegedly “insignificant.”10 Kim 
Dae-young, former researcher of Korea Defense and Security Forum (KODEF), also 
noted that given North Korea’s 200km-range of 300mm multiple-launch rocket 
systems (MRLS), not to mention other missiles, “it is difficult for South Korean 
army’s ISR assets to detect [incoming targets] if deployed beyond 100km towards the 
[North Korean] inland” (Soon Jung-woo 2016). 
                                           
9 With repeated recalibrations since the 2000s, South Korea decided to purchase four Global Hawks from the 
US (under Foreign Military Sales Agreement) during Park Geun-hye administration. The first Global 
Hawk was finally delivered to South Korea on December 23, 2019.  
10 Anonymous military official. Interview by author, November 21, 2017. 
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Although Jang Cheol-wun11 and Suh Jae-jung (2009) argued that advanced 
ISR assets such as military satellites and high-end reconnaissance aircrafts may be of 
“overkill” (Suh Jae-jung 2009: 117), given the small size of the Korean Peninsula 
and superiority over North Korea’s ISR capabilities, such view can be again 
challenged as other smaller US allies and partners with in-depth information-sharing 
with the US have acquired advanced ISR assets of their own. Israel, as exemplary, 
despite about fifth (20,770 square kilometers) of South Korea’s geographic size 
(99,720 square kilometers), population of 8.3 million (42.9 million people less than 
South Korea), and about half the size of South Korea’s military expenditure, operates 
indigenously produced Ofeq military reconnaissance satellites – Ofeq-8, -10, -11 
(Zorn 2008; Ben-Israel and Zvi 2005). Japan also operates its own military satellites 
– Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) – IGS-7A and IGS-Radar 4. Although 
formally designated as ‘multipurpose satellites,’ the IGS satellites closely monitor the 
military activities in the region including North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests 
(Oros 2007: 30; Sawako 2009: 2). Israel and Japan have also equipped with 
multifarious autonomous ISR assets, including the reconnaissance aircrafts, 
independent nationwide network of ground-based radars as in case of Japan, and 
advanced indigenously produced radars and UAVs in case of Israel. 
South Korea’s relative restraint to shorter-range, lower-end defense articles, 
and also stagnant acquisition process is an intriguing ‘complacency’ for armaments, 
                                           
11 Interview with Jang Cheol-wun on January 17, 2019, professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 
Kyungnam University. 
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unseen from other US allies. While asymmetric threats have stimulated the US allies 
to strive for autonomous armaments in the BMD and ISR to the extent that their 
armaments function as ‘useful redundancy’ to the US’s security provisions, why does 
South Korea remain relatively complacent in arming for autonomous defense 
capabilities? 
Aside from the cross-national dimensions, South Korea’s continuity in 
restraint in autonomous BMD and ISR capabilities is perplexing at the domestic, 
cross-regime dimensions. According to the predominant “conservative-progressive 
split” (Chae and Kim 2008) 12  in depicting South Korea’s domestic political 
landscape, South Korea’s restraint in armaments has been interpreted as the outcome 
of policy inconsistences. As South Korea went through two progressive 
administrations – Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) 
government – to two conservative administrations – Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) 
and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) government – the divergent threat perception on 
North Korean threats and interests in enhancing South Korea’s autonomous defense 
capabilities forestalled continuity in investments that are critical in procuring the 
costly state-of-the-art BMD and ISR capabilities. Veering against such depictions, 
however, this dissertation finds that the investments in the BMD and ISR sectors 
have been limited in both progressive and conservative regimes. The rigged 
investments in the BMD and ISR appear to be continuous phenomenon than change.  
                                           
12 See also, Snyder (2017); “sharp division” between progressives and conservatives on North Korea policy 
and alliance, according to Shin Gi-wook and Kristin C. Burke (2008: 287). 
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Indeed, as North Korea increased its asymmetric nuclear and ballistic 
missile tests since the mid-2000s, both progressive and conservative regimes have 
responded with coining new defense strategies, concepts, and pledges to enhance 
South Korea’s effective countermeasures, including the state-of-the-art missile 
defense and ISR capabilities. In terms of operational concepts, since the 2000s, the 
progressive governments have announced to construct a ‘Korean-style missile 
defense (MD),’ soon developed to the concept of the Korean Air Missile Defense 
(KAMD), a lower-tier (B)MD system designed to trace and shoot down incoming 
targets from North Korea, including the ballistic missiles. Although the latter 
conservative regimes have been relatively more keen on deliberating on joining the 
US-led BMD initiatives and extending the range of capabilities to upper-tier, both 
progressive and conservative regimes have accumulated to strategic consensus on 
autonomous KAMD construction as countermeasure to North Korea’s asymmetric 
threats. Following North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009 and heightened military 
provocations including the sinking of South Korean Cheonan vessel and shelling of 
Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, the conservative Lee Myung-bak regime also set out for 
Kill Chain, a preemptive strike system against Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile 
facilities. Following unprecedented level of multiple nuclear tests and ballistic 
missiles tests under Kim Jong-un regime, the consecutive conservative Park Geun-
hye administration further presented the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation 
(KMPR) plan, announcing its commitment to retaliate against any North Korean 
attack with force. Although power transferred back to progressive government under 
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Moon Jae-in administration since 2017, President Moon pledged to continue the 
former government’s construction of KAMD, preemptive Kill Chain, and KMPR at 
the outset of his term. Differently put, the three-pronged Kill Chain, KAMD, and 
KMPR have come to represent South Korea’s development of autonomous measures 
in coping with North Korean threats, in addition to South Korea’s traditional reliance 
on the US’s extended nuclear deterrence and stationing of advanced weapons system 
(US Forces Korea).  
Despite such transformations, however, what is most intriguing from the 
changes is that the actual progress in investment and procurement in the sectors has 
lagged behind in both progressive and conservative regimes, Figure 1. Although both 
BMD and ISR are highly interrelated and indispensable weapons system for South 
Korea’s autonomous operation of the three-pronged defense system, closer 
observation of South Korea’s armament choices across the regimes reveals that South 
Korea’s arms build-up in the BMD and ISR has recurred with postponements in 
procurement and/or purchases of lower-cost and lower-end equipment. Armament 
priorities also went to alternative conventional offensive strike capabilities, such as 
missiles (Jang Cheol-wun 2015a; 2015b), fighter-jets, destroyers, artilleries, and 
armored vehicles.  
All in all, South Korea’s relative restraint to shorter-range, lower-end BMD 
and ISR defense articles, and also stagnant acquisition process are intriguing 
‘complacency’ from both cross-national and cross-regime contexts, Figure 1. Despite 
North Korea’s emergence as de facto nuclear power, what explains South Korea’s 
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complacent reliance on the ROK-US alliance than autonomous armaments in the 
BMD and ISR capabilities? While South Korea has not been without incremental 
arms build-up in the autonomous BMD and ISR capabilities, why does South Korea 
continue to be restrained to lower-end equipment in comparison to other US allies? 
Despite regime changes, what explains the continuity in restraint in both progressive 
and conservative administrations? 
 
Figure 1 Overview: South Korea’s BMD and ISR Capabilities 
 
Source: Illustrated by author.   
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2. Existing Explanations and their Limits 
 
South Korea’s restrained armaments or alliance-reliant defense posture has been 
widely addressed topic in multifarious researches, including the studies on 
asymmetric alliance (weak state, patron-client relations), alliance dilemma, arms 
procurement and military strategies (of late defense-industrializing state or second-
tier arms producer). Yet, as the existing literatures have inclined to focus on the 
distinctive origin and attributes of the ROK-US bilateral alliance, the previous 
studies have lended little room for comprehensive comparative analysis on South 
Korea’s arms acquisition patterns.  
 Namely, at the foremost, the existing literatures have treated the BMD and 
ISR as either separate or within comprehensive discussions on South Korea’s defense 
system, without clear recognition on the highly interrelated nature of the BMD and 
ISR weapons system as deterrence against asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missiles. 
Also, although Victor Cha (2002), Yoon Duk-min and Park Cheol Hee (2007), Park 
Hwee-rhak (2013; 2016a), and others (Kim Sun-Tae 2008; Murata 1995) have 
juxtaposed South Korea to the case of Japan; to Israel (Kim Juri 2018; Park Hwee-
rhak 2016e); and to Taiwan and other Asian allies of the US (Khalilzad et al. 2001; 
Park Jae Jeok 2011; Wortzel 2000; Mishra 2016; Bush 2016; Armacost 2004); the 
discussions on arms acquisition patterns have partaken a portion of larger debate on 
comparing their overall bilateral alliance structure and relations with the US per se.  
Nonetheless, gathering from the existing literatures, four major perspectives 
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can be drawn to constructing an understanding on South Korea’s arms acquisition 
patterns in the BMD and ISR capabilities. First is rationalist approach, which 
portrays South Korea’s armaments as rational actors’ calculation of allying and 
arming for capability aggregation. Second is structuralist approach, that the resilient 
capability gap in terms of defense budget, military technologies, as well as power 
asymmetry between South Korea and the US stifle South Korea’s autonomous 
armaments. Third, institutionalists and constructivists have placed emphasis on 
enhanced symmetry in the ROK-US relations – that the resilience of South Korea’s 
US-reliant arms acquisition pattern is neither rational nor structural outcome, but 
certain institutions, norms and values formed within that are reinforcing the status-
quo than change. Fourth is the military-industrial complex or corruption studies that 
tend to refute other approaches and argue that South Korea’s arming is distorted 
outcome of vested interests of few.  
 
1) Rationalist Strand: Restraint as the ‘Rational-choice’ and ‘Economic 
Pragmatism’ for Power-maximization  
 
Under the rationalist strand, South Korea’s restrained arms acquisition in the BMD 
and ISR would be the outcome of rational calculation of benefits and costs for 
power-maximization.  
In application of the so-called “autonomy-security tradeoff model” put forth 
by Michael F. Altfeld (1994) and James D. Morrow (1993), Park Hwee-rhak (2016a) 
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and others have argued that it is South Korea’s distinctive rationality to maintain the 
alliance-reliant defense system.13 Unblackboxing the states into domestic agents and 
their preferences, the model placed emphasis on how states’ arming and allying are 
not a question of ‘either-or’ but varying “combination” of the two depending on the 
context and calculation of “political costs” and “benefits” of the options (Morrow 
1993: 231). The model provided the means to observe the incentives behind South 
Korea’s continued reliance on the alliance and reinforcing of the combined defense 
system than arms build-up. Although South Korea’s continued reliance on the 
alliance and reinforcing of the combined defense system would inevitably increase 
the traditional security dilemma (Snyder 1984) embedded in alliances (fear of 
entrapment and abandonment) and tradeoff in its autonomy (Leeds and Morgan 2010: 
140), also limiting opportunities for arms build-up of its own (Katz 1984: 9; Krause 
1992: 190; Bitzinger 2003: 35), the ROK-US combined defense system provides 
critical security benefits in return. Forged upon the US’s commitment in South 
Korea’s defense (Mutual Defense Agreement, MDA), military presence (Status of 
Forces Agreement, SOFA), provision of nuclear umbrella, and institutionalization of 
Combined Forces Command (CFC) including the Operational Control (OPCON) 
structure, these arrangements have been what Morrow (1993: 216) would call “the 
most efficient response” against adjacent North Korean threat. Park Hwee-rhak 
(2016c: 309), as one of the most explicit advocate of South Korea’s autonomy-
                                           
13 Although not focused on the autonomy-security tradeoff model, advocates of similar perspective, see Han 
Yong-sup and Jeong Sang-hyuk (2015) and Song Dae-sung (2009). 
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security tradeoff, has also outwardly stated that given North Korea’s emergence as de 
facto nuclear power and absolute dearth in South Korea’s autonomous 
countermeasures, South Korea may need to further “prioritize enhancing ROK-US 
combined forces than enhancing ROK’s autonomous military capabilities.” 
 The explanation, however, largely mutes variations in South Korean 
administrations’ efforts in arms acquisitions. Although South Korea remains 
continuously limited in autonomous defense capabilities in BMD and ISR, the post-
Cold War security environment, North Korea’s transition to asymmetric capabilities, 
and increasing divergence in North Korea perception within South Korea have 
ensued with diverse efforts to adjust its autonomous defense capabilities. Upon Roh 
Moo-hyun administration’s drive to bring back wartime OPCON in the 2000s, for 
instance, South Korea has allocated large bulks of arms spending to acquire the 
advanced ISR weapons such as Global Hawk to enhance South Korea’s autonomous 
ISR capabilities. Also, the latter conservative Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye 
administrations, in principle, demanded purchases and indigenous production of 
strategic assets for South Korean military including mid-to-upper-tier medium-range 
surface-to-air missile (M-SAM), long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM), and 
Global Hawk to establish the KAMD, Kill Chain, and KMPR as South Korea’s three-
pronged deterrence strategy against North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities.  
Indeed, increasing number of former advocates of autonomy-security 
tradeoff have called for revisions in the equation, placing emphasis on South Korea’s 
need to revamp its autonomous defense capabilities, while simultaneously 
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strengthening the ROK-US combined defense system. Park Min-hyoung and Chun 
Kwang-ho (2015: 47-54), for instance, called for an alternative model, in which both 
realms of autonomy and security can be enhanced simultaneously than traded-off – 
“autonomy-security simultaneous promotion model.” Likewise, Moon Seong-mook 
(2013) argued for concurrent efforts to enhance autonomy of South Korean military 
and strengthen the existing ROK-US combined forces structure. South Korea’s 
arming cannot be confined to the rational, cost-benefit outcome of state’s pursuit for 
the ‘most efficient response to the threat’ and capability maximization.  
More importantly, the major limitation of rationalist explanations lies in the 
dyadic nature of the literatures. Delving into monographic studies on the ROK-US 
alliance, these studies omit comparative look into how and why the ‘tradeoffs’ vary 
among other bilateral allies of the US. As observed above, Japan has strived to 
acquire its own arms in missile defense and ISR capabilities despite the US’s military 
presence and close alliance ties. Likewise, Israel acquired multiple layers of 
indigenously produced arms including nuclear capability, regardless of the US’s tacit 
but exceptional commitment in defense of Israel in the region. The close allies of the 
US have tended to arm their militaries including the state-of-the-art missile defense 
and ISR sectors, as much as to the point that the US’s military presence and/or 
provision of extended deterrence function as, what Morrow (1993: 213) would term 
“additional security” to their defense. In contrast, South Korea despite North Korea’s 
increasing asymmetric nuclear and missile threats across the border not only 
remained restrained in arming, wherein its own armaments worked as ancillary to the 
18 
US-stationed weapons, but also appeared to be hesitant in allying as well, as seen in 
South Korea’s reluctance in joining the US-led regional BMD architecture with the 
so-called ‘No MD policy.’ South Korea’s combination of alliance and armament did 
not necessarily add up to additional security nor the most efficient cost-benefit 
response to the threat stipulated by the rationalist autonomy-security tradeoff thesis.  
Interrelated, “economic pragmatism” has been another widely accepted 
rationalist explanation for South Korea’s restraint in arms acquisition. According to 
Kim Tae-hyo, former Senior Presidential Secretary for the National Security Strategy 
Office of President Lee Myung-bak (February 2008-July 2012), the main reason why 
the Lee administration postponed the purchase of advanced ISR asset, Global Hawk, 
was based on the consideration for extravagant costs. With assumption that the US 
will deploy these assets in contingencies, the government tried to bargain for better 
deals than immediate acquisitions.14 Earlier on in 2001, Hamm Taik-young pointed 
out that South Korea’s plans for ISR aircrafts, BMD, and other advanced acquisitions 
will be inefficient and “redundant to US assets,” that are also “not essential nor 
urgent” (2001: 145), considering South Korea’s geopolitical conditions (Hamm Taik-
young 2003a: 113). Jang Cheol-wun also implied his position that given the size of 
the Korean Peninsula, advanced ISR assets may become inefficient redundancy to the 
US provided capabilities under the ROK-US combined defense system.15 Studies by 
                                           
14 Interview with Kim Tae-hyo, professor at Sungkyunkwan University, former Senior Presidential Secretary 
for the National Security Strategy Office of President Lee Myung-bak (closest aide and architect of 
President Lee Myung-bak overall foreign policy) on January 16, 2019. 
15 Interview with Jang Cheol-wun on January 17, 2019, professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 
Kyungnam University. 
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Lee Misook (2017), Hong Kyudok (2009), Noh Hoon (2012), and Lim Yong-hwan 
(2018), to list more, have addressed how South Korea’s budget constraints and 
financial crises have been critical in limiting South Korea’s arms acquisitions. As 
Japan has ‘buck-passed’ parts of its security to the US-Japan alliance while focusing 
on its economic development in the twentieth century (Lind 2004), it is rational for 
South Korea to buck-pass the acquisition of advanced and expensive realms of 
security to reliance on the alliance (Heo and Roehrig 2018; Kang 2006; Kim Jaechun 
2015), while working on economic growth, political liberalization, and also arming 
in other conventional capabilities in the post-Cold War era (Lee Chung Min 2000; 
Park Sun Song 2015; Lee Dong Sun 2007).  
 Although economic considerations continue to be critical variable for South 
Korea’s arms acquisitions, the argument for economic-pragmatism remains 
insufficient for the following grounds. First, economic factors are less static than 
assumed. Depending on the domestic political process, in which threat, security, and 
economic constraints become differently connoted, ‘economic-pragmatism’ can vary 
temporally and spatially across different agents, regimes, and states. Namely, 
Taiwan’s purchase of PAC-3s is exemplary case. With about a quarter of South 
Korea’s defense spending, Taiwan prioritized the weapons “at the expense of other 
capabilities” (Thim and Liao 2017), primarily to arm against China’s continued 
advancements in nuclear and ballistic missiles. Economic constraints have varied 
across regimes, as for instance Roh Moo-hyun administration’s take on the Global 
Hawk. Unlike Lee Myung-bak administration’s decision to postpone the acquisition, 
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Roh administration pushed for Global Hawk despite limited budget as South Korea 
recovered from 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  
Second, economic-pragmatism or strategic buck-passing view can be 
challenged when we come down to the empirical discussions on South Korea’s 
contributions to the ROK-US defense burden sharing. Since 1991, the ROK-US has 
regularly convened for the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) under Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA), which decided the amount of costs covered by South 
Korea to support the US’s military presence on the South Korean soil. Offsetting 
about half of the costs of the USFK since 1991, South Korea has been sharing the 
“labor cost,” spending on interoperable arms under “Combined Defense 
Improvement Program (CDIP),” base construction costs (“Republic of South Korea 
Funded Construction, ROKFC”), and other “logistics cost” of the USFK (Paek Jae-
ok 2017). As exemplary in the case of THAAD, according to statement by General 
Vincent K. Brooks, Commander of UN Command and ROK-US CFC, on April 27, 
2017, the budget provided for USFK activities by South Korea will be “shift[ed] 
towards… THAAD site improvements.” 16  South Korean Ministry of National 
Defense confirmed several times, that the lump sum can be in principle directed for 
the payment in building and deployment of the THAAD, and construction of other 
related infrastructures. 17  Differently put, the US’s deployment of advanced 
                                           
16 Statement of General Vincent K. Brooks Commander, United Nations Command; Testimony before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, on April 27, 2017. 
17 Then Defense Minister Han Min-koo, during National Assembly Special Committee hearing on National 
Budget on July 13, 2016.; again reconfirmed by announcement by Ministry of National Defense on April 
13, 2018. 
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equipment has not been a free-lunch for the South Korean side, Table 1. According to 
former US Ambassador Mark Lippert, South Korea has been covering above 53.6 
percent of USFK’s total non-personnel costs, Table 2 (The Strait Times 2017).  
 
Table 1 South Korea’s Defense Burden Sharing (2002-2018), in 100 million won 
Year Labor Cost Base Constructions* CDIP** Logistics Cost Total 
2002 2,792 (46.7%) 1,398 (24.3%) 604 (12.4%) 574 (16.6%) 6,132 
2003 3,015 (46.2%) 1,627 (27.5%) 667 (11.2%) 603 (15.1%) 6,686 
2004 3,241 (46.4%) 1,944 (31%) 765 (8.4%) 651 (14.2%) 7,469 
2005 2,874 (46.4%) 2,494 (31%) 430 (8.4%) 1,006 (14.2%) 6,804 
2006 2,829 (42.2%) 2,646 (36.7%) 394 (6.3%) 935 (14.8%) 6,804 
2007 2,954 (40.7%) 2,976 (41%) 0 1,325 (18.3%) 7,255 
2008 3,158 (42.6%) 2,642 (35.6%) 0 1,615 (21.8%) 7,415 
Year Labor Cost Base Constructions* Logistics Cost Total 
2009 3,221 (42.4%) 2,922 (38.4%) 1,457 (19.2%) 7,600 
2010 3,320 (42%) 3,158 (40%) 1,426 (18%) 7,904 
2011 3,386 (41.7%) 3,333 (41%) 1,406 (17.3%) 8,125 
2012 3,367 (40.3%) 3,702 (44.3%) 1,302 (15.6%) 8,361 
2013 3,340 (38.4%) 3,850 (44.3%) 1,505 (17.3%) 8,695 
2014 3,430 (37.3%) 4,110 (44.7%) 1,660 (18%) 9,200 
2015 3,490 (37.4%) 4,148 (44.5%) 1,682 (18%) 9,320 
2016 3,630 (38.4%) 4,220 (44.7%) 1,591 (16.9%) 9,441 
2017 3,655 (38.4%) 4,250 (44.7%) 1,602 (16.9%) 9,507 
2018 3,710 (38.6%) 4,442 (46.3%) 1,450 (15.1%) 9,602 
Source: Ministry of Defense; Paek, Jae-ok (2017). 
Note: *Official term is “Republic of South Korea Funded Construction”; **from 1991-2009, Combined 
Defense Improvement Program (CDIP) has been fourth item for South Korea’s defense burden sharing under 
the Special Measures Agreement (SMA). Since 2009, CDIP has been incorporated under base construction 
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category of the budget. 
 
Table 2 ROK-US Defense Burden Sharing, in US$ bil 
 2000 2001 2002 2007 
Total Non-personal  
Stationing Cost (NPSC) 
1.9 2.07 2.11 2.8 
ROK Burden 1.19 (62.6%) 1.12 (54.1%) 1.19 (56.3%) 1.5 (53.6%) 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, US Ministry of Defense “Report on Allied 
Contribution to Common Defense” series. 
 
 More striking comparison can be seen from how Israel’s own arms build-up 
has been exceptionally ‘funded’ by the US. The US has provided Israel with special 
economic and military aid packages for Middle East stabilization throughout the 
post-Cold War era. Beginning with the first ten-year Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) for FY1999-2008, the so-called “Glide Path Agreement” during the Clinton 
administration, a total of $21.3 billion was provided to Israel for military aid, about 
$2.1 billion per year.18 In 2007, the Bush administration also came down to the 
current ongoing thirty billion US dollars military aid package for ten years (FY2009-
2018). As for the terms of agreement, Israel has been permitted to spend up to 26.3% 
of the aid on the US-Israeli joint development and production of arms.19 The most 
                                           
18 See, Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak, July 19, 1999. According to the 
statement, “The United States and Israel will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which will 
express their joint intention to restructure U.S. bilateral assistance to Israel. The MOU will state the United 
States’ intention to sustain its annual military assistance to Israel, and incrementally increase its level by 
one-third over the next decade to a level of $2.4 billion subject to Congressional consultations and 
approval. At the same time, the MOU will provide for a gradual phase-out of U.S. economic aid to Israel, 
over a comparable period, as the Israeli economy grows more robust, less dependent on foreign aid, and 
more integrated in world markets.” 
19 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, August 16, 2007, signed by then US 
Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns and Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General Aaron 
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recent ten-year MOU, signed on September 14, 2016, has earmarked a total of thirty-
eight billion US dollars for FY2019 to FY2028,20 which includes the US’s provision 
of thirty-three US billion dollars of grants in Israel’s arms purchases from the US 
(the Foreign Military Financing grants, FMF) as well as additional five billion US 
dollars explicitly for procuring missile defense programs such as the Iron Dome and 
Arrow Systems (Sharp 2018: 5). South Korea, in other words, appears far more 
‘buck-bearing’ than buck-passing when juxtaposed to the US allies like Israel. 
Third, this dissertation finds that emphasis on South Korea’s budget 
constraints often underestimates the bulk of South Korea’s defense spending. 
Particularly when placed in comparative context, South Korea emerged as the top 
tenth global military spender as of 2018, with $43.1 billion, consecutive to UK 
(seventh largest with $50 billion), Germany (eighth with $49.5 billion), and Japan 
(ninth with $46.6 billion). Countries like Israel with multiple-layers of missile 
defense systems spent far less than South Korea, ranking as the seventeenth spender 
($15.9 billion) on defense in 2018 (SIPRI 2018: 2). In terms of accumulative sum of 
military expenditure from 1990 to 2018, South Korea ranked the eleventh largest 
spender with a total of $746.1 billion, exceeding the amount spent by other US allies 
such as Australia ($509 billion), Israel ($425.5 billion), and Taiwan ($300.5 billion). 
Looking into smaller timeframe of 2000-2017, South Korea again recorded the 
eleventh largest military spender with sum of $563 billion, Table 3, after UK ($975 
                                                                                                                   
Abramovich. 
20 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, September 14, 2016. 
24 
billion, fifth), Japan ($873 billion, sixth), and Germany ($779 billion, ninth), 
allocating about approximately twice as much as Israel ($293 billion) and thrice as 
much as Taiwan ($182.4 billion) since 2000 to 2018.21  
 










1 USA 16,371 1 USA 11,755 1 USA 649 
2 China 2,771 2 China 2,501 2 China 250 




4 UK 1,442 4 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1,027 4 India 66.5 




1,291 6 Japan 873 6 Russia 61.4 
7 Germany 1,260 7 India 824 7 UK 50 
8 India 1,025 8 Russia 811 8 Germany 49.5 
9 Russia 1,016 9 Germany 779 9 Japan 46.6 
10 Italy 913.4 10 Italy 608 10 ROK 43.1 
11 ROK 746.1 11 ROK 563 11 Italy 28.4 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 
Note: in constant (2016) $USD. 
 
In terms of arms procurement budget, that excludes the expenses on military 
personnel and other maintenance and operating costs of the military, South Korea’s 
                                           
21 SIPRI Military Expenditure database. 
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force improvement budget (FIB) came to exceed that of even Japan’s since 2015, as 
seen in Figure 2. South Korea set 11.6 trillion won, twenty percent more than Japan’s 
9.3 trillion won (8,714 million yen) in arming (Chang Won-jun et al. 2018: 23). In 
2017, South Korea secured $11.7 billion for arms procurement, while Japan ($7.9 
billion), Taiwan ($2.9 billion), and Israel (at least $3.3 billion)22 afforded smaller 
procurement budgets. Given such bulks in South Korea’s arms spending, the existing 
explanation on South Korea’s budget constraints remains inadequate in explaining 
why South Korea would be more inclined to ‘buck-pass’ by relying on the weapons 
stationed by the US than acquiring autonomous sets of weapons. 
 
Figure 2 South Korea and Japan’s Arms Procurement (Force Improvement Budget), in US$ bil 
 
Source: For South Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, annual series.; For Japan, 
Ministry of Defense, Defense Programs and Budget of Japan, annual series, reorganized by the author.  
Note: Converted by annual exchange rates, OECD Database.  
                                           
22 US’s aid constitutes about twenty percent of Israel’s defense budget and “almost the entire procurement 
































































2) Structuralist Explanation: Restraint by Resilient Power Asymmetry   
 
Interrelated, another predominant strand of explanation has centered on South 
Korea’s structural constraints, placing emphasis on how the resilient capability gap in 
terms of defense budget and military technologies, as well as the power asymmetry 
in the ROK-US relations, have restrained South Korea’s armaments.  
Dating back to literatures in the 1980s, given the huge asymmetry in security, 
economy, and technological capacity, Baek Kwang-il and Moon Chung-in (1989: 137) 
found it inevitable for South Korea to be “inherently dependent upon and subject to” 
the influence of the US in its arms acquisitions.23 The US’s arms supply and transfer 
of technologies to South Korea were in many occasions limited to “non-leading edge, 
on the verge of being outdated, or at least older” (US General Accounting Office 
1984: 13; US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security 2007: 4-16; 
Wessner 1999: 35), or “granted on the condition that South Korea acquiesces to US 
foreign policy objectives” and abandon “the development of certain weapon systems” 
(Hwang Jin Hwoan 1995: 16) at home to prevent any competition to US’s defense 
industry at home (Baek and Moon 1989; Kim Tae Woo 1995; Hamm Taik-young 
2003a). As Kim Tae-hyung (2010: 519) deliberated on how South Korea’s 
advancements in space technologies have been barred from limited access to the 
US’s space-related technologies, the structural forces seem to continue to determine 
                                           
23 See also, Moon Chung-in and Baek Kwang-il (1985); Park Sun Song (2015); Hamm Taik-young (2003b); 
Kim Jong Ryul (2013). 
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South Korea’s armaments in the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR capabilities. Despite 
South Korea’s emergence as the fourth and eleventh largest economy in Asia and the 
World by 2017, as Lee Yong-dae, former Deputy Minister of Office of Military Force 
and Resources Management, Ministry of National Defense, also stated, the main 
reason why South Korea lacks any competitive ISR capabilities has been due to the 
US’s resilient export control – US’s refusal to sell requested weapons to South 
Korea.24  
While this study concurs with how structural forces continue to be critical 
variable to South Korea’s restrained armaments, particularly in the state-of-the-art 
weapons system, the existing theoretical and empirical dearth of comprehensive 
studies on South Korea’s BMD and ISR capabilities demand clarifications on two 
grounds. First, in cross-national context, how and why have such structural 
constraints and US’s export control per se have different influence on the US allies? 
As Loch Johnson (2008: 64) wrote how the US dominates the military realms with 
“the largest and most expensive intelligence apparatus in the world, indeed in the 
history of humankind,” the US’s structural influence from the absolute gap in 
capabilities and technological superiority has been pervasive, not only to countries 
like South Korea. Despite the US’s monopoly and hegemony in the arms market, 
however, more resource-constrained US allies have nonetheless invested and 
purchased high-tech weapons systems as seen in the case of Israel and Taiwan 
                                           
24 Interview on January 11, 2019. Currently professor in department of defense acquisition program at 
Kwangwoon University, retired Army Major General; former Deputy Minister of Office of Military Force 
and Resources Management, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, from August 2012-January 
2015. 
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discussed above.  
 Second, to what extent are such structural forces constant? An intriguing 
empirical case is again the Global Hawk. Although South Korea’s initial request to 
purchase the Global Hawk during Roh Moo-hyun administration has been denied, the 
US agreed to sell the Global Hawk in the following Lee Myung-bak regime. South 
Korea became the first US ally to be granted the sale of the model.25 Nevertheless, 
the acquisition has been put-off, not because of the US’s export control but the Lee 
administration’s strategic decision to bargain for better deal. The “principle of 
pragmatism” has been important portion of the decision than outright structuralist 
determination, through which South Korea sought to enhance its efficiency in both 
arms spending and allying.26 Park Geun-hye administration ultimately came down 
with the US for final contract in 2014. Yet, the US recently announced that it will 
delay the delivery of two Global Hawks, which were supposed to be handed over by 
latter half of 2018, allegedly to ‘beef-up’ the anti-hacking system. Structural 
constraints have seen ebb and flow over time.  
To further clarify, this study’s take on structural constraints echoes Choi 
Jong-kun and Pyo Seung-jin(2013)’s comparative analysis on fighter-jet acquisition 
patterns of South Korea and Japan. While it is true that more “mutual” and 
“interdependent” relations between the US and Japan have been the key to the US’s 
                                           
25 Interview with Yu Yong-Weon on February 1, 2019, editorial writer and military specialist at the Chosun 
Daily, and chief of Planning and Coordination Department of Korea Defense and Security Forum 
(KODEF). 
26 Interview with Kim Tae-hyo, professor at Sungkyunkwan University, former Senior Presidential Secretary 
for the National Security Strategy Office of President Lee Myung-bak (known as closest aide and architect 
of President Lee Myung-bak overall foreign policy) on January 16, 2019.  
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tendency to grant state-of-the-art sales in fighter-jets, also with “mutually beneficial” 
technology deals, as stated by Hyun In-taek and Dennis P. Patterson (1991: 92-97), 
Choi and Pyo’s work has lended more emphasis on the importance of “interaction” 
between the policies of supplier and recipient states. Although the higher asymmetry 
in the ROK-US relations would make South Korea more vulnerable to hegemonic 
ally’s one-way or trickle-down transfer of the deals, the state’s arms acquisition 
pattern is also determined, however limited, in reflection of the recipient’s approach 
to arms acquisition. The article by Park Hwee-rhak (2018) also compared Japan’s 
“cooperative” and South Korea’s “self-reliant” approach to the US’s BMD as the 
explanatory factor for the two allies’ divergence in BMD capabilities. Rather than 
outright structural determination, convergence or divergence between the two states 
also matters, wherein the actors (recipient/weaker state in the relations) can be less of 




3) Institutional and Constructivist Explanation: Restraint from the 
ROK-US Combined Defense System and Norms  
 
In dispute against both rationalist and structuralist strands of explanations, 
institutionalists and constructivists have argued that the varying arms acquisition 
patterns are of endogenous-making. With emphasis on South Korea’s economic 
growth and relative technological catch-up with considerable arms spending, they 
argued that the resilience of South Korea’s alliance-reliant arms acquisition pattern is 
neither rational nor structural outcome, but the ‘stickiness’ of institutions and norms 
formed within the ROK-US alliance that prolong and reinforce the existing 
parameters of South Korea’s arms choices under the ROK-US alliance.  
Suh Jae-jung (2007), in reference to Robert O. Keohane’s institutionalist 
thesis, After Hegemony (1984), argued that the incentive structure and hierarchy 
created since the forging of the ROK-US alliance have resulted in path-dependence, 
the so-called “alliance asset specificities,” which would make alterations or 
termination of the alliance costly and “produce tendencies and pressures to prolong” 
the existing alliance structure despite changes in power distributions between these 
allies.27 Lee Misook’s study on South Korea’s defense acquisition policy from 1988-
2003 may be also relevant here. In observation of South Korea’s inherent US-reliant 
military strategy, which came with the US’s focus on military support in air and 
                                           
27 Suh Jae-jung (2007: 63-64): “Alliance asset specificity refers to durable investments that are undertaken to 
complete alliance commitments and that would incur higher opportunity cost than best alternative uses or 
alternative users if the original alliance should be terminated.” 
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maritime, Lee Misook (2017) conveyed how South Korea has been less incentivized 
to seek all-round arms build-up. Despite South Korea’s relative improvements in its 
capabilities, the existing shape of the force structure and military strategy have 
reinforced South Korea’s limited priority in advanced weapons system including 
asymmetric capabilities. 
Chang Noh-soon’s thesis directly challenged studies that applied Morrow’s 
autonomy-security tradeoff model. Unlike how Morrow tacitly suggests for more or 
less mutual transactions in the autonomy-security tradeoff, that the traded-off 
autonomy will be returned by commensurate security from the alliance, Chang (1996) 
contended that this has not been the case for South Korea. For South Korea, security 
guaranteed from the alliance has not incurred in proportion, placing South Korea’s 
choices between alliance and armaments bounded to the decisions and strategies of 
their hegemonic ally, the US. Considering South Korea’s enhanced capabilities in the 
post-Cold War era, Chang saw South Korea’s limitations in arming neither the 
rational nor structural outcome, but a manifestation of path-dependent and 
exploitative relations reinforced by both at home and hegemonic US.  
Although such institutionalist approach to the phenomenon has provided 
empirical depth to understanding the ‘internal settings’ of the ROK-US alliance and 
their influence on South Korea’s arms acquisition patterns, the explanations remain 
limited for the following grounds. At the foremost, other US allies have been under 
their own institutional and/or normative constraints alike, as observable in the case of 
Japan. Ranging from the self-imposed one percent GNP ceiling on defense spending, 
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ban on arms exports (1967 Three Principles of Arms Exports, TPAE), and its Peace 
Constitution (Article 9) that restricted Japan’s right to collective self-defense and 
arms build-up in offensive military capabilities, Japan has been placed under 
institutional and legal pressure at home and abroad to limit their armaments under the 
confines of ‘self-defense.’ However, as Gerald Curtis (1993), Kent Calder (1988), 
and Keiko Hirata (2001) have posited that such passivity in armaments has been of 
Japan’s “state strategy” than what Thomas U. Berger (1993; 1998) contended as 
Japan’s “anti-militarist culture,” actors should be perceived as active agents, capable 
of “coping” against existing constraints (Curtis 1993). Although Japan has been 
reluctant for extra-territorial in the postwar years, preferring to focus on economic 
growth, Japan’s rise as economic power and increasing military threats in the region 
have brought the policy leaders to seek incremental changes to expand Japan’s 
regional security role and scope of armaments of their Self-Defense Forces since the 
1990s (Park Cheol Hee 2014; Park Young-june 2014; Akimoto 2018; Arase 2007; 
Easley 2016; Kitaoka 2014). As Japan’s arms build-up preceded with revision of the 
above institutional, legal, and/or normative constraints, including the replacement of 
the TPAE and reinterpretation of the constitution to allow the right to collective self-
defense, it remains a puzzle why the institutional and/or normative effects of the 
ROK-US combined defense system appear to be more resilient in the case of South 
Korea.  
Second, the endogenous-take of the explanation also remains limited in 
detaching from determinism embedded in the structuralist thesis. With the tendency 
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to conceptualize the alliance-related institutions and norms as a kind of ‘substructure,’ 
the actors again become bounded to path-dependent influence of the existing settings. 
Yet, as previous critique on structuralists pointed out, armament decisions of the 
states do not always remain confined to existing ‘settings’ but can vary, although 
limited, along the agents’ considerations for other goals and preferences than 
capability aggregation. More importantly, unlike what the term ‘combined defense 
system’ may have alluded to, the division of labor between South Korean military 
and USFK has not guaranteed seamless combined operation, often excluding for 
instance transfer of sensitive military information acquired from the US’s advanced 
ISR capabilities. Explanations remain limited as for why South Korea remains 
complacent to such institutional effects on capability aggregation.  
While existing studies have deliberated on the constructive workings of 
identities and values of the ROK-US alliance embedded in South Korea’s alliance-
reliant defense posture against North Korea (Chun Chae-sung 2004; Namgung Gon 
2000; Lee Geun and Chun Chae-sung 2001; Kim Ki-Jung 2008; Suh Jae-jung 2007), 
the emphasis on the normative realms cannot account for how previous alliance 
norms have become much in ‘flux’ in the post-Cold War era. With the emergence of 
first progressive regimes in the South Korean government under Kim Dae-jung 
(1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) administrations, more diverse security 
perceptions on North Korea and voices for greater autonomy in the ROK-US alliance 
have come to the fore of domestic politics in South Korea. Although extreme anti-
Americanism remains distant from the majority view, the increasingly vocal and 
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networked NGOs and public have come to persist and call for even withdrawal of the 
US forces and termination of the alliance at the one end of the extreme. Also, the 
ROK-US alliance has been put to significant test and readjustments in the 2000s as 
inauguration of progressive regimes in South Korea increased the wedge between 
how Seoul and Washington viewed the nature of the North Korean threat and 
corresponding strategies (Kim Chung Min 2003). The US’s turn to focus on global 
war on terrorism under President George W. Bush since the 9/11 also ensued with the 
Global Posture Review (GPR) in 2004, pressing for force reduction of the USFK and 
overall adjustments in the ROK-US alliance. When the power transitioned back to 
conservative regime under Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-2013), South 
Korean government pushed for building “comprehensive ROK-US alliance” as 
means to “restore” the ROK-US alliance, extending the scope of the alliance from 
security interests against North Korea to partnership based on shared values of 
“democracy and the market economy” (Kim Sung-han 2009). 
Considering how the post-Cold War could be defined as both South Korea 
and the US’s search for a “new raison d’être” of their bilateral alliance, as Kim 
Jaechun (2015: 34) put, vacillating to the extent of “a marriage closer to a divorce” in 
mid-2000s to again “linchpin” of the US’s Asia Policy in the 2010s according to one 
former US diplomat (Kim Jaechun 2015), alliance norms of the past have been more 
“pliable” (Cho Seong Ryoul 2009) – in flux of changes – than idle enough to cause 
path-dependent effects on how South Korea seeks its armaments.  
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4) Military-industrial Complex: Restrained by Vested Interests of a Few 
 
Last but not least is the thesis on military-industrial complex. In an enclosed 
oligopolistic, if not monopolistic nature of defense industry where the invisible hand 
of free market remains absent (Gansler 1980), Jeong Wook-sik, Kim Jong-dae, and 
others have elaborated on how South Korea’s arming has been rampant with 
corruption. It is neither South Korea’s efforts for the most efficient form of security, 
nor the struggles to escape from the path-dependent structural constraints as a non-
major power and late defense-industrializing state, but rent-seeking and irrational 
decisions of key executives (Bae Young-Il 2012), militaries (Sohn Ho-Chul 1987; 
Bae Young-Il 2012), and defense industries (Suh Jae-jung 2009: 105), especially 
those of the US’s defense industries (Hamm Taik-young 1998: 338), that maneuver 
the decisions in arming (Chung Sang Hwa 1993). South Korea’s fighter-jet 
acquisitions, one of the most consistent and regular big-ticket items South Korea 
procured from the US, were most extensively discussed in the corruption and bribery 
literatures (Kim Chul Hwan 2000; Suh Jae-jung 2009; Moon Kyu Hyeon 2003). 
Critics on missile defense systems have been particularly pronounced in 
their contentions that South Korea’s investments in missile defense assets are in 
foundation driven by the military-industrial complex forged between South Korean 
military and the US’s defense industries. Theodore A. Postol, Emeritus Professor at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), has been highly critical of the 
interceptive technologies of Patriot missile defense systems and THAAD, that the 
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US’s defense industries, in collusion with the US government and the counterparts in 
the allied countries, are generating the “myth” of missile defense. Postol argued that 
in real contingencies, the probability of the missile defense system is as low as 
“hitting an incoming bullet with another.”28 In similar context, Jeong Wook-sik 
(2015a; 2015b; 2017) and Kim Jong-dae of the progressive Justice Party, both 
longtime experts and civil activists in unveiling military affairs of South Korea, 
argued that South Korea has been ‘squandering’ the defense budget by selling the 
“myth” of interceptive technologies for private interests of a few (Kim Jong-dae and 
Jeong Wook-sik 2014).  
While this dissertation does not seek to repute the irrational realms of 
armament decisions as deliberated by the literatures on military-industrial complex 
and corruption, the explanations remain inadequate on the following grounds. First, 
given the non-market nature of all arms transactions, monographic explanation on 
South Korea’s case of military-industrial complex overlooks the covert deals and 
collusions rampant in arms transactions between the US and its other allies (Hartung 
2001; Hirose 1989). Also, while narrow self-interests of few may distort South 
Korea’s armaments, covert transactions have been the essence of how countries like 
Israel became, as Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot (2017) put, the “Weapon Wizards,” 
capable of producing both advanced asymmetric and conventional military 
capabilities at home. Second, although much has been debated on the actual 
                                           
28 Interview with Theodore A. Postol, Emeritus Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security 
Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 3, 2016. 
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effectiveness of national missile defense system, not only South Korea but other 
advanced countries around the globe have transitioned to missile defense as their 
indispensable deterrence measure against asymmetric nuclear and missile threats. 
Especially when the states’ military capabilities are less credible, studies have found 
that regardless of the performance of the system, the acquisition of national missile 
defense systems works to enhance states’ deterrence against adversaries as the 
capabilities work to make these states’ commitment in retaliatory actions against 
attacks from the adversaries “more credible” (Quackenbush 2006: 540). Furthermore, 
while military-industrial complex may be the “internal drivers” for some individual 
cases, the explanation falls short of representing the overall trajectory in South 
Korea’s arms acquisition patterns, given the institutional monitoring and audit 





5) Gaps to Fill: Variation in Rationality in BMD and ISR Acquisitions in 
Cross-national and Cross-regime Context  
 
Although the above existing explanations hold significant explanatory weight of their 
own, this study finds that South Korea’s armaments, particularly in the state-of-the-
art BMD and ISR weapons system, have been overshadowed by two monolithic 
conventions. First is a tinge of exceptionalism embedded in conceptualizing South 
Korea’s arms acquisition pattern, arising from the thicket of literatures that explore 
the historical origin, transformation, and distinctive attributes of the ROK-US 
alliance. South Korea’s threat environment and geopolitical dynamics of the Korean 
Peninsula, in which the “brothers” of same ethnic roots – North Korea – have 
persisted as the contested subject for both rivalry and reconciliation (Kim Sung-han 
2003), South Korea’s armaments tended to be a distinctive case for monographic 
analysis than comparison.  
Interrelated, given the dearth of comprehensive cross-national comparison, 
the dominant rationalist explanation, for instance, has been inclined to perceive a 
kind of ‘single’ or ‘unilateral’ model of rationality among states, that their choices for 
allying and arming are inherently driven by their cost-benefit calculations for power-
maximization. However, as seen in the case of South Korea’s BMD and ISR 
acquisitions, the alliance and armament have not necessarily added up, nor provided 
the most efficient response to the given threats. Although the autonomy-security 
tradeoff model genuinely emphasizes the significance to look into the domestic 
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political process, in which agents and their preferences form and change, the existing 
literatures’ application of the model have not fully exploited the notion that the states’ 
pursuit for armaments can be more conditional to the domestic agents and contexts.  
The structuralists, institutionalists, and constructivists have highlighted 
South Korea’s arms acquisition to be bounded and/or reflective of existing structures. 
But as empirical observations illustrate, the structural, institutional, or normative 
effects had varying influences on the US allies and also across different time periods 
in South Korea. Rigorous empirical analysis into South Korea and other US allies’ 
calculation of both “political and economic” costs and benefits of alliance and 
armament is required to capture the variations in the states’ rationalities in arming.  
Second major convention in studying South Korea’s armaments is the so-
called “conservative-progressive split” in perceiving the domestic political landscape 
of South Korea. While empirical studies on South Korea’s armaments remain thin in 
addressing the two ten-year intervals of power transitions between progressive and 
conservative regimes since 1998, the opposite political orientations on North Korea 
and the ROK-US alliance tend to be both implicitly and explicitly treated as 
underlying sources of South Korea’s limited armaments. Differently put, uncharted 
area in the above existing studies is analysis on comprehensive temporal variations in 
South Korea’s arms acquisition pattern. Although cross-regime analysis has been a 
widely attended theme in defense reform studies (Lee Geunwook 2008; Park Hwee-
rhak 2009; Noh Hoon 2012; Park Chang Kwoun 2012; Kim Tae-hyo 2013; Kim 
Yeoul Soo 2018), analysis on arms acquisition patterns of administrations has been 
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remote. The most recent cross-regime and -temporal study has been Lee Misook’s 
article (2017), comparing defense acquisition policies of South Korean regimes from 
Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993), Kim Young-sam (1993-1998), to Kim Dae-jung 
administration (1998-2003). This is a significant empirical gap, considering how 
South Korea went through its first power transfers to progressive regimes under Kim 
Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) administrations, known for 
more reconciliatory take on North Korea and emphasis on autonomous defense 
posture. As the power transitioned back to conservative regimes under Lee Myung-
bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2016) administrations, South Korean 
government rebounded to more hardlined policy on North Korea and pro-alliance 
stance in capability aggregation. Despite such opposite political orientations along 
the “conservative-progressive split” (Chae and Kim 2008; Snyder 2017; Shin and 
Burke 2008), it remains unaccounted how restrained armaments in autonomous BMD 
and ISR capabilities have been more of continuity than change in South Korea. 
This study aims to provide comprehensive cross-national and cross-regime 
comparison on South Korea’s BMD and ISR acquisitions in response to increasing 




3. Main Argument  
 
This study argues that South Korea’s restrained armaments in the autonomous BMD 
and ISR capabilities is accumulated complacency from policy leaders’ recurrent 
choice for alliance-reliance in the state-of-the-art weapons system.  
To begin from theoretical elaboration, this study brings in neoclassical 
realism as the theoretical underpinning of this research. Stripped to the essence, 
neoclassical realism is what Ira Katznelson and Barry R. Weingast (2005), and Park 
Cheol Hee (1998) would call a ‘situated rationalist’ approach to states’ armaments, in 
which variation in states’ arming becomes more conditional to how external threats 
become filtered through policy leaders’ perception and their domestic contexts (Rose 
1998; Schweller 2004; 2006; Taliaferro 2006). While systemic imperatives remain 
primary forces in driving states’ arms build-up, states’ armaments can be inflated 
and/or abated, ‘situational’ to policy leaders’ perceived realities in neoclassical 
realism.  
Unlike the existing literatures’ portrayal that South Korea’s restraint arises 
from the given structures, institutions, and norms under the ROK-US alliance, this 
study, in application of the theory, seeks to attenuate such deterministic or 
exceptionalist treatment of South Korean case. Placing South Korea in a cross-
national context to other US allies including Japan, Taiwan, UK, and Germany, this 
study argues that South Korea’s relative restraint in autonomous armaments in the 
BMD and ISR capabilities arises from policy leaders’ accumulated state-strategies in 
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reinforcing the alliance-reliance in the state-of-the-art weapons system. As North 
Korea’s emergence as de facto nuclear power aggravated South Korea’s reliance on 
asymmetric division of force structure with the US (alliance structure), the vacillating 
threat perception on North Korea and armament priorities in lower-cost offensive 
strike capabilities in both progressive and conservative regimes reinforced South 
Korea’s confinement to alliance-reliant armaments in the BMD and ISR.   
 
Accumulated Complacency for Alliance-reliant Armaments 
 
To elaborate, despite North Korea’s increasing asymmetric threats, the asymmetry in 
force structure – the division of labor – between the South Korean military and the 
USFK presided in shaping the overall parameters of policy leaders’ armament 
choices in the BMD and ISR. Although the US’s force reduction in the 2000s along 
the GPR and agreement to transfer wartime OPCON to South Korea signaled 
possible attenuation of asymmetry in the force structure as South Korean government 
pledged for all-round arms build-up including the BMD and ISR, reescalation of 
North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities since the late 2000s and repeated 
postponement of OPCON transfers reinstated overall asymmetry in the force 
structure between the US and South Korean military. Under the resilient influence 
from the structural factors, South Korean policy leaders’ domestic fragmentation on 
the imminence of North Korea’s asymmetric threats, increasing political 
consideration arising from the pull between the US and China, inter-Korean 
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reconciliation, and other national agendas at home reinforced South Korea’s limited 
investments in the BMD and ISR capabilities. Considerations of the ROK-PRC 
relations, particularly in the realms of the BMD, further refracted South Korea 
towards alliance-reliance than autonomous armaments in the economically and 
politically thorny BMD and ISR, Figure 3.  
 






Preference of Incumbent Policy Leaders under Structural Influences  
 
In cross-regime context, this study disconfirms the conventional view that the 
progressive and conservative regimes’ arms choices have been ‘split’ and ‘sharply 
divided,’ particularly when it comes to the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR weapons 
system. While progressive regimes have been deemed more reconciliatory to North 
Korea and seek more autonomous policy towards armament and alliance-reliance, 
when conservatives were seen as more hardlined to North Korea, favorable to pro-
alliance armaments as means for security, ideological divide mattered less when it 
came to the BMD and ISR capabilities. 
Although such ideological/policy differences did alter the government’s 
armament goals in the BMD and ISR at the outset of the administration, both 
progressive and conservative regimes recurred to reliance on the ROK-US combined 
defense system in BMD and ISR, while maintaining restrained growth in self-reliant 
capabilities. Such continuity arose from how both progressives and conservatives 
regardless of policy differences, preferred lower-cost, possibly homegrown, offensive 
missiles and strike capabilities that were seen as adequate in deterring North Korea’s 
asymmetric threats in addition to their shared premise of the US’s continued military 
presence. Both progressive and conservative regimes looked out for political 
connotations of their armament choices (pull between alliance-revisionist versus pro-
alliance) between China and the US, and also at home for regime stability. Also, 
North Korea’s repeated escalation of threats worked as common pull factor to the 
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ROK-US combined defense system.  
 
Figure 4 Summary of Cross-regime Comparison 
 
 
While progressive regimes under Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-
hyun (2003-2008) administrations have taken more reconciliatory approach to North 
Korea’s asymmetric threats and emphasis on self-reliance in armaments, the 
progressive regimes have been situationally induced, however “reluctant,” to resume 
to alliance-reliant armaments in the BMD and ISR capabilities. When power 
transferred back to conservative regimes under Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and 
Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) administrations, North Korea’s rapid increases in 
asymmetric threats have restored pro-alliance or alliance-reliant proclivity in 
armaments, reinforcing South Korea’s restrained armament in autonomous BMD and 
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ISR capabilities. Punctuated with economic crisis, ebb and flow in North Korea’s 
asymmetric provocations, caught in between the increasingly contentious US-China 
rivalry in the region, continuity than change can be found in arming in the lower-cost, 
possibly homegrown, offensive missiles and conventional strike capabilities. Neither 
progressive and conservative governments have pursued armaments beyond the 
structural influences from asymmetric capability gap with North Korea and resilient 




4. Composition of Research 
 
The study is structured into three main chapters.  
Chapter II focuses on constructing cross-national and cross-regime 
comparative frameworks to explain South Korea’s relative restraint in autonomous 
armaments in the BMD and ISR capabilities. Putting forth neoclassical realism and 
situated rationality as major theoretical underpinning of this research, the study posits 
that while asymmetric threat level and alliance structure with the US are the primary 
structural (independent) variables, policy leaders’ varying perceived threat level 
(threat perception) and arms acquisition policy (self-reliant versus alliance-reliant) 
become central intervening variables in abating/inflating the structural influences. To 
further delve into South Korea’s cross-regime continuity and/or change in BMD and 
ISR acquisitions, the chapter further sets to specify the intervening variables for 
cross-regime comparisons – to the regime’s North Korea policy (reconciliatory 
versus rivalry) and arms acquisition policy (self-reliant versus alliance-reliant).  
In application of the cross-national framework, Chapter III centers on 
empirical contextualization of South Korea’s arms acquisition pattern in cross-
national context. Section 1 elaborates on Japan, Taiwan, UK, and Germany cases, in 
which varying level of asymmetric threats and alliance structure, intervened by 
policy leaders’ threat perception and armament priorities (political and economic 
considerations) led to divergent, non-linear arms acquisitions in the BMD and ISR 
assets. Section 2 focuses on South Korea, bringing out contrasts and similarities 
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between South Korea and other US allies’ arming in the BMD and ISR assets. 
Section 3 summarizes main findings of the chapter. 
 Chapter IV of the dissertation delves into cross-regime comparison on South 
Korea’s arms acquisition pattern in the BMD and ISR weapons system. Despite 
North Korea’s continued advancements in the asymmetric nuclear and ballistic 
missile capabilities, each chapter traces chronologically on how South Korean policy 
leaders under progressive and conservative regimes have vacillated on North Korea 
policy but recurred to armament choices that reinforce alliance-reliance in the state-
of-the-art BMD and ISR capabilities. Section 1 begins from Kim Dae-jung 
administration, Section 2 looks into Roh Moo-hyun administration. Section 3 and 4 
discusses the two conservative regimes – Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye 
administration – respectively. Section 5 surmises how South Korean policy leaders’ 
vacillation over North Korea and armament strategy across the ten-year intervals of 
progressive and conservative regimes since 1998 have accumulated to overall 
complacency to alliance-reliance than autonomous armaments in the BMD and ISR 
capabilities. 
 Chapter V concludes with summary of findings and implications of the 




II. ANALYTICAL INNOVATION 
 
 
1. Bringing Realism Back In Neoclassical Realism:  
Situated Rationality for Capability Aggregation  
 
This study brings neoclassical realism as major theoretical underpinning of this 
research. As one of the theoretical strands to understanding international relations, 
neoclassical realism posits that variation in states’ armaments against external threats 
emerges from how such systemic imperatives become filtered through policy leaders’ 
perception and domestic contexts (Rose 1998). The theory becomes particularly 
useful in contextualizing South Korea’s restraint in armaments in both cross-national 
and cross-regime dimensions, as the theory emerged in efforts to explain why states 
do not seek power-maximization as the “highest end,” as stipulated by traditional 
structural realists (Waltz 1979),29 but “underbalance” and vary in their responses to 
external security imperatives (Schweller 2004; 2006).30 Reincorporating classical 
realists’ observations on domestic unit-level variables, neoclassical realists contend 
that while the anarchic structure of the international system remains primary in 
                                           
29 For critique on how structural realism is limited in explaining state behaviors in the international system, 
see, Paul Schroeder (1994); Barry Buzan (1996); Richard Ned Lebow (1994). 
30 Neoclassical realists which explored how domestic factors intervene include Gideon Rose, who first 
labelled the term “neoclassical realism,” as well as Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, 
Brian Rathbun, etc., see Rose (1998); Taliaferro (2006); Lobell et al. (2009); Rathbun (2008). Before 
earning the appellation, Stephen M. Walt (1998), Fareed Zakaria (1992), Jack L. Snyder (1991) and others 
have written seminal articles on realism and domestic politics. 
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shaping states’ disposition for power (capability aggregation), domestic agents and 
processes come to intervene differently, “act[ing] as the final arbiter for state survival 
within the anarchic environment[emphasis added]” (Sterling-Folker 1997: 7).  
 Yet, as Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik’s article (1999), “Is 
Anybody Still a Realist,” has been one of the most profound critiques on the theory, 
the main drawback of previous neoclassical realist literatures has been that the 
‘unblackboxing’ of the state often tended to lose the realists’ core premise that the 
structure (systemic variables) determines the state behaviors. Elucidating on the 
domestic processes and agents, as well as epistemic variables that seemed to be 
reserved only for liberalism and constructivism, neoclassical realists have befallen to 
the trap of treating the domestic factors as independent than intervening variables in 
analysis.31  
Nonetheless, finding critical theoretical and empirical merits in constructing 
comprehensive understanding of variations in state behaviors, particularly in the 
states’ choices between alliance and armament, this section of the dissertation aims to 
build upon Legro and Moravcsik’s critique (1999), critically review existing 
neoclassical literatures, and thereby bring back ‘realism’ to neoclassical realism.  
Shortly put, Legro and Moravcsik (1999: 28) found that neoclassical realists’ 
emphasis on the domestic context have turned the theory “indistinguishable” from 
other non-realist theories.32 Differently put, Legro and Moravcsik saw that this new 
                                           
31 An exemplary case, in which, the emphasis on domestic context appears to overpower neoclassical realists’ 
original intention in linking structural/systemic variables to domestic variables, see Yoo Hyon Joo (2012). 
32 Legro and Moravcsik (1999: 23) also wrote, “Such explanations inevitably import consideration of 
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strand of realism has ‘self-negated’ the core assumptions of realism: While realism 
purports that 1) states are rational and unitary actors in anarchy, 2) with “fixed” and 
“uniform” preferences for power, and that 3) state behaviors are reflective of their 
material capabilities (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 12-18), neoclassical realism has 
“flatly violate[d]” the latter two premises (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 19). By 
exploring too much of the domestic politics, the neoclassical realists ended up 
becoming what Fareed Zakaria would call “a restatement of the traditional 
Innenpolitik case” (Zakaria 1992: 178), “only mudd[ying]” the theoretical boundaries 
of realism (1999: 50).  
However, as Mark R. Brawley (2017) distinguished the differences between 
neoclassical realism and other non-realist theories, this study finds that the merits of 
neoclassical realism can be revived when analysis can be redesigned under which the 
direction of causality is clarified in linking the structural variables to domestic unit-
level variables. Brawley (2017), in brief, argued that the analytical reasoning of 
neoclassical realism begins from ‘constructing an understanding of the external 
environment.’ It is therefore distinctive from the liberalists’ “bottom-up” approach, 
which seeks to understand the “individuals” (Brawley 2017) first, “taking their 
preferences seriously” (Moravcsik 1997), and seeing the international relations as 
outcome of how endogenously constructed preferences are transmitted “up” to the 
international stage. Neoclassical realists, in contrast, perceive state behaviors to be 
                                                                                                                   
exogenous variation in the societal and cultural sources of state preferences, thereby sacrificing both the 
coherence of realism and appropriating midrange theories of interstate conflict based on liberal 
assumptions.” 
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dependent on how systemic imperatives become transmitted “down” to the domestic 
context, especially when it comes to “amass[ing] the resources” at home to meet 
changes in the international environment (Brawley 2017). In this way, the 
“theoretical core,” which Legro and Moravcsik rightfully pointed out to have been 
lost in neoclassical realism can be brought back to the theory. 
Additionally, I find denying the merits of neoclassical realism for ‘easing’ 
the old premises fails to appreciate how realist and non-realist paradigms have 
influenced and refined each other to better grasp the empirical reality. The blurring of 
theoretical distinctiveness is caused, at least partially, by how inherent power-
centrism of realism has come to permeate other theoretical disciplines. As J. Samuel 
Barkin’s treatise on “Realist Constructivism” (2003) has found overarching 
compatibilities between constructivism and realism, realists’ tendency to reduce 
states to be driven by structural and materialist concerns has become common in non-
realist traditions, particularly when it comes to discussions on power and security. 
States’ rationality for “traditional geopolitical” conception of power (Larson and 
Shevchenko 2010) has frequently “smuggled back” more than often in the topics of 
armaments (Jo Bee Yun 2016).  
The essential merits of neoclassical realism lie in abating realists’ rigidity in 
depicting states to be constantly driven by their rational interests for power-
maximization (capability aggregation). By looking into domestic agents while 
upholding realist emphasis on anarchy and states’ concerns on security, states’ 
rationality for capability aggregation has become more situational in neoclassical 
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realism.33 
In other words, neoclassical realism advances the realist paradigm towards 
what I would call a model of “situated rationality” for capability aggregation. 
Although the Waltzian strand of structural realism has been, as Miles Kahler put, 
“ambiguous” on state’s rationality as their emphasis on structure made the 
discussions on “rationality of agents see[m] superfluous” (Kahler 1998: 925), realism 
has generally portrayed the states to be rational and unitary actors with fixed interests 
for power (capability aggregation). Therefore, while states’ underbalancing in 
structural realism, would be ‘irrational,’ neoclassical realists’ exploration into states’ 
key agents and their circumstances now enables the realist paradigm to see states’ 
balancing to be, as how Ira Katznelson, Barry R. Weingast, and Park Cheol Hee 
would describe, more “situationally induced” (Katnelson and Weingast 2005: 4) and 
“defined” (Park Cheol Hee 1998: 59). With focus on how agents’ particular 
preferences, their considerations for domestic politics and societal relations (e.g. 
regime stability) can intervene, states’ rationality for armaments (capability 
aggregation) against exogenous threats becomes situational in neoclassical realism, 
which does not necessarily adhere to “cool-headed, cost-benefit calculations” for 
power-maximization (Morgan 2003: 12-13).  
The notion of “situated rationality” originates from the debate between 
                                           
33 Colin Duek(2009: 272)’s description nicely surmises the point: “A neoclassical realist model begins by 
positing that state officials inevitably have some conception of the national interest in the face of potential 
external threats… The anarchic condition of the international arena forces states to pay close attention to 
their security… domestic political or second image causes can have a powerful impact on patterns… 
shaping or skewing foreign policy choices…”  
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rational-choice theorists and historical institutionalism, which diverged in their 
position on preference formation in social science. Yet, as the neoclassical realism 
has begun to pay attention to the preferences and perception of key elites and 
decision-makers, intriguing parallels could be drawn from the discussions. The 
rational-choice theorists have argued that actors are driven by preferences that are 
exogenously given (such as power in traditional realism), while historical 
institutionalists disputed the view that actors’ preferences are of historical and social 
constructs. However, as the rational-choice theorists have begun to attend for 
“historical and institutional processes” in understanding actors’ preferences, while 
historical institutionalists on how preferences can be exogenously induced, there 
emerged some convergence between the two schools. The rational-choice theorists, 
in particular, according to Katznelson and Weingast (2005: 8), have become “far 
more empirical, conditional, and situational in deploying preferences,” placing them 
in context of “interaction with other actors.” As a kind of third approach to the debate, 
“situated rationality” emerged upon such cross-fertilization of the two schools, in 
which the actors become no longer confined to exogenously given (rational-choice) 
nor endogenously constructed (historical institutionalism) imperatives, but, as Park 
Cheol Hee (1998: 60) put, decide their actions under “perceived realities, available 
alternatives, mobilizable resources, and embedded relationships.”  
Neoclassical realist discussions have been explicitly resonant of such 
‘situated’ approach, portraying states’ internal balancing (armaments) to be 
contingent to the elites’ perceived external vulnerabilities and diverse political, 
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economic, and social considerations at home. Randall L. Schweller’s elite 
cohesion/fragmentation model (2004: 164), for instance, argued that variations in 
states’ response to external threats become situational to policy leaders’ threat 
perception and how they “weigh the likely domestic costs[emphasis added] of 
balancing behavior against the alternative means available to them[emphasis added].” 
The level of elites’ consensus on threat perception and internal cohesion in domestic 
politics would be, therefore, important, for they would grant lesser political and 
social oppositions or constraints at home (what Schweller calls “mobilization hurdles” 
or “domestic costs”) in implementing preferred security policies to address the 
threats. The higher the division among policy elites on “how to respond to the threat” 
(Schweller 2004: 170), the more constrained the state would be in putting forth 
effective internal balancing measures in meeting external security imperatives, and 
vice versa. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro’s resource-extractive state model (2006) also 
similarly argued that the “types of internal balancing strategies” are shaped by “the 
relative ability of the state to extract or mobilize resources” – “the extraction and 
mobilization capacity” – as well as the sense of “external vulnerability.”  
All in all, in accounting for cross-national and cross-regime comparison on 
South Korea’s arms acquisition patterns, the theoretical merit of neoclassical realism 
lies in retaining traditional realists’ attention to the external conditions, while 
accounting for domestic contexts and agents, which allows observations than 
blackbox how their primacy in security concerns (pursuit for capability aggregation 
against systemic imperatives) can be more ‘situationally induced.’ Under systemic 
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imperatives, how the domestic agents “perceive” their realities and weigh the costs of 
armaments can reinforce and/or abate the structural influences in determining the 
states’ decisions – the foundation to why states overbalance and underbalance against 
threats, Figure 5.  
 






2. Analytical Framework 
 
1) For Cross-national Comparison 
 
In light of neoclassical realism and situated rationality, this study posits that the 
variation in the US allies’ arming in the BMD and ISR sectors can be distinguished 
along how increasing asymmetric threats and alliance structure with the US – two 
independent variables – become filtered by two central intervening variables – policy 
leaders’ threat perception (threat imminence or latency from nuclear and ballistic 
missile capabilities) and their arms acquisition policy (alliance-reliant or -parallel 
armament), Figure 6. While independent structural variables would predominate 
states’ armaments in the BMD and ISR, further variations within the US allies would 
arise from how states’ domestic contexts divert the structural forces.  
 





(1) Independent Variable (1): Asymmetric Threats 
Increases in asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile threats from rivaling 
powers are foundational stimuli to the states’ armaments in the BMD and ISR. 
Defining the asymmetric threats to be derivative of the rivaling powers’ qualitative 
and quantitative increases in asymmetric capabilities and frequency of nuclear and 
ballistic missile tests, this study posits that the US allies’ armaments in the BMD and 
ISR are contingent to the increasing level of asymmetric threats. Although the 
proposition does not dispute how the perceptual realms can inflate and/or deflate the 
given threat levels (Jervis 1976; Rathjens 1969), this study adheres to McNamara 
(1967) earlier conclusion that “Whatever their intentions or our intentions, actions” – 
offensive or defensive – “on either side relating to the buildup of nuclear forces 
necessarily trigger reactions on the other side” (Freedman 1981). Also, in reference 
to extensive studies on states’ military expenditures and arms race, this study posits 
that states’ threat levels are also determined by the relative balance in the number of 
deployed weapons (Ward 1984) and military expenditures of the adversary, as well as 
states’ ‘grievances’ on the adversary (Richardson 1960). Depending on the number 
and quality of deployed/deployable nuclear warheads and missiles, heightened by the 
number of nuclear and missile tests, overall gap in military balance and expenditures, 
the US allies’ external threat environment will be distinguished into ‘immediate’ to 




(2) Independent Variable (2): Alliance Structure 
Another determining independent variable for the US allies’ variations in the 
BMD and ISR capabilities is the level of symmetry or asymmetry in the force 
structure embedded in the alliance – between the state’s own military and their 
reliance on the US-stationed or US-deployable weapons system. Among South Korea, 
Japan, and Taiwan, for instance, in response to North Korea and/or China’s 
modernizations in asymmetric ballistic missiles, the states’ varying level of 
autonomous defense capabilities and the US’s security provisions – the “division of 
labor” (Park Hwee-rhak 2016d) – set the parameters of armaments in the state-of-the-
art BMD and ISR. Although both South Korea and Japan’s security postures include 
the US’s military presence and stationing of advanced weapons system, South Korea 
has maintained more asymmetric force structure under the ROK-US combined 
defense system. Aside from the wartime OPCON of South Korean military 
maintained under the US’s leadership, South Korea also relied on the US’s extended 
nuclear deterrence, provision of advanced satellite and reconnaissance capabilities, 
stationing and/or rotational deployment of advanced air and maritime weapons 
system, while prioritizing armaments in conventional ground forces, human 
intelligence (HUMINT), and strike capabilities including the missiles. Although 
North Korea’s increasing asymmetric threats would push for arms build-up in the 
BMD and ISR, such asymmetric division of labor would create path-dependent 
influence on reinforcing the policy leaders’ priorities in expanding the range and 
qualities of missiles and other strike capabilities per se, while relaying the advanced 
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BMD and ISR tasks to the USFK.  
Japan, in contrast, has maintained more parallel or symmetric division of 
labor. Without the joint operational command structure found in the case of South 
Korea (and also within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO), Japan’s 
conventional self-defense forces have very much accumulated to parallel armaments 
to the USFJ. While Japan has also relayed nuclear deterrence to the US’s provision of 
nuclear umbrella, symmetricity between Japan and the US-stationed weapons system 
is higher than the South Korean case. Such symmetricity would shape the policy 
leaders’ level of armaments in the BMD and ISR.  
Taiwan, without formal treaty alliance nor US’s military presence on its soil, 
cannot but be impelled to seek more symmetric force structure. Despite resource 
constraints to about a quarter of South Korea’s defense budget, the absence of formal 
agreement or explicit institutionalization of division of labor between the ROC and 
US forces would compel Taiwan towards more active armaments.  
As Loch Johnson (2008) wrote, the US dominates the military ventures with 
“the largest and most expensive [apparatuses] in the history of humankind.” Under 
the so-called “autarky-efficiency dilemma” (Moravcsik 1991), ‘self-sufficiency,’ 
‘self-reliance,’ or ‘autarky’ in armaments – the ability to “procure and produce 
domestically quantities and qualities of military supplies, raw materials, and 
equipment” (Esper 1969: 185-186) – has been rare except for very few first-tier arms 
producers like the US (Krause 1992; Harkavy 1975). Alliance-reliance, although with 
varying degrees, has thus been indispensable to the US allies. Yet, the given 
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symmetry/asymmetry in the division of labor would set the initial parameters of 
policy leaders’ armament choices and priorities. 
 
(3) Intervening Variable (1): Policy Leaders’ Threat Perception  
While the above two structural variables would predominate the US allies’ 
armament patterns in the BMD and ISR, the anomalies or variations would arise 
from, first of all, how the policy leaders perceive the given threats. This first 
intervening variable is adopted from neoclassical realism’s main tenet that the 
changes in the external environment are “filtered” through domestic elites/policy 
leaders – how the systemic imperatives are conceived as ‘imminent’ versus ‘latent.’ 
The higher the threat imminence perceived, as Taliaferro (2006) put, the more policy 
leaders would be interested in seeking armaments. The threat perception may not 
necessarily correlate with actual increases or decreases in rivaling powers’ 
asymmetric capabilities and provocations. To befit the analysis, this dissertation 
defines and categorizes policy leaders’ threat perception on adversary’s asymmetric 
nuclear and ballistic missiles, as the following, Table 4:  
 
Table 4 Cross-national Intervening Variable (1): Policy Leaders’ Threat Perception 
Policy Leaders’  
Threat Perception 
Definition 
Imminent Threat Perception 
Policy leaders perceive that the rivaling powers’ increasing 
asymmetric capabilities are direct threat to the state 
Latent Threat Perception 
Policy leaders does not recognize specific entity/states’ 
increasing asymmetric capabilities as direct threat to the state 
 
62 
Furthermore, distinguishing from previous neoclassical realist literatures, 
‘policy leaders’ in this study refers precisely to the executive branch – the political 
executives including presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, and ministers 
(Bach 2018). The main rationale is that the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR assets 
demand comparatively astronomical amount of resource mobilization and allocation 
– one of the so-called ‘flagship policy areas’ of the government, in which the 
motivation and interests of executives become pivotal in the implementation. 
Although shorter time-horizon and limited policy expertise would make executives 
responsive to the preferences of bureaucrats, militaries, and other relevant 
government organizations (Bach and Wegrich 2018; Okimoto 1990; Lodge and 
Wegrich 2014; Aberbach et al. 1981; Scharpf 1994), executives’ ability to elect and 
replace top officials of the organizations tends to ensure the executives’ final say in 
major policy agendas (Dahlstroem et al. 2011; Rudalevige 2009; Peters and Pierre 
2004; Hollibaugh et al. 2014). Presidents are particularly dominant, notwithstanding 
power and influence from the national assembly or congress (Trimble 1989: 752), 
especially during “times of war or national emergency [wherein] the executive 
branch tends to eclipse the legislature” (Masters 2017). Furthermore, as agents with 
the most stake in maintaining regime stability or survival, the interlinkage between 
policy leaders’ conception of external environment and domestic conditions can be 
elucidated by looking into the executive leadership. As Lobell (2009) narrowed down 
to the foreign policy executives in accounting for variation in states’ foreign policies, 
the process of how leaders, “especially vulnerable ones, cannot simply choose 
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security policies” but have to consider the “costs attached to the policy options,” as 
Schweller (2004: 174) mentioned, can be better accounted by zooming down to the 
executive branch.  
 
(4) Intervening Variable (2): Policy Leaders’ Arms Acquisition Policy  
The second intervening variable in determining the US allies’ arming in the 
BMD and ISR sectors is the policy leaders’ varying arms acquisition policy. Building 
upon the notion of “resource-extractive capacity” from the neoclassical realist 
literatures, which depict states’ armaments to be situational to policy leaders’ relative 
capacity to extract/mobilize resources at home against diverse domestic constraints 
(political, economic, and social constraints) or what Yoo Hyon Joo (2012: 326-327) 
calls “domestic hurdles,” this study argues that the states’ pursuit for BMD and ISR 
armaments can be influenced by the policy leaders’ varying resource-extractive 
capacity to ‘self-reliant’ versus ‘alliance-reliant’ arms acquisitions.34  
Although complete self-reliance in the BMD and ISR capabilities is hardly 
plausible, given the long lead time and exponential costs required in arms 
procurement, the underlying rationale is that the pursuit for ‘self-reliance’ has been 
important competing value for policy leaders among the US allies. In the realms of 
security, policy leaders have been drawn to the security benefits of reducing states’ 
exposure to alliance-reliance that come with diverse concessions and demands from 
                                           
34 Although the topic of analysis is different, the distinction made between South Korea’s “self-reliant” to 
Japan’s “cooperative” approach to the US’s BMD system by Park Hwee-rhak (2018) was important for 
refining the framework.  
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the alliance. Also, as Srdjan Vucetic and Atsushi Tago (2014) intriguingly noted, the 
pursuit for self-reliance in armaments has emerged as important political assets for 
policy leaders. Although expensive arms procurement decisions have always carried 
“political controversy,” “inefficiencies” arising from efforts to enhance autonomy in 
armaments often “deemed [as more] acceptable” to public (Vucetic and Tago 2014: 
119). This has been more so wherein alliance-reliance becomes increasingly 
negatively connoted as overcharged and depriving of their own opportunities for 
autonomy and defense-industrialization.35 In ties to growing anti-American and anti-
US base movements among the civilian society of the US allies, as Peter W. Rodman 
(2000) and Mark E. Manyin (2003) observed, policy leaders have become more 
accountable to increasing voices against the arms of the US origin (Ku Young-sik 
2017). Self-reliant arms acquisition has paved a leeway for policy leaders to position 
themselves against any ‘pro-alliance’ stigmatization from the public. Alliance-reliant 
arms acquisition, in contrast, provides the security benefits of reinforcing and/or 
signaling the US’s security commitment for the allied state, economic benefits of 
curtailing arms spending, and political benefits that arise from the government’s 
ability to allocate resources for other national agendas than armaments.  
Caught in between the two competing values of self-reliant and alliance-
reliant arms acquisitions, policy leaders’ emphasis on self-reliance would 
dilute/attenuate the influence of asymmetric alliance structure (independent variable). 
                                           
35 Moon Chang-soo, retired colonel, in interview with journalist Ku Young-sik from OhmyNews, see, Ku 
Young-sik (2017); Rodman (2000); Manyin (2003). 
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In case of symmetric alliances, policy leaders’ self-reliant armaments would magnify 
the structural forces in seeking alliance-parallel, autonomous armaments in the state-
of-the-art BMD and ISR. The policy leaders’ alliance-reliant arms acquisitions, in 
contrast, would aggravate the path-dependent influence from the asymmetric alliance 
structure, while alliance-reliant arms acquisitions in symmetric alliances would 
lessen the degree in the states’ pursuit for autonomous armaments.  
 
(5) Charting the Cross-national Variation in Arming in the BMD and ISR 
Taken together, this study posits that the US allies’ arming in the BMD and 
ISR can be generalized into four distinctive arms acquisition patterns, Figure 7. 
While the US allies’ armaments in the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR weapons system 
are contingent to the level of asymmetric threats from the rivaling powers and 
symmetricity in the alliance structure with the US, policy leaders’ threat perception 
and arms acquisition policy would account for the US allies’ varying rationalities that 
cannot be fully captured at the structural dimensions. The extent of influence from 
intervening variables would also determine the positions within each quadrant below. 
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Figure 7 Charting Four Major Arms Acquisition Patterns 
 
Asymmetric Threat Level 
Alliance Structure 
Imminent Latent 
Asymmetric Restrained Passive 
Symmetric Active Proactive 
 
(i) Active arms acquisition: Under imminent asymmetric threats and symmetric 
alliance structure with the US, policy leaders are likely to seek ‘active’ 
armaments in the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR weapons system in parallel 
to the US deployed/deployable weapons system.  
(ii) Restrained arms acquisition: Despite imminent asymmetric threats, 
asymmetric alliance structure is likely to reinforce the state’s reliance on the 
US deployed/deployable weapons system, while ‘restrained’ in its own 
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armaments.  
(iii) Proactive arms acquisition: Despite latent asymmetric threats, policy leaders 
under symmetric alliance structure are likely to be induced to ‘proactive’ 
armaments in the BMD and ISR.  
(iv) Passive arms acquisition: Under latent asymmetric threats and asymmetric 
alliance structure, policy leaders are likely to be ‘passive’ in the costly 
BMD and ISR acquisitions. 
 
2) For Cross-regime Comparison 
 
In further application of the cross-national framework, the latter half of the 
dissertation aims to explain South Korea’s continuity in restraint in the BMD and 
ISR across both progressive and conservative regimes. Placed under North Korea’s 
increasing asymmetric nuclear and ballistic threat levels (asymmetric threats) and 
asymmetric division of labor in force structure (alliance structure), the variations 
and/or continuity across progressive and conservative regimes within South Korea in 
BMD and ISR acquisitions can be captured via two specific intervening variables: 1) 
the regime’s North Korea policy – reconciliatory versus rivalry, established upon 
their ideological differences in perceiving North Korean threats and emphasis on 
inter-Korean reconciliation; and 2) the regime’s arms acquisition policy – self-reliant 
versus alliance-reliant armaments in the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR, Figure 8.  
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Figure 8 Framework for Cross-regime Comparison 
 
 
(1) Independent Variables:  
North Korea’s Asymmetric Threats and Asymmetric Alliance Structure 
Adopting from the cross-national framework, North Korea’s ebb and flow in 
nuclear and ballistic missile tests and the asymmetric division of labor between South 
Korean military and the USFK shape South Korea’s pursuit for BMD and ISR 
armaments. As the 1994 Agreed Framework (Geneva Convention) – aimed to freeze 
and replace North Korea’s indigenous nuclear program36 – collapsed with North 
Korea’s disclosure of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) program in 2002 and 
withdrawal from the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, North Korea’s 
asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile threats began to re-escalate in the mid-2000s, 
launching its first nuclear test in October 2006. Although the multilateral Six Party 
Talks since 2003 accumulated to the 2007 agreement, seeming to again curtail North 
                                           
36 “The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea,” signed on October 21, 1994. 
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Korea’s military provocations in 2008,37 North Korea again resumed in 2009 with 
the second nuclear test and multiple ballistic missile tests, including the Nodong 
medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM). North Korea’s asymmetric threats 
escalated to unprecedented level since 2013 under Kim Jong-un regime, reaching its 
peak in 2017 with alleged successful hydrogen bomb and intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM). North Korea’s incremental ebb and flow in nuclear and ballistic 
missile tests have been critical stimulus in renewing South Korean governments’ 
interests in BMD and ISR as important countermeasures.  
While North Korea’s increasing asymmetric threats is an important push 
factor towards autonomous armaments in the BMD and ISR, the asymmetric alliance 
structure has been the opposite independent variable, pulling back to restrained 
armaments. The asymmetric division of force structure, under which South Korea 
relied on the US’s provision of extended nuclear deterrence, the USFK’s stationing 
of PAC-2s (since 1993). later upgraded by PAC-3s in 2004, as well as the USFK’s 
tactical and strategic ISR capabilities (including satellites), have created path-
dependent influence on South Korea’s restraint in autonomous BMD and ISR 
capabilities. Although the asymmetry in force structure appeared to change in flux of 
the US’s strategic transformations, particularly after 9/11, announcing the GPR in 
2004 that ensued with the USFK’s troop reduction, dispatch of Second Infantry 
Division to Iraq, and 2006 agreement to transfer wartime OPCON back to South 
Korean military, the US’s Pivot to Asia by the 2010s and South Korea’s repeated 
                                           
37 In this second 6PT agreement in February 2007, North Korea again agreed to denuclearization. 
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postponement of OPCON transfer reinstated the asymmetry in the force structure.  
 
(2) Intervening Variable (1):  
Reconciliatory versus Rivalry North Korea Policy 
Caught in between North Korea’s increasing asymmetric threats and 
resilience of asymmetric alliance structure, limited variations in pursuit for arms 
build-up in the BMD and ISR arise from how South Korean policy leaders of 
progressive and conservative regimes diverge along ‘reconciliatory’ versus ‘rivalry’ 
take on North Korea’s increasing asymmetric capabilities. North Korea’s asymmetric 
capabilities have been highly ideologically laden subject in South Korea, wherein the 
progressives, with emphasis on inter-Korean reconciliation and engagement, inclined 
to perceive as North Korea’s efforts for survival and bargain chip within the US-
DPRK relations than direct threat to South Korea. Conservatives, in contrast, have 
been skeptical of engagement, placing more confrontational, hardlined approach, 
perceiving North Korea’s asymmetric threats as more immediate and direct security 
concerns for South Korea. Divided into ‘reconciliatory’ versus ‘rivalry’ policy on 
North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities, North Korea’s increasing asymmetric threats 
are likely to be diluted under progressive regimes, while inflated under conservative 
regimes.  
For more precise definitions, North Korea policy can be distinguished as the 
following, Table 5:  
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Table 5 Cross-regime Intervening Variable (1): North Korea Policy 
North Korea Policy Definition 
Reconciliatory 
Policy leaders seek engagement with North Korea and maintain 
tolerant, ‘reconciliatory’ stance against North Korea’s increasing 
asymmetric capabilities. 
Rivalry 
Policy leaders are skeptical of engagement and maintain hardline, 
‘rivalry’ stance against North Korea, including their increasing 
asymmetric capabilities. 
  
(3) Intervening Variable (2): Alliance-reliant versus Self-reliant Arms 
Acquisition Policy 
Under North Korea’s increasing asymmetric threats and asymmetric force 
structure with the US, South Korean regimes vary in their pursuit for BMD and ISR 
armaments between ‘self-reliant’ versus ‘alliance-reliant’ arms acquisition policy.  
Specific to the BMD, self-reliant arms acquisitions have been critical for 
South Korean policy leaders in attenuating the external pressures arising from the 
US-China rivalry. While the US has pressured South Korea to join the US-led BMD 
since the 1980s, China with increasing assertiveness in the 2000s has criticized and 
retaliated against measures that implied South Korea’s integration into the US-joined 
BMD system. Although such external pressures from the US and China have been 
more or less mute in the realms of ISR, the higher the policy leaders’ political 
considerations between the US and China, South Korean policy leaders would opt for 
self-reliant arms acquisition policy, under which the path-dependent structural forces 
from asymmetric alliance structure may be attenuated. North Korea’s increasing 
asymmetric threats can be in the same way diluted in affecting South Korea’s 
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enhanced armaments in the BMD, as self-reliant arms acquisitions involve lengthier 
time scope and investments.  
The ROK-US agreement to transfer wartime OPCON in 2006 has been 
another critical juncture in shaping the policy leaders’ considerations for self-reliance 
in the BMD and ISR. While progress in the timeline of OPCON transfer would 
stimulate self-reliant arms acquisitions to meet the force vacuum arising from the 
asymmetric division of labor in ROK-USFK force structure, postponements in the 
transfer would reinvigorate cost considerations and reinforce alliance-reliance on the 
USFK’s capabilities.  
The pull between self-reliant and alliance-reliant arms acquisition policy 
among South Korean policy leaders has been also subject to political and economic 
costs and benefits elaborated above (cross-national framework).  
Caught in between the two competing values of self-reliant and alliance-
reliant arms acquisitions – between reform and status-quo – the regime’s emphasis 
on more alliance-reliance would further aggravate the path-dependent influence from 
the asymmetric alliance structure (independent variable). Should the regime strive for 
more self-reliance, the structural forces, although limited, will be deflated, Table 6.  
 
Table 6 Cross-regime Intervening Variable (2): Arms Acquisition Policy 
Arms Acquisition Policy Definition 
Self-reliant 
Policy leaders’ armament priorities exert more emphasis on 
enhancing South Korea’s self-reliance in armaments within the 
asymmetric alliance structure.  
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Alliance-reliant 
Policy leaders’ armament priorities exert more emphasis on 
enhancing South Korea’s alliance-reliance, reinforcing the 
asymmetric alliance structure.  
 
(4) Charting the Cross-regime Variations  
Taken together, this study posits that although the structural forces from 
North Korea’s increasing asymmetric threats and resilient asymmetric alliance 
structure with the US predominate in shaping South Korea’s armaments in the BMD 
and ISR, cross-regime variations would occur across the two cross-axis of 
intervening variables, Figure 9:  
 
Figure 9 Cross-regime Framework for US Allies’ Arming in the BMD and ISR 
 
North Korea Policy 
Arms Acquisition Policy 
Rivalry Reconciliatory 
Alliance-reliant Complacent Reluctant 
Self-reliant Active Proactive 
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(i) Complacent arms acquisition: Despite ‘rivalry’ policy on North Korea’s 
increasing asymmetric capabilities, the pursuit for ‘alliance-reliant’ 
armaments in the state-of-the-art military ventures is likely to draw policy 
leaders to seek ‘complacent’ armaments in the BMD and ISR weapons 
system, reinforcing the asymmetric alliance structure. 
(ii) Active arms acquisition: In pursuit of ‘self-reliant’ armaments against ‘rivalry’ 
conception on North Korea, incumbent policy leaders are likely to seek 
‘active’ armaments in the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR weapons system, 
attenuating the structural forces arising from the asymmetric alliance 
structure.  
(iii) Reluctant arms acquisition: In pursuit of ‘alliance-reliant’ and ‘reconciliatory’ 
policy on North Korea’s asymmetric threats, policy leaders are likely to seek 
‘reluctant’ armaments in the BMD and ISR.  
(iv) Proactive arms acquisition: Despite ‘reconciliatory’ policy on North Korea’s 
asymmetric threats, incumbent policy leaders in pursuit of ‘self-reliant’ 
armaments are likely to seek ‘proactive’ armaments in the BMD and ISR to 








1. The US Allies’ Arms Acquisition Patterns in the BMD and ISR  
 
1) Arming against Imminent Asymmetric Threats 
 
Surrounded by nuclear capable China (People’s Republic of China, PRC), Russia, 
and newly emergent de facto nuclear power, North Korea, the Northeast Asian region 
has seen the nuclear powers’ resurgence in the post-Cold War era with their 
advancements in ballistic missile capabilities. While the asymmetric threats and 
capabilities have become the new normal of the security environment, South Korea’s 
arms acquisition patterns in the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR capabilities can be 
most explicitly distinguished in the context of how the key allies and partners of the 
US like Japan and Taiwan in the region have diverged in their responses.  
The section highlights how South Korea, increasingly portrayed as the  
“hesitant” (Park Cheol Hee 2019), “reluctant” (Roehrig 2017), or “ambivalent” (Kim 
Joon Hyung 2019) ally,38 retained heavier reliance on the US’s BMD and ISR 
capabilities, while the “enthusiastic” ally of the US (Roehrig 2017), Japan, pursued 
                                           
38 Ambivalence not as in mere ROK-US alliance but in overall deterrence and peace-keeping initiatives. 
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more active armaments in autonomous BMD and ISR capabilities. Fueled by the 
systemic imperatives arising from North Korea and China’s increasing asymmetric 
threats, the US’s vacillation in their strategic focus between the Middle East and Asia 
in the 2000s, Japanese policy leaders’ consensus on the immediate threat 
environment further induced active armaments in the BMD and ISR. Extending the 
symmetricity in force structure between Japan’s SDFs and the USFJ, Japanese policy 
leaders pursued self-reliant armaments in both the BMD and ISR capabilities, to the 
extent that the weapons system become useful redundancy to the US’s security 
provisions.  
Taiwan is another intriguing case, which despite similarities in the structural 
environment arising from the adversary’s increasing nuclear and ballistic missile 
capabilities and asymmetric alliance with the US, has shown higher level of 
autonomous armaments in the BMD and ISR than in the South Korean case. 
Although Taiwan has spent about a quarter of South Korea’s military expenditures, 
relative convergence on the policy leaders’ threat perception and self-reliant arms 
acquisition policy appear to have abated the structural forces in restraining Taiwanese 
autonomous armaments in the BMD and ISR.  
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(1) Active Arms Acquisition for Capability Aggregation: Japan 
 
Japan’s active armaments in the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR capabilities 
have in foundation stimulated by the threat imminence forged upon North Korea’s 
asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile tests and China’s resurgence since the late 
1990s. With heightened threat perception since North Korea’s Taepodong-launch in 
1998, which overflew Japanese territory and landed in the Pacific Ocean, and 
China’s modernization of its ballistic missiles have further preoccupied Japanese 
cabinet on their military capabilities. As Sheila A. Smith (2019) points out, the 
emergence of nuclear North Korea and assertive China since the 2000s, have 
revealed the limitations of the US’s security provisions in the region and how it may 
“not [be] in their best interest to limit their military as others invest in their own.”  
 
Japan’s Active BMD Armaments in the Parameters of the Alliance 
To elaborate on Japan’s active armaments in the BMD capabilities, three different 
phases can be distinguished in understanding how the policy leaders’ rationalities 
accumulated in response to the changes in asymmetric threats and force structure 
within the US-Japan alliance. The initial phase of the process dates back to the early 
1990s when North Korea test-launched the medium-range Nodong ballistic missiles 
in May 1990 and May 1993, placing Japan for the first time within North Korea’s 
target ranges. While threats from China remained relatively latent, North Korea’s 
ballistic missile tests have been recognized immediately as direct threat to Japan in 
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the defense white paper (Japan Defense Agency 1991). As observable from the 
remarks by Keisuke Nakanishi, the Chief of Defense Agency, in meeting with the US 
Defense Secretary Les Aspin on September 27, 1993, Japan showed interest in 
joining the US’s BMD (then TMD) architecture, also calling for replacement of 
Japan’s defense policy in 1993, which rested on the 1976 framework that restrained 
Japan’s armaments in air defense capabilities.  
 While North Korea’s missile launches stimulated Japan to deliberate on the 
BMD system, the relative symmetric force structure between Japan’s SDFs and USFJ 
induced the policy leaders to consider both means of building autonomous BMD 
capabilities in tandem with joining the US-led BMD architecture. Namely, Japan has 
already signed to procure the PAC-2 through license production in 1985. Considering 
how South Korea relied on the US-stationed PAC-2s throughout the 1990s, only 
coming down to the decision to acquire second-hand PAC-2s from Germany in 2006, 
the earlier models of Patriot batteries without the hit-to-kill interceptive technology 
reflected relative symmetry in the US-Japan alliance structure. With plans to deploy 
twenty-six of the PAC-2 missiles over the 1990s, Japan in response to North Korea’s 
ballistic missile tests in the early 1990s came down to joint research program with 
the US, launching the US-Japan Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Working Group 
since 1993 to review the technical requirements and possible realms of cooperation 
between the two allies. After meeting twelve times, the group further evolved to 
bilateral program for joint study on BMD technologies, for which the Japanese 
government allocated about $7.3 million from 1995 to 1998 (Oros 2008; Yoo Hyon 
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Joo 2012: 330).  
 Aside from structural stimuli arising from North Korea’s missile tests, 
Japan’s interests in BMD armaments have been further reinforced by overall 
consensus among domestic policy leaders in perceiving the given threat environment. 
As the two Nodong ballistic missile tests occurred within the long reign of 
conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominance in Japanese leadership, the 
majority of policy leaders has been “shocked” by North Korea’s missile test. Also, in 
reflection of the PAC-2s in deployment, the key policy leaders of the conservative 
LDP government, such as Seiroku Kajiyama and Keisuke Nakanishi (Chief of 
Defense Agency), argued that the first-generation PAC-2s would not be adequate 
protection against the ballistic missiles.39  
Furthermore, as this study finds, the early 1990s marks a momentum when 
Japanese policy leaders in both government and Japan’s defense industry came down 
to overall consensus in the merits of self-reliant armaments – pursuit of kokusanka – 
within the parameters of the US-Japan alliance. By the time of the early 1990s, 
Japan’s trade frictions with the US in the 1980s, heightened by Japan’s pursuit for 
indigenously produced (kokusanka) fighter-jets (FS-X program), have come down to 
settlements with significant compromises from both sides. While the US’s ‘Japan 
Bashing’ of the 1980s pressured Japan to forego its original plan to produce 
indigenous fighter-jets, both sides came down to an agreement, wherein Japan would 
                                           
39 Keisuke Nakanishi in meeting with the US Defense Secretary Les Aspin, September 27, 1993. See also, 
Yoo, Hyon Joo (2012). 
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acquire modified version of the US Lockheed Martin’s (formerly General Dynamics) 
F-16C in return for technology transfers. The 1980s contestations in between the two 
allies have been important juncture in situating Japanese policy leaders to recognize 
the values of joint development programs with the US. As early as in February 1990, 
for instance, the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) chairman commented that 
“Japan should no longer try to force kokusanka of projects when the United States 
has a competitive system or one for joint development” (Koku Shinbunsha Wuingu 
1991). Another Japanese defense firm personnel also stated in 1991 that “Whether 
this new era brings domestic development or international joint development does 
not matter; what matters is the capability of development itself” (Koku Shinbunsha 
Wuingu 1991). The 1995 statement by Keidanren Defense Production Committee – 
the association of Japan’s defense industry – further reflects such general consensus 
forged among Japanese policy leaders as the statement in setting out the roadmap of 
Japan’s armaments called for the need to “maintain and enhance the defense 
production and technology base” by “mak[ing] it possible to undertake joint R&D 
and production with the United States, with which Japan has close ties in security 
matters” (Keidanren 1995). Although full-fledged kokusanka has been compromised, 
Japanese policy leaders have newly converged on how joint ventures in arms 
procurement with the US enable Japan’s self-reliant armaments in the latest state-of-
the-art weapons system.  
The second phase of Japan’s BMD acquisitions can be traced from North 
Korea’s Taepodong-launch in 1998. By 1997, Japan has stationed over 120 PAC-2 
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missiles (IISS 1997). Coupled with growing concerns on China’s military 
advancements, which have shown about 96.3 percent increase in defense budget from 
1990-2000, exceeding that of Russia by 1997 and Japan by 2001, Japan announced 
its decision in 2003 to acquire autonomous multi-tier BMD system including the 
ground-based PAC-3 for lower-tier and ship-based SM-3 Block II for upper tier 
defense (Japan Ministry of Defense 2017: 327; Mizokami 2017; Takahashi 2012: 7). 
The BMD acquisition plans begins to appear for the first time as the first component 
of Japanese Ministry of Defense’s annual releases on “Defense Programs and Budget 
of Japan” from FY2004 to FY2007 (Japan Ministry of Defense 2004; 2005; 2006; 
2007). 
Although Japanese policy leaders have spat over the cost of the BMD 
system and also institutional and constitutional constraints arising from the concerns 
that Japan’s BMD system will violate the Peace Constitution and 1969 Diet 
resolution, which forbid Japan’s involvement in collective self-defense or military 
use of outer space, respectively, North Korea’s Taepodong-launch in 1998 curtailed 
much of the debate. Following immediately after the launch, in August 1998, 
Japanese government further allocated thirteen million US dollars for joint TMD 
research and announced to join the joint research and development program for BMD 
technology with the US (Cronin 2002).40  
Japan’s armaments in the BMD have continued to alternate along North 
                                           
40 Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Japan-US Joint Technological Research on Ballistic Missile 
Defense, December 25, 1998.  
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Korea’s asymmetric military provocations as North Korea resumed to consecutive 
ballistic missile tests and launched its first underground nuclear test in October 2006. 
Also North Korea’s military tests came within the context in which the US in 
response to 9/11 was deeply engaged in the Middle East, relocating their overseas 
military personnel including the USFJ. The US’s announcement of the GPR in 2004 
further signaled repositioning of the US’s bases and reduction in the US’s overseas 
presence, Figure 10. In face of such threat imminence from North Korea’s 
asymmetric capabilities and transformations in the alliances, Japan expedited its 
original plans for acquiring autonomous BMD capabilities. Also since 2006, as 
notably “enthusiastic partner” for US’s BMD architecture in East Asia (Roehrig 
2017), Japan welcomed US’s deployment of BMD assets including the PAC-3, X-
band radar, aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3s (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan 2006). By 2007, just a year after South Korea’s acquisition of second-hand 
PAC-2s from Germany, Japan began to field its first batch of PAC-3 and launched its 
first test-flight of SM-3 on their aegis destroyers (Japan Ministry of Defense 2008: 
11). Set upon symmetric grounds for alliance structure and arms transactions, the US 
provided license production for PAC-3 systems and granted sales of the SM-3 as 
their first foreign sale to Japan (Hoff 2015). 
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Figure 10 US Forces Japan (USFJ), Number of Military Personnel 
 
Source: IISS, The Military Balance, annual series. 
 
 
The third phase in Japan’s BMD armaments spiraled off within more diverse 
dimensions and sources of asymmetric threats in the region. North Korea under the 
latest Kim Jong-un regime (2011-present) embarked upon successive nuclear tests 
and test-firings of longer-range ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs),41 including the ICBM-type Hwasong-12 (KN-17), Hwasong-14 (KN-20), 
and SLBM-type Pukkuksong-1 (KN-11), as well as the sixth nuclear test (supposedly 
hydrogen bomb) of the largest magnitude to this date on September 3, 2017 (100-
120kt).42  As North Korea for the first time officially alleged to have finally 
succeeded in test-launching of the ICBM-type Hwasong-15 (KN-22) on November 
                                           
41 The two main pillars of the so-called “nuclear triad [(ICBM, SLBM, and bombers)]” advanced delivery 
systems for nuclear warheads, See US Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 
Nuclear Matters (2010).  
42 Estimates of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal vary. 2015 report listed about ten to sixteen weapons from 
spent fuels acquired from the Yongbyon reactor and uranium enrichment facilities. See Joel Wit and Sun 
Young Ahn (2015); see also 2016 estimate of about thirteen to twenty-one by David Albright and Serena 















29, 2017, North Korea emerged as a de facto nuclear weapons state with capability to 
target distances of up to approximately 13,000km – placing all of the US mainland 
for the first time within North Korea’s target ranges. 
Aside from North Korea’s emergence as de facto nuclear power by the 
2010s, Russia and China, the two formally recognized nuclear weapons states, have 
also resurged with accelerated modernization of their ballistic missile capabilities. 
With inventories of 6,490 and 290 nuclear warheads, respectively (Davenport and 
Reif 2019), China’s military resurgence since the 2000s, in particular, has 
accompanied with about 1,038 percent growth from 1990-2018, about 480 percent 
increases from 2000-2018, growing as the largest arms spending country in the 
region. As of 2018, China spends about five times over Japan. Russia, mired into 
territorial disputes with Japan over the Kuril Islands, has also gradually resurged in 
defense expenditures, exceeding that of Japan by 2008, Figure 11. As highlighted by 
China’s ongoing development of the new ICBM-variant, Dong Feng-41 (DF-41), 
anticipated to reach the US in thirty minutes upon launch, the exponential growth in 
military budget followed with advancements in ballistic missile capabilities. Russia, 
with RS-28, “Sarmat,” is reportedly to become capable of the world’s largest nuclear-




Figure 11 Military Expenditures by Japan, China, Russia (2000-2018), in US$ billion 
 
Source: SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database. 
 
While the source of asymmetric threats became more diverse in the 2010s, 
(elaborate on force structure – SM-3, PAC-3): With the outbreak of the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2008, the hegemonic foundations of the US that seemed 
unsurmountable in the so-called their “unipolar moment” began to be seriously 
challenged for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although 
projections remain debated (Nye 2011; Brezezinski 2012; Layne 2009), increasing 
contestations to American primacy clearly had significant repercussions to the US 
allies in Northeast Asian region including Japan and South Korea that rested on the 
US’s security commitment and provision of extended deterrence in pursuit for 











“new era” (Wang 2018) of the US-China rivalry (Friedberg 2011), the growing 
presence of Chinese naval and air forces in the regional waters and air, tested the 
resilience of whether the US will come to defense of the allies in Asia in case of real 
military contingencies in the region. While the US rebalanced to Asia since 2011 
(Clinton 2011), revamping the forward-deployed forces in Asia including the USFJ 
forces back to the level of 40,000 military personnel by 2012,43 the US government’s 
2013 budget sequestration made the US’s pivot to Asia at unease. Placed in this 
context, Japan’s selection of the US’s state-of-the-art weapons system in the 2010s 
including not only the BMDs but also big ticket items like the F-35s have been 
“welcome[d]” by the US (Global Times 2014), under which Japan was able to 
enhance its own military capabilities, interoperability between the US and Japan 
forces, while setting out for the new US-Japan Defense Guidelines in 2015. With 
continued “signal to Washington that Tokyo is willing to invest more in compatible 
and interoperable equipment” (Lee 2015), especially under the Abe cabinet, the 
horizontal arms transactions in the US-Japan relations thickened, reciprocating into 
the US’s provision of technology and budget for joint development of enhanced SM-
3 Block IIA by the 2010s (Japan Ministry of Defense 2016; Hoff 2015: 5).  
Building upon symmetric alliance force structure and transactions in the 
state-of-the-art BMD, and transformations in asymmetric threats, Japan, as of 2018, 
has accumulated to multi-tier BMD capabilities ranging from the PAC-2 and PAC-3 
                                           
43 Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated that the US will keep sixty percent of overseas naval 
assets in Asia including the Pacific Fleet, which alone comprises of 180 ships and submarines, 1,500 
aircraft, and 100,000 personnel.  
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on ground, as well as the two sea-based Atago-class aegis destroyers equipped with 
SM-2 interceptors, and four Kongo-class aegis destroyers (Kongo, Chokai, Myoko, 
and Kirishima) with SM-2 and SM-3, Figure 12. Beginning with the first successful 
test-launch of SM-3 in December 2007 – first country other than US to succeed in the 
test – Japan completed deployment of all Kongo-class aegis destroyers with the SM-
3 Block IAs by April 2011, as originally planned (Yamaguchi 2013).  
Although Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) for the first time assumed office 
since 2009 for three years until 2012, Japanese policy leaders’ threat perception and 
arms acquisitions have remained in continuum. Key empirical cases include, Japan’s 
2010 National Defense Program Guideline, announcing Japan’s plan to upgrade the 
above two Atago-class destroyers since 2017 to be equipped with the new SM-3 
Block IIA missiles jointly produced between the US and Japan (Japan Ministry of 
Defense 2010; NTI 2018). The US and Japan, during the talks between US Defense 
Secretary Leon Panetta and Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto held on 
September 17, 2012, also agreed to deploy another X-band radar in Japan.44 While 
the LDP came back to office following its landslide victory over the DPJ in 
December 2012, Lower House election, the newly issued 2014 National Defense 
Program Guidelines in December 2013 reconfirmed the need to maintain and 
enhance Japan’s own BMD systems to meet the “threat of nuclear weapons” (Japan 
Ministry of Defense 2013). 
                                           
44 During joint press conference after the talks between US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Japanese 
Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto.  
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With sea-based SM-3s, three-stage missiles to intercept short-to-
intermediate-range ballistic missiles in space with a range beyond 1,000km, Japan 
has completed deployment of three-stage autonomous BMD system, lower-tier air 
defense by ground-based PAC-2s and sea-based SM-2s, interceptive PAC-3s and 
SM-2s, and sea-based midcourse phase upper-tier by the SM-3 variants, Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12 Japan’s BMD Capabilities 
 
Source: Illustrated by author with data from IISS, Military Balance; Defense White Papers and Government 
reports; in inspiration from BMD weapons diagram by Heritage Foundation, see, Klingner (2015) 
 
Aside from the BMD systems already in operation, Japan decided to procure 
two land-based Aegis Ashore batteries in December 2017. Expected to be operational 
by 2023, the Aegis Ashore will be ground-based version of upper-tier system, alike 
the sea-based SM-3s, which aims to intercept incoming missiles in the exo-
atmosphere, before the re-entry of the missiles into atmosphere (Reuters 2017). Japan 
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is also expected to place two more maya-class aegis destroyers in service since 2020 
(launched in July 2018), equipped with SM-3, as well as SM-6 interceptors, which 
can hit-to-kill medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and cruise missiles (Gady 
2019).  
Japan’s incremental armaments have become complementary to the US-
stationed AN/TYP-2 X-band radars (one at Shariki and another one at Kyogamisaki 
base), four PAC-3 batteries deployed in and around Japan, and about seven SM-3 
equipped aegis ships deployed in near seas of Japan (Japan Ministry of Defense 2016; 
Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance 2018). The increasing asymmetric threats and 
symmetricity in US-Japan alliance force structure largely shaped Japan’s armaments 
in the BMD. Relative domestic consensus on threat perception and self-reliant arms 
acquisition in strategic utilization of joint development programs with the US have 
further reinforced Japan’s active armaments in the BMD.  
 
Self-reliant Arms Acquisition Policy for ISR under Symmetric Alliance 
Determined by the transformations in the external structural environment described 
above, this study finds that Japan’s active armaments in major ISR weapons systems 
have been further induced by the domestic policy leaders’ repeated engagement with 
the US in pursuing its self-reliant arms acquisitions. Namely, the AN/SPY radars 
equipped on Japan’s six aegis destroyers, as of 2018, have been the critical 
technological corollaries of Japan’s sea-based SM-2 and SM-3 BMD acquisitions. 
The multi-function phased-array radars, AN/SPY-1D on Kongo-class aegis 
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destroyers and AN/SPY-1D(v) on Atago-class aegis destroyers, providing detection 
of multiple targets beyond 320 kilometers are the “heart” of the aegis weapons 
system per se that centralize and automate the command-and-control (C2) and 
weapons control system on the destroyers including the SM-2 and SM-3 interceptors 
(US Navy 2019). While procured as set of the BMD systems, the aegis combat 
system and AN/SPY radars equipped on the six destroyers (eight by 2020) have 
become important pillars of Japan’s autonomous ISR capabilities at sea. The 
capability for simultaneous detection and decision to launch the weapons system 
enables detection and interception against diverse targets on sea and ground, 
including submarines, ships, cruise missiles, and others that are not restricted to 
ballistic missiles. Under close coordination and interoperability with the US forces, 
Japan’s armaments have been jointly funded by the US and Japanese governments, 
including the latest Aegis Baseline 9/BMD 5.1 equipped to the Atago-class 
destroyers.  
As Japan’s budget allocation for FY2004 first set out major investments in 
the BMD armaments, including the PAC-3 and SM-3, the budget plan also included 
upgrading the existing ground-based radar sites along the perimeters of Japan’s 
mainland – Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) – as the means 
to revamp Japan’s overall monitoring, early warning, and defense against increasing 
ballistic, maritime, and air threats in the region (Japan Ministry of Defense 2004). At 
times of the US’s troop reduction in Asia to focus on their war in the Middle East, 
Japan’s increases in autonomous radar capabilities were more than welcomed as 
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“useful redundancy” to the US’s forces in the region.45 As Japan and the US 
established the Bilateral Joint Operation Coordination Center at the Yokota Air Base 
in October 2005, as well as the Joint Tactical Ground Station at Misawa airbase in 
January 2008, Japan’s armaments under the confines of the horizontal, joint, 
interoperable BMD architecture facilitated Japan’s arms build-up in the ISR 
capabilities.  
The JADGE, to elaborate, in addition to the US-stationed AN/TPY-2 X-band 
radars at Shariki and Kyogamisaki bases, are known to provide “full coverage of the 
Japanese Islands” (Simpson 2011) as the radar systems located along twenty-eight 
sites are integrated under computerized information and network. Although the full 
detection range and details of newly added radar systems remain undisclosed, 
Japanese government has incrementally allocated defense budget to upgrade these 
J/FPS radar systems to enhanced versions – the J/FPS-3 and FPS-5 – since the 
decision to acquire BMD capabilities in 2003. Seven sites are now reportedly 
equipped with J/FPS-3A, providing detection range of around 370km in length and 
150km in height; six sites with enhanced versions of J/FPS-4; five sites with J/FPS-5; 
and four sites with older radar systems including AN/FPS-20 and AN/FPS-6 radars, 
Table 7.   
                                           
45 US Deputy Commander of the Space & Missile Defense Command, General John Seward, January 2008. 
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Table 7 Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) 
ASDF Northern Air Defense Force - Northern Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Wing 
Unit/Location Radars 
18th AC&W Sq. Wakkanai Sub-base J/FPS-2 
28th AC&W Sq. Abashiri Sub-base J/FPS-4 
26th AC&W Sq. Nemuro Sub-base J/FPS-2 
45th AC&W Group. Tobetsu Sub-base J/FPS-3A 
36th AC&W Sq. Emori Sub-base AN/FPS-20; AN/FPS-6 
42nd AC&W Group. Ominato Sub-base J/FPS-5 
37th AC&W Sq. Yamada Sub-base J/FPS-2 
33rd AC&W Sq. Kamo Sub-base J/FPS-3A 
29th AC&W Sq. Okushirijima Sub-base J/FPS-4 
ASDF Central Air Defense Force - Central AC&W Wing 
Unit/Location Type 
27th AC&W Group. Otakineyama Sub-base J/FPS-3A 
46th AC&W Sq. Sado Sub-base J/FPS-5 
44th AC&W Sq. Mineokayama Sub-base J/FPS-4 
23rd AC&W Group Wajima Sub-base J/FPS-3A 
22nd AC&W Sq. Omaezaki Sub-base J/FPS-2 
35th AC&W Sq. Kyogamisaki Sub-base J/FPS-3A 
1st AC&W Group Kasatoriyama Sub-base J/FPS-3A 
5th AC&W Sq. Kushimoto Sub-base AN/FPS-20; AN/FPS-6 
ASDF Western Air Defense Force - Western AC&W Wing 
Unit/Location Type 
7th AC&W Sq. Takaoyama Sub-base J/FPS-4 
17th AC&W Sq. Mishima Sub-base J/FPS-2 
19th AC&W Sq. Unijima Sub-base J/FPS-2 
43rd AC&W Group Seburiyama Sub-base J/FPS-3A 
15th AC&W Sq. Fukuejima Sub-base J/FPS-4 
9th AC&W Sq. Shimokoshikijima Sub-base J/FPS-5 
13th AC&W Group Takahatayama Sub-base AN/FPS-20; AN/FPS-6 
ASDF Southwestern Composite Air Defense Division - Southwestern Composite AC&W Wing 
Unit/Location Type 
7th AC&W Sq. Takaoyama Sub-base J/FPS-4 
Source: Simpson (2011). 
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The aegis destroyers and ground-based radar systems (JADGE) are further 
enhanced through the interlinkage with Japan’s autonomous military (although 
formally termed ‘multipurpose’) IGS satellites, which were first initiated in the late 
1990s for development in response to North Korea’s Taepodong-launch in 1998.46 
Beginning with the first two IGS satellites – IGS-Optical 1 and IGS-Radar 1 – 
launched in March 2003, Japan further replaced the optical satellite with the IGS-
Optical 2 in September 2006. Enhanced versions of IGS-Optical 3V and IGS-Radar 2 
were launched in February 2007. Second-generation of optical satellites IGS-Optical 
3 and IGS-Optical-4 were launched in November 2009 and September 2011, 
respectively, followed by IGS-Radar 3 and IGS-Radar 4 in December 2011 and 
January 2013. Additional IGS-Radar 5 has been deployed in March 2017 (second-
generation). The third-generation of IGS satellites came with the launch in March 
2015 (IGS-Optical 5), followed by the IGS-Optical 6 in February 2018 and Synthetic 
Aperture Radar (SAR) equipped IGS-Radar 6 in June 2018. Administered under the 
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and Cabinet Satellite Intelligence 
Center (CSICE) of Japan’s intelligence agency, the Cabinet Intelligence and 
Research Office (Naicho), Japan currently operates five radar satellites (four second-
generation IGS-radar 2-5 and one third generation IGS-radar 6) and three optical 
satellites (two second-generation IGS-optical 4-5 and one third generation IGS-
optical 6). The IGS-6 series now provide high-resolution images for both national 
security and disaster monitoring to the cabinet, with imaging capabilities from 
                                           
46 Initially began with the plan to acquire two optical and two radar satellites. 
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resolution of forty centimeters (third-generation IGS-optical radars) to one meter 
range (second-generation IGS-optical radars), Table 8 (Spacetech 2018; Graham 
2018). 
 
Table 8 Japan’s Military Satellites in Operation, as of 2018 
Satellites* Type Range (approx.) Launch Date 
IGS-4 Optical Optical (Second generation) 60cm 2011 
IGS-5 Optical Optical (Third generation) 30-40cm 2015 
IGS-6 Optical Optical (Third generation) 30-40cm 2018 
IGS-2 Radar Radar (Second generation) 1m 2007 
IGS-3 Radar Radar (Second generation) 1m 2011 
IGS-4 Radar Radar (Second generation) 1m 2013 
IGS-5 Radar Radar (Second generation) 50cm 2017 
IGS-6 Radar Radar (Third generation)  2018 
Source: In reference to Spacetech (2018); Graham (2018) 
*Note: Japanese government designations are used, which are different from the designations used by North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 
  
Although the acquisition process has seen stagnations and difficulties at 
times with technical failures and ending of services earlier than planned lifespans, 
North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile arsenal and China’s increasing maritime 
activities in the region have pushed Japan to continue the development program. The 
plans to procure enhanced versions of IGS satellites were first introduced in 2009 in 
the midst of increasing US-China rivalry and faltering of the US’s presence in 
Northeast Asia following the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. For FY2009, Japan 
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placed 6.8 billion yen to fund the program. Again, the acquisition progress unfolded 
with Japan’s pursuit for armaments under the bilateral alliance framework with the 
US, wherein the alliance-cooperative efforts and emphasis on imminence of security 
threats overshadowed the thorny issues surrounding Japan’s Peace Constitution and 
1969 Diet resolution, which banned Japan’s use of outer space to only peaceful 
purposes. The second term of Abe Cabinet, in particular, as stated in the National 
Security Strategy released in December 2013, called for integrating Japan’s space 
policy under close coordination with the US. The US and Japan in putting forth new 
joint defense guidelines in April 2015, agreed to promote “seamless” cooperation in 
boosting Japan’s space capabilities in complementary to the US-Japan Security 
Alliance. The reinterpretation of the Peace Constitution in September 2015 further 
enabled joint use of the space forces for collective self-defense purposes. Ultimately, 
the Revised Basic Plan, which came after report submitted by the Space Policy 
Commission to Prime Minster Abe on November 11, 2014, set out to “strengthen” 
Japan’s ISR capabilities by expanding the number of IGS satellites. The report 
recommended “doubling” the number of IGS to eight satellites and two more spare 
satellites for relay operation in the orbit (Kallender-Umezu 2015).  
Japan also operates diverse equipment in air ranging from four F-4 modified 
reconnaissance fighter-jets RF-4J (RF-4E Phantom II) and four electronic 
intelligence (ELINT) YS-11EB aircrafts; thirteen signals intelligence (SIGINT) E-2C 
Hawkeye aircrafts and four E-767 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) 
aircrafts; forty-four helicopters with ISR capabilities (OH-6D); as well as one 
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Kawasaki EC-1 and two YS-1EA aircrafts that are equipped with electronic warfare 
(EW) capabilities that can jam enemies’ radar and radio systems on flight. Diverse 
range of ISR capabilities procured in response to increasing asymmetric threats in the 
region and strengthening of alliance cooperation in self-reliant armaments now 
function in complementary to the USFJ’s AN/TPY X-band radar at Shariki and 
another one at Kyogamisaki base, the five E-2D Hawkeye AEW&C aircrafts, two E-
3B Sentry airborne early warning (AEW) aircrafts, one RC-135 Rivet Joint ISR 
aircraft, and five high-altitude RQ-4A Global Hawks (IISS 2018). 
Japan has shown active, “step-ahead” (Ko Bong-Jun 2008: 402-404) arms 
acquisitions in both the BMD and ISR capabilities. In addition to the external stimuli, 
policy leaders’ heightened threat perception upon security junctures including North 
Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear tests and China’s military contestations in the 
region, led to active armaments in the BMD and ISR, Figure 13. 
 




Also Japan utilized joint arms production initiatives as the means to expand 
its self-reliant armaments and enhance its competitive military edge under the 
bilateral alliance with the US. While the heavy sunk costs and high technological 
barriers in sensitive BMD and ISR capabilities proved cooperation with the US vital 
to the US allies’ access to the weapons system per se, the symmetricity accumulated 
from the past joint production programs since the 1980s situated Japan more 
favorable to join the US-led BMD initiatives. The structural constraints arising from 
the US’s export control on the latest weapons systems have been alleviated as 
Japan’s activism in joint production and arms build-up in complementary military 
capabilities since the 2000s dovetailed with the US’s need to stretch over to the 
Middle East, while check-balancing against North Korea and China’s increasing 
military assertiveness in the region. Especially after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, 
which aggravated the long cycles of defense budget cuts by the US’s major allies in 
Europe including the UK, the joint initiatives in arms production and technology 
advancements with Japan have been more than welcomed by the US government and 
their defense industries. While the critics of incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
call the cabinet’s lifting of the ban on Japan’s arms exports by replacing the 1967 
Three Principles of Arms Exports (TPAE) and reinterpretation of Peace Constitution 
(Article 9) to allow Japan’s right of collective self-defense as Abe’s “stealth” 
revisionist efforts to remilitarize Japan (Reuters 2013), changes in Japan’s security 
posture and approach to armaments including the BMD and ISR realms have been 
indeed incremental since the 1990s in response to such systemic imperatives from 
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their external settings (Park Cheol Hee 2014; 2016; Park Young-june 2014; Arase 
2007), Table 9, Figure 14. 
 
Table 9 Japan’s Active Armaments in the BMD & ISR Capabilities 
Weapons Details 
BMD 
US PAC-3, PAC-3 MSE 
Japan 
Three-stage, mid-to-terminal phase, BMD System 
PAC-2, PAC-3, SM-2, SM-3 variants 
Satellites 
US 
Keyhole (KH) Satellites, Defense Support Program (DSP) Satellites, 
SBIRS (Space-based Infrared System) 





RC-135, E-3B Sentry (Kadena Air Base), E-2D, Global Hawks 
Japan 
Mid-High Mix 
E-767 (AWACS); E-2C, EP-3 (SIGINT); RF-4E/EJ (Reconnaissance 
aircrafts), YS-11EB (ELINT); OH-6D (ISR helicopters) 
Radars 
US X-band Radar (AN/TPY-2), Aegis (AN/SPY-1D) 
Japan 
Nation-wide Scope 
Aegis destroyers (AN/SPY-1D variants); JADGE (nationwide) 




























































(2) Restrained Arms Acquisition for Symbolical Capability Aggregation: 
Taiwan 
 
As much as South Korea’s national security decision-making has long 
anchored on North Korean threats since the division of Korean Peninsula in 1945, 
Taiwanese policy leaders have shaped the foundation of their security posture in 
defense against the mainland China since its separation into disparate political 
entities in 1949. While China’s outright claims for Taiwan as integral part of China 
(One China policy) have seen ebb and flow over time, China’s rapid military 
resurgence in the post-Cold War era accompanied both asymmetric and conventional 
arms build-up that seriously challenged Taiwanese defense posture across the Strait.
 While the extravagant cost of BMD and ISR capabilities have been no less 
contested within the Taiwanese government, China’s drastic outspending in military 
expenditures and boost in asymmetric capabilities since the 1990s have incrementally 
constructed a consensus that Taiwanese should pursue, although limited to selective 
areas, self-reliant armaments in the BMD and ISR capabilities as symbolical 
countermeasures. The 1995/1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, in particular, has been the 
critical juncture in Taiwanese armaments, during which China test-fired ballistic 
missiles in nearby of Taiwan’s main harbors and launched military exercises in the 
East China Sea.  
China’s annual double-digit growth in military expenditures, display of 
high-end weapons systems, and continued refusal to rule out the possibility of 
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Beijing’s use of military force against Taiwan have further contributed in escalating 
the threat level imposed from China. In terms of military expenditures, as Figure 15 
illustrates, the gap between China and Taiwan has seen exponential growth, China 
spending about twofold ($21 billion) of Taiwan ($11.7 billion) in 1990, China began 
to spend about four times more ($41.3 billion) by 2000, accumulating to about fifteen 
times disparity in total defense budget by 2017 (China: $154.3 billion, Taiwan: $10.4 
billion). In 2018, Taiwan’s defense budget is $10 billion. China’s is $154 billion. The 
disparity in bulk of spending on armaments, which excludes personnel and force 
operating costs from total military expenditures, has been far more profound, China 
spending about twenty-three times more worth of armaments than Taiwan by 2017, 
Table 10.  
 
Figure 15 China and Taiwan’s Military Expenditure (1996-2018), in US$ bil 
 











Table 10 China and Taiwan’s Military Expenditures and Armaments (2010-2017) in US$ bil 
Year Total Military Expenditure Arms Procurement Only 
China (A) Taiwan (B) A/B China (C) Taiwan (D) C/D 
2010 78.8 9.3 8.5 26.2 2.6 10.1 
2011 93.3 9.72 9.7 31.9 2.7 11.8 
2012 106.0 10.3 10.3 38.1 2.8 13.6 
2013 119.6 10.3 11.6 43.7 2.7 16.2 
2014 134.9 10.1 13.4 52.7 2.8 18.8 
2015 146 10.3 14.2 58.7 3.2 18.3 
2016 147.0 9.9 14.8 60.7 3.0 20.2 
2017 154.3 10.4 14.8 63.4 2.8 22.6 
Source: China’s 2019 Defense White Paper; IISS, Military Balance, Annual series; Ministry of National 
Defense, National Defense Report, annual series. 
 
Upon China’s military aggrandizement, the sheer gap in cross-strait military 
balance has become far more drastic. In the realms of conventional capabilities, by 
2018, China has accrued to 1,490 fighter-jets, 240 ships, fifty-two submarines, and 
about a million of active duty soldiers in the People’s Liberation Army (US Office of 
the Secretary of Defense 2018). Taiwan remained limited to 420 fighter-jets, twenty-
three ships, two modern attack submarines, about 140,000 ground troops. In this 
backdrop, China’s rapid modernization of asymmetric ballistic missiles and cruise 
missiles have posed far more imminent threats to Taiwan, especially in regards to 
China’s deployment of about 300-350 short- to medium-range ballistic missiles 




Table 11 China’s Inventories of Missiles 
Missile Type Range (km) Number in Inventory 
1996 2003 2010 2017 
SRMBs 
DF-11 280-350 Small 175 700-750 ~1,200 
DF-11A 350 




DF-21C 2,500 0 0 36-72 108-274 
DF-16 800-1,000 0 0 0 
IRBMs 5,000 0 0 0 Possible 
Cruise Missiles 
DH-10 1,500-2,000 0 0 200-500 400-1,250 
ALCM 3,300 0 0 Inventory 
Source: Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems Database; IISS, The Military Balance, annual series; US Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China, Washington DC, annual series. 
 
Given the cross-strait military imbalance that seems “hopeless” in both 
conventional and asymmetric capabilities, as Drew Thompson (2018) put, Taiwan’s 
major deterrence against China has rested on its asymmetric alliance with the US. 
Indeed, it is generally viewed that the threat of US intervention in event of Chinese 
military invasion may be the only credible and the most critical deterrence against 
China.  
The asymmetry in the US-ROC relations has remained profound, 
particularly as Taiwan lacks formal treaty alliance with the US. As the 1954 Mutual 
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Defense Treaty agreement 47  ended with the US’s normalization of diplomatic 
relations with China in 1979, the US no longer maintains military presence on 
Taiwan. Although the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was enacted by the US 
congress in replacement of Mutual Defense Treaty, which stipulated the US to 
maintain its ability to defend Taiwan and provide necessary “arms of a defensive 
character,”48 the domestic legislation (US) included neither of the stationing of US 
troops nor formal military plans and coordination in times of contingency. Given the 
nonbinding nature of the act, the escalations in cross-strait tensions have made 
Taiwan heavily dependent on the US administration’s official announcements, 
reconfirming the US’s support for Taiwanese security, and ad-hoc dispatch of naval 
forces in the region. Taiwan’s asymmetric reliance on the US, differently put, rested 
on what Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver (2001) put “uncertain relationship” 
upon the TRA.  
The asymmetric alliance also rested on the US’s strict export control on 
armaments, particularly in the 2000s, as the US became more reluctant in delivery of 
arms as China became more assertive against the US’s arms sales to Taiwan. 
Although the TRA stated the US’s continued commitment in making “available” the 
provision of “defense articles and defense services… necessary to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,”49 the US’s increasing “inconsistency” 
(Hickey 2013) and strategic ambiguity in dealing with Taiwan Strait issues have 
                                           
47 Formally, “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China.” 
48 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Pub.L. 96–8, 93 Stat. 14, enacted April 10, 1979; H.R. 2479 
49 Taiwan Relations Act, Section 3(a). 
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indeed prevented Taiwan’s access to arms purchases. Especially since the 1982 US-
China Joint Communique, the US government mandated that it will not “carry out a 
long term policy arms sales to Taiwan and will not exceed, in either qualitative or in 
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment 
of the relations between the US and China.”50 While the US has granted the sales of 
excess defense articles and other “more obvious” defensive weapons systems, the US 
has been rigid in sales of for instance warships, fighter-jets, and armored vehicles to 
manage their strategic rivalry and tensions in the US-China relations.  
 
Restrained but Symbolical Armaments in the BMD and ISR  
While China’s drastic outspending in defense budget, nuclear and ballistic missiles 
armaments, and asymmetric relations with the US have left both qualitative and 
quantitative military balancing by Taiwan at dismay, Taiwanese government’s 
relative convergence on the threat imminence from China and emphasis on self-
reliant armaments have pushed the Taiwanese government to not forego their 
armaments in autonomous BMD and ISR capabilities.  
With the political schism on One China Policy within Taiwanese domestic 
politics, Taiwan’s security strategies and emphasis on armaments have indeed 
alternated as the power transferred back and forth between the traditional 
Kuomintang (KMT) to new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in leadership. The 
KMT, as President Ma Ying-jeou’s (2008-2016) three-no policy represents, inclined 
                                           
50 US-China Joint Communique, August 17, 1982. 
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to pursue relative moderation or defensive nature of armaments. While the KMT 
maintains the One China policy in which Taiwan (Republic of China) is considered 
as the sole legitimate government, the strategic priorities have lied in namely seeking 
no unification, no independence, no use of force (Cossa 2008). In contrast, DPP’s 
leadership has emerged as an alternative, recognizing China and Taiwan as two 
separate sovereign nations. In this vein, the military strategy under KMT government 
inclined to be more defensive in nature. As exemplary in the case of the long era of 
President Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000), Taiwanese government pursued the concept of 
“effective deterrence” as termed in the 1996 National Defense Report (Ministry of 
National Defense, Republic of China 1996), later defined as “defensive deterrence” 
in 1998 National Defense Report (Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China 
1998), as sufficient than pre-emptive nature of military strategies. The DPP, in 
contrast, as President Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) replaced Lee Teng-hui, has been 
critical of KMT’s defensive posture. The Chen Shui-bian administration modified 
Taiwan’s military strategy by reconceptualizing the previous “effective deterrence” to 
refer to enhancing critical air, naval, and information-based countermeasures (Chen 
2009). The Chen administration also put new military doctrine of “fighting the 
decisive military campaign beyond the border” during a speech at the National 
Military Academy on June 16, 2000, calling for build-up in “high precision strikes, 
early warning capability and intelligence superiority.”51  
                                           
51 President Chen Shui-bian, “Decisive Battle Outside the Territory,” speech given at the Military Academy 
on June 16 2000.  
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With emphasis on counterstrike capabilities, the 2004 National Defense 
Report under Chen administration newly coined the term “Active Defense” (Ministry 
of National Defense, Republic of China 2004). Yet, when the power transferred back 
to KMT under President Ma Ying-jeou in 2008 (2008-2016), Taiwanese restored the 
previous President Lee Teng-hui’s defensive interpretation of the term, “effective 
deterrence” (Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China 2009a; 2009b).  
Nonetheless, although Taiwanese government’s military strategies alternated 
in the post-Cold War era across regimes, the bottom line is that both defensive- or 
offensive-oriented defense strategies of the KMT and DPP leadership, respectively, 
converged on the existential nature of Chinese threat, that China’s arms build-up is 
“to exercise the military option in the future.” While the precise connotations of the 
terms such as “posture of effective deterrence,” “resolute defense,” “compact but 
delicate” and “highly capable” military capabilities alternated across regimes, 
Taiwanese policy leaders have concurred on threat imminence and self-reliant 
armaments in both the state-of-the-art, network-centric BMD and ISR capabilities. 
Notwithstanding China’s overwhelming outspending and asymmetric relations with 
the US that limited Taiwanese access to necessary armaments, Taiwanese policy 
leaders’ convergence on threat imminence has propelled Taiwan to strengthen its 
“prowess in information and electronic arena” (Ministry of National Defense 2002). 
Also, in utilization of the US’s willingness to deliver arms of defensive nature, the 
BMD and ISR capabilities could be demanded as ‘defensive’ means of arms to signal 
Taiwanese firm commitment in its defense. The armaments in the sectors provided 
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the platform to seek alliance cooperation and anchor the US’s interest and 
commitment in security of Taiwan in check-balancing China’s increasing 
assertiveness in the region.  
As the 1995/1996 Taiwan Strait crisis clearly demonstrated how China’s 
ballistic missiles could easily penetrate Taiwan’s defense system without landing on 
Taiwanese maritime borders, the incumbent Lee Teng-hui administration at the time 
rushed to procure missile defense systems from the US in tandem with launching of 
indigenous cruise and ballistic missile programs of its own. The heavy criticisms 
from then Chen-led DPP opposition party played also important role in push for the 
BMD.  
By the 2000s, Taiwan, spending about a quarter of South Korea’s arms 
procurement budget, fielded three PAC-2s in 1997 (Kan 2006: 12). In response to 
China’s increased missile attacks throughout the 2000s, including the threats posed 
from China’s launch of decapitation military exercises and operations, Taiwan under 
the Chen administration since May 20, 2000 (May 2000-May 2008), strived for 
armaments in air and ballistic missile defense, and reconnaissance capabilities. The 
declining force improvement budget (expenditures on military equipment) began to 
pick up from 2003 ($1.3 billion) reaching up to $3.8 billion in 2008, Figure 16.  
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Figure 16 Taiwan’s Force Improvement and Total Defense Budget (2000-2017), US$ bil 
 
Source: IISS, Military Balance, Annual series; Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan, annual series. 
 
Placing utmost primacy in “safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity” against China, President Chen Shui-bian pledged to increase Taiwanese 
defense budget to the level of three percent of GDP and “demonstrate Taiwan’s 
determination for self-defense and eliminate doubts of allied countries” by arms 
build-up including “three major armament procurements of Patriot PAC-3 missiles, 
new diesel-electric submarines, and P-3C fixed wing anti-submarine warfare 
aircrafts.”52 Primarily to arm against China’s continued advancements in stockpiles 
of SRBMs, the Dong Feng varieties, as well as the short-to-medium-range DF-16s 
(1,000km range), and intermediate-range DF-26s (IRBM, 2,500km), Taiwanese 
government submitted a request for price and availability data in April 2003. In 2004, 
                                           











Defense Minister Lee Jye requested six PAC-3 units and upgrade of three existing 
PAC-2 units to the PAC-3 standard for about US$ 4.3 billion (Kan 2006: 13). 
Also, in October 2002, Taiwanese government began to deliberate to 
approve funding for the US-origin Kidd-class destroyers. Ending in favor of the bill, 
Taiwan legislature approved the funding by May 30, 2003. With delivery ahead of 
schedule from October 2005 to 2006, Taiwanese navy since October 29, 2005, has 
been equipped with SM-2 launched Kidd-class destroyers.53  
The procurement plans for Patriots systems, yet, did experienced some 
delays as the referendum President Chen Shui-bian placed on the Presidential 
election day on March 20, 2004, to acquire the missile defense systems ended with 
limited voter turnouts. The considerations for more “cost-effective systems” and 
oppositions from the ruling opposition party, KMT,54 in lookout for more amicable 
relations with China turned out with less than fifty percent of ballots casted at the 
legislature (fifty percent is needed), blocking the bill from approval until 2008. In 
response, the Taiwanese government further strived to bypass by submitting the 
Special Budget in May 2004 (NTI 2006). Compromises were also made, requesting 
only the price and availability data for PAC-2 upgrades and supplemental budget at 
the legislature for Patriot upgrades in 2006 (Kan 2006: 14).  
Nonetheless, when Ma Ying-jeou of KMT assumed office since May 20, 
2008, China’s increasing military provocations in the late 2000s have ultimately led 
                                           
53 Voter turnout for decision on SM-2 equipped Kidd-class detroyers: Eighteen in favor from the ruling DPP 
and also Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) and sixteen from ruling opposition party KMT, and also 
People’s First Party (PF) in opposition. See, Kan (2006: 8). 
54 E.g. position of KMT Legislator Shuai Hua-ming, a retired army lieutenant general. 
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the KMT government to continue upgrading of the existing fleets of PAC-2 batteries 
and also put down new orders for PAC-3 hit-to-kill interceptive capabilities, as part 
of a $6.5 billion arms purchases from the US in 2008 (AFP 2016). Three PAC-2 
batteries have been upgraded to Configuration-3 PAC-2 GEM, and signed to procure 
four more PAC-3s in 2009 (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance 2018). The PAC-3 
missiles have been placed to purchase in 2008 and 2010, accumulated to about 386 
missiles from 2010-2013. The four PAC-3 batteries arrived in 2014-2015.55  
 China further ventured into building military bases in the South China since 
2012 and increased frequency in the military activity in north and south of Taiwan to 
conduct military exercises in the Western Pacific. Heightening the tensions across the 
Taiwanese Strait, China’s heavy armaments including the nuclear capable H-6K 
bombers have crossed into Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone, reaching the 
record high level of frequency in transgressing over Taiwanese air space in 2017. 
While such increasing systemic imperative from China’s military threats in the 
region have led Taiwan to seek advanced PAC-3 acquisitions in the 2010s, even “at 
the expense of other capabilities,” as Michal Thim and Liao Yen-fan stated, 
“economics of missile defense” have become less of “primary concern” than its 
defense against China’s asymmetric capabilities (Thim and Liao 2017). President Ma 
Ying-jeou indeed reconfirmed Taiwan’s need to revamp its air and sea denial 
capabilities, first stipulated under the previous Chen administration. Resonating the 
Chen administration’s emphasis on how China’s increasing “military satellites, 
                                           
55 Defense Industry Daily database, November 2014. 
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technology of ballistic missile, and information warfare” are the utmost security 
threats to Taiwan,56 President Ma Ying-jeou in pursuit of “resolute defense” and 
“credible deterrence,” stated in 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), that 
China’s increasing presence in the region has called for arms build-up in the BMD 
and ISR capabilities. Taiwan currently deploys nine PAC-3 batteries, some equipped 
with upgraded PAC-2 GEM systems.  
Taiwan’s spree for armaments in the ISR capabilities emerged under 
President Ma Ying-jeou as well (KMT government). The AN/FPS-115 PAVE Phased 
Array Warning System, deliberated under President Chen Shui-bian (DPP 
government) as the surplus deal of Taiwan’s acquisition of the earlier Patriot system 
in 2000, entered in service by 2013. Although the radar itself is already over forty 
years old since development by the US (Raytheon) and requires upgrading, the 
detection and early warning capabilities up to 3,000 nautical miles have provided 
long-range surveillance radar system (Surveillance Radar Program) in Taiwan, 
stationed in the northern part of Taiwan, Hsinchu County (Calvo 2018; Danielsson-
Murphy 2010). The P-3Cs, which President Chen Shui-bian pledged to acquire in 
2008, also began to be in service since 2015 with four units, augmenting to about 
twelve by 2018. 57  Taiwan also operates six E-2K (E-2T Hawkeye upgraded) 
AEW&C aircrafts that assist Taiwanese air force and operation of Patriot batteries. 
As the first arms sales agreement with the US under President Ma Ying-jeou, 
                                           
56 Defense Minister Kao Hua-chu, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China (2002).  
57 IISS, The Military Balance, annual series. 
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Taiwanese government put down $250 million for upgrade of four E-2T aircraft to 
the Hawkeye 2000 standard, in October 2008. Equivalent to E-2C operated by the US 
Air Force, USFJ, and Japan’s ASDF, the first two of existing four E-2T Hawkeyes 
were sent for upgrade in June 2010 and returned by the end of 2011. The rest two 
were sent in 2011. The upgrade of the four E-2T has all been completed by 2013 
(Chen and Kao 2013).  
As the most high-end ISR capabilities, Taiwan also launched the Formosat-5 
satellite on August 24, 2017, which can provide up to two to four-meter resolution, 
under the US’s joint funding in procurement, Table 12. 
 
Table 12 Taiwan’s Restrained but Symbolical Armaments in the BMD and ISR 
Weapons Details 
BMD 
Lower-end, terminal-phase BMD System (yet, earlier than South Korea) 
PAC-2, PAC-3, SM-2 




Low: Mastiff III light UAVs, RF-5E Tigereye, ASW helicopters 
High: E-2K (2008-2013), P-3Cs (since 2015) 
Radars 
Nation-wide Scope 
AN/FPS-115 PAVE Phased Array Warning System 
Source: China’s 2019 Defense White Paper; IISS, Military Balance, Annual series; Ministry of National 
Defense, National Defense Report, annual series. 
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Although Taiwan’s armaments in the BMD and ISR cannot but be restrained 
under asymmetric alliance with the US, overwhelming China’s capabilities, not to 
mention heavier resource constraints arising from spending about a quarter of South 
Korea’s arms procurement, Taiwan’s armaments have been relatively active than 
South Korea. Policy leaders’ convergence on existential Chinese threats, commitment 
in armaments symbolical of Taiwanese commitment in defense, and efforts to anchor 
the US’s security provisions appears to have been critical in abating the structural 
forces arising from the given security environment, Figure 17, Figure 18.  
 































































2) Arming under Latent Asymmetric Threats 
 
South Korea can be further contextualized in cross-national context by juxtaposing to 
how the US allies under latent asymmetric threats have approached armaments in the 
BMD and ISR capabilities. Although the more discrepant security environment of the 
US allies in Europe may afford little room for comparability, the two cases are 
selected below – the UK and Germany – which indicate how the US allies’ divergent 
arms acquisition policy/preferences, despite latent asymmetric threat levels, can 
intervene differently in leading the states to seek proactive versus passive armaments 
in the BMD and ISR.  
 
(1) Proactive Arms Acquisition for Alliance and Technological Edge: UK 
 
As the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security 
Review 2015 stated that there is “currently no immediate direct military threat to the 
UK mainland” (UK Cabinet Office 2015), the post-Cold War security environment of 
the UK remained relatively latent in threats. As the UK’s arms spending highlights, 
throughout 2000 to 2017, the defense budget has remained at an average of 2.3 
percent of GDP. Also, the allocated budget for arms procurement has taken a fall 
since the outbreak of Global Financial Crisis in 2008, Figure 19. Dropping from the 
peak of $16.1 billion in 2008 to about fifteen percent decrease to $13.7 billion in 
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2009, the arms procurement budget remained at an average of $12.8 billion 
throughout the 2010s.58 
 
Figure 19 UK’s Defense Budget and Arms Spending (2000-2017), US$ bil 
 
Source: NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, annual series; IISS, Military 
Balance, Annual Series 
 
Although the UK did begin to recognize how the UK’s defense system is 
becoming more “tested by aircraft, including Russian aircraft, near [the UK’s] 
airspace, and maritime activity near [the UK’s] territorial waters” (UK Cabinet 
Office 2015), including Prime Minister Theresa May’s remarks that there are 
“resurgence of state-based threats” in reference to Russia’s military actions in Syria 
and Ukraine (UK Cabinet Office 2016), the UK’s total military expenditure and arms 
                                           













procurement budget have shown continuous fall. In 2015, the defense budget fell 
from $61.5 billion to $56.2 billion, and the budget solely for arms procurement also 
dropped thirteen percent from $14 billion to $12.2 billion, Table 13.59  
 







(%) Total FIB Personnel Infra Etc 
2000 1,400 34.8 8.9 13.3 1.5 11.0 25.7%  2.5% 
2001 1,400 33.6 8.1 13.0 0.4 12.1 24.2% -3.4% 2.4% 
2002 1,580 36.6 8.6 14.6 0.3 13.0 23.6% 8.9% 2.3% 
2003 1,800 42 9.5 16.6 0.4 15.5 22.6% 14.8% 2.3% 
2004 2,150 49 11.2 19.5 0.9 17.4 22.8% 16.7% 2.3% 
2005 2,230 51.1 11.8 21.3 0.2 17.8 23.1% 4.3% 2.3% 
2006 2,400 53.1 11.3 21.5 1.3 19.0 21.2% 3.9% 2.2% 
2007 2,810 61.1 13.8 23.7 1.4 22.2 22.6% 15.1% 2.2% 
2008 2,670 71.4 16.1 26.1 1.5 27.8 22.5% 16.9% 2.7% 
2009 2,260 62.4 13.7 23.4 1.4 24.0 21.9% -12.6% 2.8% 
2010 2,250 58.2 14.3 20.8 0.9 22.3 24.5% -6.7% 2.6% 
2011 2,470 63.7 14.0 23.9 1.0 24.7 22.0% 9.5% 2.6% 
2012 2,440 61.3 12.0 23.8 1.2 24.3 19.5% -3.8% 2.5% 
2013 2,420 57 12.5 21.6 1.2 21.8 21.9% -7.0% 2.4% 
2014 2,950 61.5 14.0 22.5 1.2 23.8 22.8% 7.9% 2.1% 
2015 2,860 56.2 12.2 20.7 0.9 22.4 21.8% -8.6% 2.0% 
2016 2,630 52.6 11.3 18.2 1.0 22.0 21.6% -6.4% 2.0% 
2017 2,570 50.7 11.2 17.3 1.0 21.3 22.0% -3.6% 2.0% 
Source: NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, annual series; IISS, Military 
Balance, Annual Series. 
 
Indeed, the bipartisan agreement on relative threat latency from asymmetric 
                                           
59 NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, annual series; IISS, Military Balance, 
Annual Series. 
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threats has been more of a continuous phenomenon, tracing back to the early 2000s 
as well. Despite alternations from Labor Party (1997-2010 under Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown) to Conservative Party-led (2010-2019 under David Cameron and 
Theresa May) governments in the post-Cold War era, 60 the UK government has 
maintained its earlier assessment of security environment, that the threats posed from 
ballistic missiles to the UK remain “many years off” (UK Cabinet Office 1998). With 
nuclear deterrence capability as one of the five recognized nuclear powers, Secretary 
of State for Defense, Geoff Hoon, in February 2001, further reiterated that “There is 
currently no significant ballistic missile threat, nor any other significant threat of 
attack.”61 In 2008 National Security Strategy, the UK government – under Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown of the Labor Party – also concluded that “no state currently 
has both the intent and the capability to pose a direct nuclear threat to the United 
Kingdom or its vital interests” (UK Cabinet Office 2008). When Prime Minister 
David Cameron restored the Conservative Party back to office since May 2010 (May 
2010-July 2016), “economic security” has continued to be the primary concern of the 
UK government (Cameron 2015).62 Adding to how foreign and defense policy has 
never been “central issue” in the UK’s general elections (Harrois 2015: 1), the 
overall theme of Cameron’s Conservative Party campaign was the UK’s economic 
                                           
60 With Tony Blair assuming office as Prime Minister in May 1997 to June 2007, Blair government restored 
the Labor Party as the ruling party, after seventeen years of government under the Conservative Party, led 
by Margaret Thatcher (May 1979-November 1990) and John Major (November 1990-May 1997). 
Extending to another three years of government under Labor Party, with Gordon Brown as Prime 
Minister (June 2007-May 2010), the Conservative Party regained office under David Cameron (May 
2010-July 2016) and Theresa May (July 2016-July 2019). 
61 HC Deb 12, February 2001, c49w. 
62 Prime Minister David Cameron’s statement in the House of Commons on the National Security Strategy 
and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, on November 23, 2015. 
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situations and call for drastic cuts in defense budget. While nuclear deterrence based 
on the Trident SLBMs will continue to serve as the “ultimate insurance policy,”63 
Cameron proposed ‘pragmatic’ cuts to defense budgets to be redirected to deal with 
economic problems at home, as stated in the 2010 release of UK Strategic Defence 
and Security Review (SDSR), “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty” (UK 
Cabinet Office 2010). 
Although the opposition Labor Party has been even more reserved on the 
UK’s armaments, raising questions whether the UK needs to maintain its nuclear 
deterrence, the Labor Party soon converged to consensus after the government’s 
release of the Trident Alternatives Review (HM Government 2013). Departing from 
the position that the UK government should “look very carefully at whether renewing 
Trident is the necessary or the right thing to do,” the Labor Party reconfirmed its 
position in its manifesto that the UK shall remain “committed to a minimum, credible, 
independent nuclear capability, delivered through a Continuous At-Sea Deterrent” 
(Labour Party 2015: 78). 
When Prime Minister Theresa May assumed in office (July 2016-July 2019), 
continuing another three years of government under Conservative Party, Brexit (June 
2016 referendum) and terrorist attacks, including the March 22, 2017, attack outside 
the House of Parliament in Westminster, London, and March 22, 2017, suicide 
bombing at the Manchester Arena during concert, pervaded the government’s 
                                           
63 David Cameron's speech to the Conservative Party Conference on October 6, 2010. 
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security concerns. As the House of Commons voted and agreed under majority to 
renew the Trident nuclear program on July 19, 2016, 64  the May government 
continued the UK’s reliance on its indigenous nuclear deterrence.  
 
‘Hedging’ with Proactive Joint Initiatives in the BMD  
Given the overall absence in imminent asymmetric threats and bipartisan consensus 
on maintaining nuclear deterrence as sufficient and credible means for security, the 
UK has indeed preferred “adherence to diplomatic means and established postures” 
including its own nuclear deterrence than acquiring the BMD system (Stocker 2004). 
Yet, with strategic priority for alliance maintenance, the UK has opted for 
collaborating in the policy, infrastructure, and technical realms with the US and 
prevent any outright disagreements that may disrupt the two countries’ long-standing 
alliance ties. Indeed, “hedging” has been the bipartisan stance on BMD, under overall 
asymmetric threat latency, while seeking opportunities for self-reliant armaments and 
capability aggregation through joint production deals with the US and its European 
allies.  
 The UK has been no exception from other allies under the US’s pressure for 
BMD initiatives. Tracing back to Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ speech in 1983, which 
proposed the development of interconnected system to shield against missile attacks, 
the US’s implementation of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s called for 
cooperation from its closest allies including the UK for finance, research, and 
                                           
64 472 for pro- and 117 as against, majority of 355 votes. 
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development of such ambitious technological system. Particularly since President 
George W. Bush’s announcement to withdraw from Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty with Russia in 2001 to further enhance the BMD technology, the US began to 
deploy the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to intercept ICBMs, 
requiring land-based stations across the globe including the European areas. 
Although President Barack Obama appeared in the beginning, since elected in 2008, 
to curtail the US’s BMD initiatives, particularly in Europe, signing a New Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia in April 2010, the Ballistic Missile 
Review Report released in 2010 revealed that the Obama administration indeed 
aimed for further modification and expansion of the land- and ship-based BMD 
installations in Europe, under the plans to “defend” against “regional threats” (US 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 2010).  
 While striving to maintain both its strategic alliance with the US and its 
nuclear-deterrence centered self-reliance in armaments, especially under the 
bipartisan consensus on overall threat latency from ballistic missile threats, the UK 
government has opted for infrastructural and technical cooperation. In a written 
memo on April 13, 2000, by then Secretary of State of Defense, Geoff Hoon, under 
Prime Minister Blair’s leadership (Labor Party), expressed support for the US’s 
position on missile defense.65 In a statement to the House, Hoon further declared the 
government’s position that “if there is a United States request for the use for missile 
defence purposes” of UK’s facilities such as the Fylingdales, the UK “will consider it 
                                           
65 HC Deb 9 December 2002, c7-8. 
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seriously” in the ways in which the cooperation would enhance their bilateral 
relations. When the UK received the request from the US in December 2002 to 
upgrade the UK’s early warning radar facilities at RAF Fylingdales for missile 
defense purposes, the UK government displayed support of the US, stating that 
proliferation of asymmetric capabilities would be also serious concerns to the UK, 
for which the UK’s “answer to the US request must be yes, and that [UK] should 
agree to upgrade as proposed.”66 A MOU on the general principles of US-UK 
technical cooperation has been signed on June 12, 2003, between Hoon and the US 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. The MOU stipulated in constructing the 
Joint Missile Defense Center, under which both sides will “manage all missile 
defense related efforts… including: potential UK contributions to the US BMDS 
Program; current and future joint work programs, including activities initiated under 
the SDI MOU [strategic defense initiative], research, testing and procurement; 
…interfaces and collaboration; personnel assignments…; and missile defense 
intelligence relations.”67  
Although the UK’s cooperation with the US’s BMD, including the 
modification of the Fylingdales site to missile defense purposes, have instigated 
speculations on the UK’s possible entanglement into the wars of the US, the UK 
ultimately granted to upgrade the radar systems at the site as requested. Since 2007, 
under Prime Minister Brown (Labor Party), the UK further granted the US’s use of 
                                           
66 HC Deb 15 January 2003, c696-699. 
67 Memorandum of Understanding between Secretary of Defense on behalf of the Department of Defense of 
the United States of America and the Secretary of State for Defence of the UK and Northern Ireland 
concerning Ballistic Missile Defence, June 2003. 
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the satellite communication facilities at RAF Menwith Hill station to complement the 
US’s missile defense system. The Menwith Hill is run by the US National Security 
Agency (NSA), working as critical component of the US’s intelligence-gathering. 
These two joint use of Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill bases in Yorkshire now 
serves as the joint means to detect, track, and, allow interception of incoming 
missiles. By 2007, the Menwith Hill also became the European Ground Based Relay 
Station for the US Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), which is critical 
component of the US’s early warning and tracking system for missiles, developed to 
upgrade the US Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite systems. As elaborated 
earlier, the SBIRS and DSP satellites are important source of information shared to 
the US allies including South Korea and Japan in case of North Korea’s nuclear and 
ballistic missile tests.  
While Prime Minister David Cameron, coming into office since May 2010, 
restored the Conservative Party-led administration in the UK, the 2015 UK SDSR 
appears to reflect overall continuity in “hedging” for autonomous BMD armaments 
while seeking proactive joint production programs in technical realms. The 2015 
SDSR announced the UK’s commitment in building ground-based radar system to 
enhance NATO’s missile defense system. The UK’s hedging through the NATO 
umbrella has been indeed another continuity within the UK government, dating back 
to Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. Shortly put, the UK’s three-pronged strategy 
included “lukewarm” support for direct incorporation into the US’s BMD system, 
while “committing” in cooperation with the US for research, and seeking 
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simultaneous cooperation with the European partners (Kaushal 2019).  
While overall nuclear and ballistic missile threat latency lied at the 
foundation of the UK policy leaders’ lukewarm interest in the autonomous BMD 
acquisitions, the strategic interests in maintaining the US-UK alliance and close 
partnership with the Europe, as well as opportunities for technological and capability 
aggregation in the state-of-the-art technologies, impelled the UK to be keen on 
acquiring BMD related technologies and infrastructures. The UK is in this regard can 
be surmised as ‘proactive’ in BMD, particularly in the cross-national context, as the 
BMD-related cooperation incurred despite concrete, identifiable, and/or immediate 
asymmetric threats.  
Furthermore, the rationale for such proactive approach to the BMD appears 
to have situated upon the specific alliance structure between the US and UK. The 
UK’s maintenance of its own nuclear deterrence – the Trident D5 missiles equipped 
on their four vanguard ballistic nuclear submarines, as of 2018 (IISS 2018) – has 
been indeed critical for the symmetricity in the force structure between the US and 
UK. Given the overall threat latency from asymmetric threats, the UK’s nuclear 
deterrence has been critical in allowing its successful hedging against a kind of BMD 
spree. Opting for nuclear deterrence, the UK remained without any land-based BMD 
systems. Also, at sea, the UK limited its armaments to anti-ship missile defense 
systems, including the Sea Viper deployed on the Type-45 class destroyers and 
Rapier air defense systems that can engage little more than about five miles away in 
range. Nonetheless, to fill possible power vacuum in the BMD capabilities, the UK 
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has proactively extended its symmetric alliance ties with the US to the realms of 
technological and infrastructural cooperation in the BMD. The MOU with the US in 
the establishment of the Missile Defense Center, for instance, made strategic sense to 
work together with the US on expensive software and radar enhancements of its own 
armaments. Particularly in the context of plans to decommission old weapons system 
and reduce military personnel in the 2010s, Table 14, symmetric cooperation with the 
US afforded the UK’s proactive acquisition of technologies to reinforce its 
technological edge and alliance with the US, despite relative threat latency in 
asymmetric capabilities. 
 
Table 14 UK’s Plan for Equipment Decommissioning in the 2010s 
Equipment Schedule 
Army  
Challenger 2 Tank – 40% reduction TBD 
AS90 Heavy Artillery – 35% reduction TBD 
Royal Navy  
Carrier HMS Arik Royal - Decommission 2010 
Remaining 4 Type-22 Frigates - Decommission April 2011 
RFA Largs Bay - Decommission April 2011 
RFA Bayleaf & RFA Fort George - Withdrawal April 2011 
Carrier HMS Illustrious - Withdrawal 2014 
Sea King Mk7 - Withdrawal 2016 
Royal Air Force  
Harrier Fleet – Retire 2011 
VC-10 and Tristar - Withdrawal 2013 
Tornado Fleet (40->18) 2015 
Sentinel Surveillance Aircraft (Withdrawal) 2015 
Source: House of Commons Research Paper (2011).  
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In the high-end satellite and advanced ISR capabilities, despite falling 
defense budget and latent asymmetric threats, the UK maintained its overall 
symmetricity in alliance structure, by seeking self-reliant armaments to maintain its 
strategic edge in the region. The fixed-wings include multiple range of UAVs, such as 
the medium Watchkeeper to heavy MA-9A Reaper UAVs, and diverse AEW Sea 
King aircrafts Sentinel and Shadow ISR aircrafts, RC-135W Rivet Joint electronic 
intelligence aircrafts, and advanced airborne early-warning and control E-3D Sentry 
(IISS 2018). The latter RC-135 variant is one of the ISR assets stationed by USFJ, 
critical to South Korea’s detection and tracing of North Korea’s ballistic missile tests. 
Aside from autonomous fleets, the symmetricity in alliance structure shaped 
the UK’s proactive cooperation with the US in advanced satellite, space-related 
programs with the US. Building upon the Five Eyes signals intelligence alliance 
forged during World War II among the US, UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 
the UK has long institutionalized joint operation of surveillance programs with the 
US. The Joint Forces Command within the UK’s Ministry of Defense, has cooperated 
with the US in overseeing the space, intelligence, information system, and 
cyberspace with access to the Pentagon’s space war games and technologies (e.g. 
US’s Schriever space wargames). In addition to the UK’s autonomous Skynet 
satellites in operation (-4, -5), the UK also closely cooperates with the US’s satellite 
system for military purposes (Norris 2011: 45). The symmetric nature of cooperation 
embedded in the alliance has been critical in the development of the UK’s gradual 
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self-reliant arms acquisition policy in space, particularly after the UK’s Brexit, which 
in essence terminated the UK’s previous space relative activities under the European 
Space Agency (e.g. Galileo satellites). Dating back to the founding of the UK Space 
Agency (UKSA) in 2010, the UK in 2014 and 2015 showcased its first UK National 
Space Policy and National Space Security Policy, respectively. By 2018, the UK 
enacted the UK Space Industry Bill into law, creating a framework for further 
commercial space legislation (Bowen 2017).  
When asymmetric threats from adversaries remained latent, the UK’s 
rationality in seeking proactive armaments in the BMD and ISR sectors has been 
largely driven by their pursuit for regional/global military edge and securing their 
existing bilateral and multilateral security frameworks as source of “additional 
security,” Table 15. Such trend is likely to be aggrandized as the UK, especially in 
the prospective post-Brexit era, will be approaching a new “inflection point” for UK 
to consider serious funding for BMD and ISR armaments. Not only due to Russia and 
North Korea’s accelerated threat of missile capabilities since mid-2010s, which are 
becoming “far beyond previous official expectations,” as Peter Roberts (2018) put, 
but also because the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union would terminate 
previous joint development programs and networks in space and BMD that the UK 
has previously engaged. Going out of the EU would mean the UK’s need for more 
armaments to fill the possible vacuum in their capabilities.  
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Table 15 UK’s Proactive Armaments in the BMD and ISR 
Weapons Details 
BMD 
Lower-end: Ship-based Sea Viper 
 Proactive Joint Initiatives in Technical Research & Infrastructure 
• Technical Research with NATO & US   
• Infrastructural Cooperation: Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) in 
Fylingdales; Granting use of satellite communication facilities at RAF 
Menwith Hill  
Satellites 
Skynet Satellites 
Proactive Joint Initiatives  
• Five Eyes signals intelligence alliance  




• UAVs: medium UAV Watchkeeper; heavy MA-9A Reaper UAVs 
• ACs: Sea King aircrafts; Sentinel; RC-135W Rivet Joint (ELINT), AWACS 
E-3D Sentry 
Source: Listed by author in reference to official reports, IISS Military Database, and SIPRI Database. 
 
 Despite threat latency in asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile threats, the 
symmetry in alliance structure, reinforced by overall consensus on armaments among 
the policy leaders, appear to be central in enabling the continuity in the UK’s reliance 
on its autonomous nuclear deterrence, while seeking proactive means for BMD 
cooperation with the US and armaments in the ISR, Figure 20. The UK’s interests in 
alliance management and search for joint production deals have intervened towards 
proactive armaments in the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR, regardless of overall threat 
latency from asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile threats. 
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(2) Passive Arms Acquisition: Germany 
 
Under overall threat latency from asymmetric threats and increasing 
asymmetric division of labor in force structure, Germany has shown passive arms 
build-up in both BMD and ISR capabilities. Unlike the UK’s pursuit for proactive 
armaments to maintain its technological edge and global and regional presence 
within the parameters of the alliance with the US, Germany appears to have grown 
most lukewarm in autonomous armaments in the state-of-the-art weapons system.  
While the comparison may be less suited as Germany’s reliance on the US’s 
security commitment charters on a multilateral framework under the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) than the bilateral military alliances of the above cases, 
Germany is in many occasions conversed in tandem with South Korea and Japan as 
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the major ‘continental allies’ of the US that house the largest number of US’s military 
personnel and bases on their soil. According to 2015 data on the US’s overseas 
deployment, Germany ranks second with 34,805 military personnel, between Japan 
(39,345) and South Korea (23,468).68 More critically, Germany’s limitations in arms 
acquisitions have drawn significant criticisms from both at home and abroad that 
shed some important implications on South Korea.  
To elaborate, all political stripes of Germany since the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and reunification have pursued drastic cuts in defense spending. Aside from the 
political, economic, and social policy schisms between the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP) and Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which ran the country from 1998-
2005 and 2005-present, respectively, post-militarism has indeed pervaded across the 
political parties. With the reform of the Bundeswehr in 2011, in particular, Germany 
further proceeded to suspend compulsory military service, reduced the total number 
of personnel, and made their military focused on crisis management operations 
(Kunz 2018). Indeed, Germany’s defense in essence came to increasingly reliant on 
the multilateral NATO security framework, including the US and its binational 
security cooperation in Europe, rejecting unilateral operations in principle. Such 
post-military trajectory is generally perceived to be making Germany’s autonomous 
military readiness hollow and “short of almost everything” (Deutsche Welle 2016), 
wherein only a fraction of existing stockpiles of weapons remains fully operational. 
                                           
68 Countries with highest number of US’s overseas deployment (over 10,000 personnel) include, as in the 
order of Japan (39,345), Germany (34,805), South Korea (23,468), and Italy (12,102). US Department of 
Defense (2015).  
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As further criticism goes, the gap between Germany’s own military capabilities and 
that of neighboring partners is making Germany inevitably a country “defended by 
others,”69 the “quintessential European free-rider” (Rough 2018), that is drawing the 
ire from its NATO partner countries, including the US. 
 Germany’s overall passivism for armaments under latent security threats can 
be seen explicitly in the sheer bulk of military expenditures and arms procurement. 
As observable from Table 16, Germany’s total defense budget dwindled to an 
average of spending 1.2% of GDP from 2000-2017.  
 
Table 16 Germany’s Defense Budget (2000-2017), in US$ bil 
Year GDP 





(%) Total FIB Personnel Infra Etc 
2000 1,800 23.6 3.2 14.3 1.2 4.9 13.5%  1.3% 
2001 1,800 21.5 3.0 13.0 0.9 4.6 14.0% -8.9% 1.2% 
2002 2,240 25.1 3.5 14.9 1.1 5.5 14.1% 16.7% 1.1% 
2003 2,410 27.7 3.8 16.6 1.1 6.1 13.8% 10.4% 1.1% 
2004 2,670 29.7 4.4 17.6 1.1 6.6 14.8% 7.2% 1.1% 
2005 2,850 30.2 4.3 17.6 1.1 7.2 14.2% 1.7% 1.1% 
2006 2,880 34.8 5.2 19.9 1.3 8.5 15.0% 15.3% 1.2% 
2007 3,440 38.9 5.7 21.3 1.6 10.3 14.6% 11.6% 1.1% 
2008 3,650 43.3 7.4 23.3 1.8 10.8 17.1% 11.4% 1.2% 
2009 3,400 46.5 8.2 24.7 2.2 11.4 17.6% 7.4% 1.4% 
2010 3,280 42.3 7.4 22.3 2.2 10.4 17.6% -9.0% 1.3% 
2011 3,600 44.2 7.3 23.1 1.8 12.0 16.4% 4.5% 1.2% 
2012 3,400 41.0 6.7 20.7 1.4 12.1 16.5% -7.2% 1.2% 
2013 3,600 44.2 5.6 22.0 1.6 15.0 12.7% 7.8% 1.2% 
2014 3,870 43.1 5.6 21.8 1.6 14.1 12.9% -2.5% 1.1% 
                                           
69 According to journalist Paul Taylor 
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2015 3,370 36.7 4.4 18.3 1.3 12.7 11.9% -14.8% 1.1% 
2016 3,490 38.3 4.7 18.5 1.3 13.8 12.2% 4.4% 1.1% 
2017 3,650 41.7 5.7 20.3 1.6 14.0 13.8% 8.9% 1.1% 
Source: NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, annual series; IISS, Military 
Balance, Annual Series. 
 
As Figure 21 further juxtaposes Germany’s spending on weapons system 
(only force improvement budget, excluding personnel and other military operating 
costs) to South Korea and Taiwan, Germany’s spending on defense articles have 
fallen below the amount spent by South Korea, except for the years in 2009 and 2010. 
Although total defense budget of Germany continued to exceed that of South Korea 
from 2000 to 2017, when it comes to spending on weapons only, excluding the 
personnel, maintenance, and other operating costs, South Korea in fact spent about an 
average of 1.5 times more in armaments than Germany. In 2015 and 2016, South 
Korea spent 2.2 times more. Germany spent only an average of twofold than Taiwan, 
the disparity becoming even more vague in years like 2001 and 2015, as Germany 
spent about 1.2 and 1.4 times more than Taiwan, respectively. Germany appears to be 
the typical model of capability restraint under limited systemic imperatives for 
armaments in the post-Cold War Europe. Interrelated, Germany launched significant 
cuts in military throughout the 2000s, setting out plan to close about 200 military 
bases, decommissioning of armored vehicles and other conventional weapons system. 
The air defense system ModFlaSys has been abandoned and further curtailment 
occurred with Tiger helicopters, TRIGATs, and NH90s.  
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Figure 21 Force Improvement Budget (FIB) by Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan (2000-2017), 
US$ bil 
 
Source: NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, annual series; IISS, Military 
Balance, Annual Series; ROK. Defense White Paper, annual series; Ministry of National Defense, ROC. 
National Defense Report, annual series 
 
Despite Germany’s outright minimalist take on autonomous defense 
capabilities in both BMD and ISR, Table 17, the most intriguing implications from 
the German case arise from the similarities and differences from the UK’s proactive 
interests in cooperation with the US. As the German defense white paper published in 
October 2006 called for the need to enhance reconnaissance, command and control, 
missile defense, and precision strike capabilities to contribute in times of 
international crisis, Germany has shown resilient, although limited, interests in 
joining multilateral efforts in the BMD system as well as acquisitions of European-
made Typhoon aircrafts. To fill any possible force vacuum while Germany 
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patriot batteries to PAC-3s and PAC-3 CRI missiles. Germany has also continued 
investments in multilateral missile defense programs such as the Medium Extended 
Air Defense System (MEADS) with the US and Italy,70 and the European Phased 
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense system (Kaya 2013). Despite threat 
latency, Germany maintained, although limited, multilateral efforts in the state-of-
the-art military ventures. 
 
Table 17 Germany’s Passive Arms Acquisitions in BMD and ISR 
Weapons Details 
BMD 
Lower-end: PAC-2/PAC-3, upgraded from the 1980s 
Some Multilateral Efforts 
- Joint development with US & Italy: Medium Extended Air Defense System 
(MEADS), decision in 2015 to acquire them with continued delays 
(Taktisches Luftverteidigungssystem) 
- the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense system 





- UAVs: Heavy-Medium-light UAVs (Heron, KZO, Luna) 
- Ground-based radars: Cobra, RASIT, RATAC 
Source: Listed by author in reference to official reports, IISS Military Database, and SIPRI Database. 
 
 In cross-national context, Germany’s passive armaments in the BMD and 
                                           
70 When the US’s withdrew from MEADS in 2011, however, Germany also decided to not buy the MEADS 
and instead opted to seek its own Taktisches Luftverteidigungssystem (TLVS) using the technologies and 
know-hows acquired from the MEADS program. See, Gotkowska (2018).  
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ISR have accumulated upon limited systemic imperatives (asymmetric threats), 
asymmetric alliance force structure with the US, reinforced by internal drive for post-
militarism – a typical model of restrained capability aggregation under low threat 
environment in the post-Cold War Europe, Figure 22. 
 




2. South Korea’s Restrained Arms Acquisition in the BMD and 
ISR 
 
1) North Korea’s Asymmetric Threats & Alliance-reliant Armaments 
 
Asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile threats to South Korea have centered on 
North Korea’s emergence as de facto nuclear power by the late 2010s. From the 
1990s to 2017, North Korea went through a total of seventy-five successful test-
launches of their Scud-variant short- (SRBMs) to medium-range ballistic missiles 
(MRBMs), ranging from Hwasong-6 (Scud-C), Hwasong-5 (Scud-B), Hwasong-9 
(Scud-ER, Extended Range), Hwasong-7 (Nodong, Scud-D), recent Scud-C (KN-18) 
and Scud-B (KN-21) variants with maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV), as well as 
Soviet’s Tochka-derived Hwasong-11 (KN-02 or Toksa), placing the region under 





Figure 23 North Korea’s SRBM-MRBM Tests (1990-2017) 
 
Source: Drafted by author, in reference to, the CNS North Korea Missile Test Database, funded by NTI. 
Note: 1990, 1991, 2/5 2016 Nodong, and 2017 Hwasong-5 MaRV tests failed 
 
Beginning with the first underground nuclear test of magnitude of one to two 
kilotons in October 2006, second nuclear test in May 2009, North Korea in the 2010s 
under the latest Kim Jong-un regime (2011-present) embarked upon successive 
nuclear tests and test-firings of longer-range ICBMs and SLBMs,71 including the 
                                           
71 The two main pillars of the so-called “nuclear triad [(ICBM, SLBM, and bombers)]” advanced delivery 
systems for nuclear warheads, See US Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 
Nuclear Matters (2010).  
139 
ICBM-type Hwasong-12 (KN-17), Hwasong-14 (KN-20), and SLBM-type 
Pukkuksong-1 (KN-11), as well as the sixth nuclear test (supposedly hydrogen bomb) 
of the largest magnitude to this date on September 3, 2017 (100-120kt). As North 
Korea for the first time officially alleged to have finally succeeded in test-launching 
of the ICBM-type Hwasong-15 (KN-22) on November 29, 2017, becoming capable 
of targeting distances of up to approximately 13,000km – placing all of the US 
mainland for the first time within North Korea’s target ranges, Table 18 (Klingner 
2017; Lee Geun 2017).  
 
Table 18 North Korea’s Nuclear and ICBM/SLBM Tests (2000-2017) 
Date Nuclear Test (Yield)/Missile (Range) Regime 
Nov-29-2017 ICBM Hwasong-15 (8,500-13,000km: KN-22) Kim Jong-Un  
(4 Nuclear Tests;  
6 ICBM-type Tests;  
6 SLBM-type Tests) 
Sep-3-2017 6th Nuclear Test (100-140 kt)  
Jul-28-2017 ICBM Hwasong-14 (8,000-10,000km: KN-20) 
Jul-4-2017 ICBM Hwasong-14 (8,000-10,000km: KN-20) 
Sep-9-2016 5th Nuclear Test (10 kt) 
Aug-24-2016 SLBM Pukkuksong-1 (1,200km: KN-11) 
Jul-9-2016 SLBM Pukkuksong-1 (1,200km: KN-11) 
Apr-23-2016 SLBM Pukkuksong-1 (1,200km: KN-11) 
Feb-7-2016 ICBM/SLV Taepodong-2/Unha-3 (4,000-10,000km/+) 
Jan-6-2016 4th Nuclear Test (7-10 kt) 
Dec-21-2015 SLBM Pukkuksong-1 (1,200km: KN-11) 
Nov-28-2015 SLBM Pukkuksong-1 (1,200km: KN-11) 
May-9-2015 SLBM Pukkuksong-1 (1,200km: KN-11) 
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Feb-12-2013 3rd Nuclear Test (6-9 kt) 
Dec-12-2012 ICBM/SLV Taepodong-2/Unha-3 (4,000-10,000km/+) 
Apr-13-2012 ICBM/SLV Taepodong-2/Unha-3 (4,000-10,000km/+) 
May-25-2009 2nd Nuclear Test (2.4 kt) Kim Jong-Il  
(2 Nuclear Tests;  
2 ICBM-type Tests) Apr-5-2009 ICBM/SLV Taepodong-2/Unha-3 (4,000-10,000km/+) 
Oct-09-2006 1st Nuclear Test (1-2 kt) 
Jul-5-2006 ICBM/SLV Taepodong-2/Unha-3 (4,000-10,000km/+) 
Source: Compiled by author in reference to, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTOL), ROK 
Ministry of National Defense; CSIS Missile & Defense Project. 
Note: The 2000s also include North Korea’s test-firing of its cruise missiles in 2003 (three times), 2007 (four 
times), 2008 (six times), 2012 (twice), 2015 (four times), and 2017 (four times) – KH-35 and KN-01, 150-
260km). 
 
 While North Korea’s emergence as de facto nuclear power stimulated arms 
build-up by neighboring states in the region, the incremental growth in asymmetric 
nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities appears to have had less immediate effect on 
South Korea’s drive for BMD and ISR capabilities.  
 
2) Case of Missile Defense: Between the US’s BMD and KAMD 
 
To elaborate, South Korea’s strategic considerations on the BMD capabilities 
began upon its dire economic conditions that beset the country since the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. Outlining 3.1 percent of GDP as the defense budget plan for 
FY1999 in 1998, which reflected a drop of 0.4 percent for the first time in the fifty 
years of South Korean history, the IMF constraints indeed drove South Korean policy 
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leaders to focus on building and maintaining “current” and affordable capabilities in 
the late 1990s (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 1998: 2-3). Although the 1998 
Taepodong-launch accelerated Japan’s BMD armaments within the US-led BMD 
architecture, the 1998 and 1999 fiscal conditions of South Korea afforded little room. 
As exemplary, South Korea postponed the payment of 750.1 billion won for Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) from the US to be paid in years after 2000 in order to reduce 
loss from drastic fall in South Korea’s foreign exchange rates (ROK National 
Assembly Secretariat 1999c: 10-11). 96.2 billion won from 3.8 trillion won from 
force improvement expenditure was redirected to meet the government spending on 
military personnel and force operation in 1998 (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 
1999c: 16). In this backdrop, South Korea announced its first formal refusal in 1999 
that South Korea will not acquire nor joint the US-led BMD systems (then, TMD).  
As Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek’s further remarks at the National 
Assembly reveals, South Korea put forth “economic development and social 
development,” “Economic revival” “prioritized over any other national agendas in 
1999,” as the country strived to restore from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 1998: 70). The incipient phase of South Korea’s 
deliberation on the BMD placed the South Korean government to maintain alliance-
dependent defense posture. As Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek further stated, in 
case of North Korea’s missile contingencies, “The USFK’s Patriot missiles can be 
used, when necessary, not only to protect the USFK but also entire Korean Peninsula 
including the metropolitan areas” (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 1998: 70). 
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If the incipient phase of South Korea’s ambivalence to BMD acquisitions 
emerged from its economic distress, South Korea’s restraint soon gained more 
political weight since the early 2000s as South Korean government embarked on 
major inter-Korean reconciliatory agenda, dubbed as the Sunshine Policy, under 
which cooperation with rising China became politically and economically significant. 
As the first progressive government under President Kim Dae-jung came into power 
since 1998 (1998-2003), the threat recognition on North Korea’s asymmetric threats 
has indeed become more contested. Although North Korea announced its withdrawal 
from the NPT in January 2003, the consecutive progressive regime under President 
Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) appeared to further consolidate such “progressive-
conservative” split on threat recognition. While President Lee Myung-bak (2008-
2013) restored conservative-rule since 2008, followed by President Park Geun-hye 
(2013-2017), North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities have continued to be bound to 
dichotomous debate, under which both progressive and conservative regimes became 
bounded to domestic backlash. The attempts for autonomous armaments have ensued 
with criticisms for being ‘revisionist’ to the ROK-US alliance, while limited 
armaments have been criticized for being ‘reconciliatory’ to South Korea’s main 
adversary, North Korea. While such constraints have not been always so static nor 
deterministic, the policy leaders’ contested threat perception and preference for 
regime stability repeatedly found prolonging the status-quo, division of labor, and/or 
alliance-reliant armaments in the BMD and ISR than change.  
The geopolitical context also transformed with the US’s relocation to fight 
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their war on terrorism in the Middle East since 9/11. Unlike how the US’s GPR had 
significant repercussions in accelerating Japan’s active armaments in the BMD, 
South Korea’s armament priorities became further complex as the GPR accompanied 
with the ROK-US agreement in 2006 to transfer the wartime OPCON back to the 
South Korean military (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 1998: 2-3).72 While the 
US’s repositioning involved force reduction from the USFK to dispatch additional 
forces to the Middle East,73 Figure 24, South Korean government’s armament 
priorities went to other conventional realms including armored vehicles, fighter-jets, 
and patrol ships.  
 
Figure 24 US Forces Korea (USFK), Number of Military Personnel (1998-2016) 
 
Source: IISS, The Military Balance, annual series. 
                                           
72 The OPCON was first transferred in July 1950 when North Korea invaded across the 38th parallel, 
triggering the US’s involvement in the Korean War to repel communist expansion on the Korean War. 
The OPCON of ROK forces remained so (UNC), with only a ten-day break in May 1961 during General 
Park Chung-hee’s military coupd’ état. In years 1978-1994, the US retained both wartime and peacetime 
OPCON through its leadership of the US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC). While the peacetime 
OPCON transferred back to South Korean military in 1994, the wartime OPCON remains under CFC 
until today. 
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When North Korea resumed to consecutive ballistic missiles tests and 
launched the first nuclear test in October 2006, South Korean government continued 
to restrain its acquisitions to low-end missile defense capabilities such as the second-
hand ground-based PAC-2 from Germany and ship-based SM-2. Under the 
geopolitical context of increasing economic interdependency and strategic value of 
reconciling North Korea, South Korean government rested ambivalent to BMD 
acquisitions, capping the armaments to low-end and lower-tier assets as interim 
choices, and insisted on building independent Korea Air Missile Defense (KAMD) 
system. As President Roh Moo-hyun’s later remark in his speech on October 1, 2008, 
at the first anniversary of October 4 declaration illustrates, South Korean government 
in the 2000s insisted on refusing the US’s proposals including the regional BMD 
system and new preemptive-oriented “operational plan 5029” that may “provoke 
North Korea and China.74  
As Figure 25 highlights, South Korea’s defense budget categories have 
never treated the BMD in separate bracket. Under a comprehensive classification, 
named as ‘new special guided weapons system,’ the BMD budgets have been treated 
as part of armaments for offensive missile capabilities including the cruise missiles. 
Except for a peak in 2008, the arms procurement budget encompassing the BMD has 
shown continuous fall – a clear divergence between increasing asymmetric threat 
levels and BMD acquisitions. 
                                           
74 President Roh Moo-hyun, October 1, 2008, the first anniversary of October 4 declaration.  
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Figure 25 South Korea’s Expenditures in Special Guided Weapons System (2007-2017), in billion 
won 
Source: DAPA. Defense Acquisition Program Statistical Yearbook, annual series; DAPA. Fiscal Year 
Balance, annual series. 
 
 While North Korea under Kim Jong-un regime has shown unprecedented 
level of asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile tests, the early 2010s continued to 
be further stricken by the government’s reservations on arms spending after the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis. The deepening of economic interdependence and 
assertiveness of China in the region, also constrained South Korea’s BMD 
acquisitions, as explicit in the case of THAAD. South Korea’s “tilting” towards 
China or “swinging” between the US and China (Park Cheol Hee 2015; Kang Tae-
jun 2015; Han Suk-hee 2012; Power 2015) have bereft of neither strategic 
strengthening of the bilateral alliance with the US nor active armaments of its own in 
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South Korea has remained relatively belated and restrained in autonomous BMD 
capabilities despite increasing imminence of asymmetric threats, Figure 26.  
 
Figure 26 South Korea’s BMD Capabilities in Comparative Context 
 
Source: Illustrated by author with data from IISS, Military Balance; Defense White Papers and Government 
reports; in inspiration from BMD weapons diagram by Heritage Foundation, see, Klingner (2015).  
 
 
3) Case of ISR: OPCON Transfer & Armament Priorities 
 
While South Korea’s increasing strategic focus on inter-Korean and ROK-
PRC relations reinforced its asymmetric reliance on the US under the confines of the 
ROK-US combined defense system, this study also finds that the repeated 
interactions in the ROK-US relations and ambivalence to the US-led security 
initiative in the region have transcended to other realms of military cooperation, 
including South Korea’s armaments in the ISR capabilities.  
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The US’s strategic emphasis on the Middle East after the 9/11 became 
intertwined with the US’s relocation of the bases in South Korea and the ROK-US 
agreement in 2006 to transfer the wartime OPCON to South Korean military by 2012. 
Although South Korea strived for active armaments in autonomous ISR capabilities 
to meet the timeline for OPCON transfer, South Korea’s ambivalence to the US-led 
BMD architecture reinforced the asymmetric force structure between South Korea 
and the US. Also, North Korea’s nuclear tests and military provocations since 
October 2006 have ensued with reinforcement of the existing ROK-US combined 
defense system, punctuating the plans for OPCON transfer.  
Following the repeated postponement of OPCON transfer, the budget for the 
state-of-the-art ISR capabilities has continuously dwindled as armament priorities of 
the government went to acquiring other conventional platforms than the costly BMD 
and ISR capabilities, Figure 27. In sheer number, the accumulated sum of arms 
spending from 2007-2017 (availability of data) has been the highest in the category 
of ‘ships/vessels’ with a total of 16.1 trillion won, followed by aircrafts with sixteen 
trillion won, and firepower with 14.6 trillion won. In terms of average from 2007-
2017, budget allocations for ISR and command, control and communications have 
been at the lowest with 340.3 billion won and 198.4 billion won, respectively.  
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Figure 27 South Korea’s Force Improvement Expenditures (2007-2017), in billion won 
Source: DAPA. Defense Acquisition Program Statistical Yearbook, annual series; DAPA. Fiscal Year 














Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare
New Special Guided Weapons System
149 
To clarify, the fluctuations of ISR investments in contingent to OPCON 
transfer plans can be observed as in Figure 28. With the repeated postponements of 
transfer on February 23, 2007, to April 17, 2012, followed by another one on June 26, 
2010, to be transferred by 2015, the FIB allocated for ISR capabilities took a drastic 
fall from 681 billion won in 2010 to 420.5 billion won in 2011. With about sixty 
percent cut from the previous year, the budget plunged further. When OPCON 
transfer schedule was again delayed on October 23, 2014, this time to indeterminate 
“conditioned-based” transfer, the ISR budget fell to the lowest since 2006, to 
allocating 187.5 billion won for FY2015. 
 
Figure 28 South Korea’s ISR Expenditures (2007-2017), billion won 
 
Source: DAPA. Defense Acquisition Program Statistical Yearbook, annual series; DAPA. Fiscal Year 
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As result, alike in the case of the BMD, South Korea’s autonomous 
armaments in the ISR have remained restrained to the lower-end ‘tactical’ weapons 
systems including reconnaissance aircrafts and UAVs75 that provide limited detection 
range beyond the DMZ. Although South Korean government announced in August 
2017 to resume its plans to field five military satellites to be operable by 2023 – the 
“425 Project” (Yonhap News 2017), the program has seen continuous delays. Plans 
to acquire advanced ISR assets including the Global Hawk have been postponed 
repeatedly as South Korean governments spat over the budget.  
Given the situation, the limited detection range of existing fixed-wings has 
kept the US forces indispensable in garnering information and surveillance on North 
Korea’s major nuclear and missile test sites, including Tongchang-ri (missile launch 
site), Punggye-ri (nuclear test site), Sinpo (SLBM test-launch and submarine base), 
and the Pukchang Airfield (major launch sites of Hwasong-12 and -14 ballistic 
missiles) (Pinkston 2014). Without “cross-referencing to information collected by” 
the US’s Keyhole (KH) and DSP military satellites and stationing of advanced 
reconnaissance aircrafts (U-2S stationed at Osan base, RC-7 at Pyeongtaek 
Humphreys), as well as the RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft stationed at Japanese 
Okinawa-Kadena air base, information collected from South Korea’s existing ISR 
                                           
75 The ‘Baekdu’ (Hawker-800SIG), ‘Kumkang’ (Hawker-800RA), and the RF-16 (replacing the old fleets of 
RF-5As in operation since 1972; and RF-4Cs in operation since 1990), as exemplary have been limited to 
observing 100 kilometers range into North Korea beyond the Military Demarcation Line (MDL).; RF-
5As (in operation since 1972) and RF-4Cs (in operation since 1990) have been decommissioned 
completely in year 2007 and 2014, respectively. 
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assets are allegedly “insignificant,”76 Table 19. 
 
Table 19 South Korea's BMD and ISR Capabilities 
Weapons Details 
BMD US PAC-3, PAC-3 MSE, THAAD 
ROK Lower-tier, terminal phase KAMD 
Ground-based: PAC-2, PAC-2 upgraded PAC-3, M-SAM  (final stage of 
development by 2017), L-SAM in development 
Sea-based: SM-2 
Satellites US Keyhole (KH) Satellites, DSP (Defense Support Program) Satellites,  
SBIRS (Space-based Infrared System) 




U-2S, RC-7B, Aegis & Global Hawks (not permanent) + RC-135 (USFJ) 
ROK Low-High Mix 
In ties to KAMD: 
- Peace Eye (Airborne Early Warning Aircraft) 
- Green Pine Radars (Israel) 
- AN/SPY-1D (aegis destroyers) 
Tactical UAVs: 
- Songgolmae (homegrown, 1991 -> operation since 2002), Harpy, 
RemoEye 
- Searcher (Israel), Heron (Israel) 
Tactical ISR/SIGINT ac:  
- Baekdu & Kumkang, RF-16, Refurbished Baekdu (Falcon 2000) 
AEW&C: B-737 (4, delivered since 2011) 
 
                                           



































































3. Summary of Findings 
 
Figure 30 Summary of Cross-national Comparison 
 
 
Placed in cross-national context to other US allies, Figure 30, South Korea has shown 
relatively ‘restrained’ armaments in autonomous BMD and ISR capabilities. Despite 
increasing imminence of asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile threats from North 
Korea, the asymmetric division of force structure within the ROK-US alliance has 
reinforced South Korea’s reliance on the US’s provision of extended nuclear 
deterrence and stationing of advanced BMD and ISR equipment. Yet, rather than 
mere systemic outcome (given threats and alliance structure), policy leaders’ 
vacillating threat perception on North Korea’s asymmetric threats and policy 
preference for arms acquisition policy have accumulated to South Korea’s recurrence 
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to alliance-reliant armaments in the BMD and ISR. The policy leaders’ concerns for 
budget, preference for other offensive strike capabilities, and increasing strategic 
concerns on inter-Korean reconciliation and ROK-PRC relations have reinforced the 
structural influence from the imbalance in asymmetric capabilities with North Korea 
and the asymmetric division of force structure within the ROK-US combined defense 
system in determining South Korea’s arms acquisition patterns. 
 South Korea’s restrained armaments in the BMD and ISR drew stark 
contrasts to Japan and Taiwan, regardless of how the three major US allies and 
partners in the Northeast Asian region have shared similar changes in increasing 
asymmetric threats and transformation in the US’s strategy in the region, Table 20. 
The higher convergence on threat perception on asymmetric threats upon security 
junctures including North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear tests and China’s 
military contestations in the region has been critical in reinforcing Japan’s ‘active’ 
armaments in the BMD and ISR.  
Although Taiwan has shown ‘restrained’ armaments in comparison to Japan, 
Taiwan revealed more ‘active’ armaments in both BMD and ISR when juxtaposed to 
South Korean case. Taiwan has actively armed for BMD, even at the expense of other 
capabilities, given the overwhelming power asymmetry between Taiwan and China, 
absence of formal security treaty with the US (asymmetric alliance), contesting for 
formal recognition as independent state in the international community. Driven by the 
rationality for symbolical capability aggregation from fostering close alliance ties in 
armaments with the US, Taiwan managed for at least more active armaments in the 
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BMD and ISR than South Korea, despite their strenuous resource restraints with arms 
spending limited to about a third of South Korea’s military expenditures.  
 
Table 20 Cross-national Comparison on BMD & ISR Capabilities: Overview 




O O O 
Keyhole (KH) Satellites, DSP (Defense Support Program) Satellites, SBIRS 
(Space-based Infrared System), 
Ind 







Advanced Advanced X 
PAC-3, THAAD PAC-3, SM-2/3 - 
Ind 
Lower-end Advanced Low-High Mix 
PAC-2 (+upgrades), 
SM-2 




Low-High Mix Advanced X 
U-2S, RC-7B 
+ RC-135 (USFJ) 
RC-135, E-3B Sentry 
(Kadena Air Base) 
Not Stationed 
Ind 
Lower-end Low-High Mix Lower-end 
Baekdu (Hawker-
800SIG - SIGINT), 
Kumkang (Hawker-




E-767 (AWACS), E-2C, 
EP-3 (SIGINT) 
RF-4E/EJ (Recon ac), 
YS-11EB (ELINT) 
Mastiff III (light UAV) 













Limited Scope Nation-wide Scope Limited Scope 
Aegis (AN/SPY-1D) 





Phased Array Warning 
System 
Source: Listed by author in reference to official reports, IISS Military Database, and SIPRI Database. 
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 Intriguing implications could be drawn from how other US allies have 
shown higher correlation between the structural (independent) variables and 
armament patterns in the BMD and ISR. Japan and Taiwan have been the explicit 
cases. Germany has been another typical case, wherein the state pursued ‘passive’ 
armaments in the BMD and ISR, given the overall threat latency from asymmetric 
nuclear and ballistic missile threats. The limited threat perception and pervasive post-
militarism in arms acquisitions among the political stripes have reinforced such 
passivism in the state-of-the-art military ventures and asymmetric reliance on the US 
than autonomous armaments. As in the case of the UK, despite latent threats and 
symmetry in alliance based on its indigenous nuclear deterrence capabilities, the 
policy leaders’ consensus on alliance management, technology acquisitions, and 
interest in maintaining the UK’s regional and global security role have impelled the 
UK to seek ‘proactive’ cooperation in BMD with the US and armaments in the ISR.  
 South Korean case has indeed become more distinctive in this respect, as it 
resembled more to the US allies like the UK, which under latent asymmetric threats, 
particularly in the realms of BMD tried to pursue self-reliant, hedging strategy, while 
limiting cooperation with the US to joint infrastructural cooperation. South Korea 
also resonated the passive arms acquisition pattern of Germany. South Korea retains 
distinctive divergence from the US allies under imminent asymmetric threats, 
wherein the countries like Taiwan and Japan have been more active in autonomous 
armaments. Placed in such cross-national context, South Korea retains its distinctive 
‘complacency’ for alliance-reliant BMD and ISR capabilities as most of other US 
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allies, regardless of given constraints and threat latency, showed higher level of 
autonomous armaments in the BMD and ISR. Through cross-national 
contextualization, this section of study has been an attempt to explain the variation 
among the US allies through varying combination of common variables, placing 








1. Restraint under Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998-2003) 
 
The Kim Dae-jung administration, coming into office in February 1998, retained 
overall reluctance in acquiring the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR capabilities. At the 
foundation of restraint lied President Kim Dae-jung’s landmark Sunshine Policy, 
which, newly put forth a reconciliatory approach to North Korea. As the first 
progressive candidate to assume office in South Korean government, the Kim 
administration presented an alternative way of understanding North Korea and belief 
that the policy of positive-sum approach, engagement, and mutual recognition can 
bring changes in North Korea. With the ideals of Sunshine policy, which placed 
primacy on “peace over war” (Kim Dae-jung 2010), President Kim perceived arms 
build-up and alliance as double-sided swords for both security and the vicious cycle 
of arms race and military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, regarding 
“reconciliation, interaction and cooperation” as the “best possible option” (Moon 
Chung-in and Boo Seungchan 2013: 127) instead in “lead[ing] North Korea down a 
path toward peace, reform and openness.”77 With the reconciliatory Sunshine Policy 
                                           
77 Speech delivered by President Kim Dae-jung on April 4, 1998, at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, London University.; Office of the President, the Republic of Korea (1999: 63-64). 
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at the forefront of national agenda, the Kim Dae-jung administration lended little 
room for new investments in the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR capabilities. With 
emphasis on economic revival from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and setting 
amicable relations with regional powers including China as critical pillar of the 
administration’s Sunshine policy, North Korea’s incremental asymmetric threats and 
military provocations have not ensued with commensurate interests in politically 
thorny BMD and expensive ISR capabilities.  
 
1) Reconciling with Non-nuclear North Korea  
 
The reluctance for the BMD capabilities under the Kim Dae-jung administration has 
accumulated upon the early debates in the 1990s, when North Korea’s series of 
Nodong ballistic missile tests on May 29, 1993, followed by the first nuclear crisis in 
June 1994, prompted the USFK to station five PAC-2 batteries. With the start of the 
USFK’s deployment of Patriot systems in 1994, debates reinstated within South 
Korean Ministry of National Defense, particularly as the discussions coincided with 
the need to replace the military’s aging Nike-Hercules air-defense missiles, known as 
the surface-to-air missile experimental “SAM-X” program. Yet, the earlier 
discussions have been predominated by concerns over, very simply, the cost-
effectiveness of the program. Given Seoul’s geographic proximity to North Korea’s 
forward-deployed long-range artilleries and rockets across the border that place 
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Seoul within forty to fifty kilometers of target-range, South Korea’s armaments took 
priority in offensive missile capabilities that were perceived as cheaper, cost-effective 
assurance of second-strike capabilities, enough to deter and dissuade North Korea 
from missile provocations that remained at the incipient phase of development.  
Diplomatic concerns of South Korean government also became more 
multidimensional as President Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik and President Kim Young-
sam’s Globalization set engagement with North Korea’s traditional allies including 
former Soviet Union (Russia) and China as important means for the stability of the 
Korean Peninsula. Thus, while the USFK’s deployment of Patriot batteries 
invigorated discussions on South Korea’s development of new air and missile 
defense program, South Korea’s considerations included not only the US-origin high-
end expensive Patriot systems, but also Russia’s Almaz-Antey S-300 (SA-10 within 
NATO), which was offered as part of the so-called “bul-gom” weapons deal. To pay 
down its heavy debt incurred from South Korea in the early 1990s, Russia proposed 
for technology transfer and sales of discounted military equipment in return. The 
negotiations on possible license production of S-300 continued onto October 1996, 
until the US’s concerns for interoperability between the US and South Korea’s 
defense systems pressured the South Korean government to forego such an option.  
Such US’s “advice, or pressure,” as Joshua H. Pollack (2017) put, on South 
Korea to acquire or join the US-led BMD initiatives have been present, well before 
North Korea’s Nodong missile tests in 1993. Dating back to April 1985, the US 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked South Korea to participate in the SDI 
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put forth during the Reagan administration. While the basic ideas of developing 
networked, interceptive technologies against ballistic missiles remained, the SDI 
scaled down to the so-called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) 
under President George H. W. Bush, followed by the Clinton Administration’s 
Ballistic Missile Defense Initiative (BMDI). North Korea’s Nodong missile tests in 
May 1993 ensued with the US Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutsch’s proposal 
to launch joint research team during his visit to Seoul in September 1993. In June 
1996, the USFK commander (nominee at the time of statement) John H. Tielelli, Jr. 
stated that “TMD” is needed to be deployed on the Korean Peninsula during his 
speech at the Senate confirmation hearing. In April 1997, Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen visited Seoul to again demand South Korea to purchase Patriot 
missiles.  
By the time when Kim Dae-jung administration came into office in 1998, the 
cost concerns that predominated the 1990s aggravated as the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis afforded only 0.1 percent increase in defense budget for 1998. Considering 
how South Korea accumulated to an average of about eleven percent annual growth 
in defense budget from 1990 to 1997, the Kim Dae-jung administration emerged 
upon drastic turn in South Korea’s defense budget trends. The portion of defense 
budget in total government budget dwindled to 18.3 percent in 1998 from an average 
of twenty-three percent from 1990-1997, about 2.4 percent decrease from 1997 (20.7 
percent). In 1999, South Korea for the first time experienced actual defense budget 




Table 21 South Korea’s Defense Budget (1990-1999), in billion won 
Year Defense Budget DB Increase (%) DB/GDP (%) DB/Government Budget (%) 
1990 6,637.80 10.4 3.36 24.2 
1991 7,476.40 12.6 3.13 23.8 
1992 8,410.00 12.5 3.08 25.1 
1993 9,215.40 9.6 2.97 24.2 
1994 10,075.30 9.3 2.75 23.3 
1995 11,074.40 9.9 2.58 21.3 
1996 12,243.40 10.6 2.54 20.8 
1997 13,786.50 12.6 2.6 20.7 
1998 13,800.00 0.1 2.63 18.3 
1999 13,749.00 -0.4 2.38 16.4 
Source: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, annual series. 
 
The first two years of the Kim Dae-jung administration, in this backdrop, 
called for what can be interpreted as ‘three-pronged restraints’ in armaments, calling 
for armament priorities in enhancing “existing capabilities,” “homegrown 
armaments,” and “minimizing” foreign arms purchases that require foreign capital 
(ROK National Assembly Secretariat 1998: 8). Large foreign military purchase 
programs were indeed postponed in the first year of Kim Dae-jung government, 
including the payment of 750.1 billion won for FMS agreement with the US to be 
paid after 2000, in order to curtail loss from South Korea’s drastic depreciation in its 
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currency at the time (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 1999c: 10-11). The 1999 
budget plan as presented by Defense Ministry at the National Defense Committee on 
September 11, 1999, again placed emphasis on “utmost minimization” of acquisition 
programs requiring foreign capital (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 1998: 35). 
As Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek stated, “Economic revival” was “prioritized 
over any other national agendas in 1999.”78 The Kim Dae-jung administration’s first 
formal refusal to acquire nor join the US-led BMD (then TMD) system in 1999, in 
response to North Korea’s Taepodong-launch in 1998, set upon such severe 
economic conditions that revamped South Korea’s concerns on the cost-effectiveness 
of the system.  
Aside from the economic factor in setting the parameters of South Korea’s 
armament patterns in BMD, however, this dissertation finds that the cost concerns 
have been reinforced in foundation by the administration’s signature Sunshine Policy. 
Putting forth a reconciliatory approach to North Korea under the conviction that the 
policy of positive-sum approach and engagement is the best possible alternative,79 
arms spending in general under the Kim administration remained limited, in ties to 
the government’s emphasis on economic revival from the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis. The statement by Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil at the National Assembly is an 
exemplary reflection of the point, as he mentioned that “our government in 
foundation hopes for resolutions in North Korea’s missile problems through dialogue 
                                           
78 Response by then Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek, see, ROK National Assembly Secretariat (1998: 70). 
79 Speech delivered by President Kim Dae-jung on April 4, 1998, at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, London University.; Office of the President, the Republic of Korea (1999: 63-64). 
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and cooperation.”80  
Interrelated, the Kim Dae-jung administration also inherited South Korea’s 
threat concerns on North Korea’s conventional arsenal than the asymmetric missiles 
per se. Recognizing the “missile problems” to be resolved through dialogues between 
“the US and North Korea,” as stated by Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil (ROK National 
Assembly Secretariat 2001a: 55), Defense Minister Kim Dong-shin in clarifying 
South Korea’s position on missile defense stated that the “more imminent threats” for 
South Korea are “North Korea’s artilleries at the Military Demarcations Line 
(MDL).”81 As the defense budget bill for FY2000 highlights, the ninety-six percent 
of the FIB – 5.1 out of 5.3 trillion won – have been directed to continued programs to 
enhance the capabilities of existing defense systems including the self-propelled 
artilleries. While the rest of the budget, 194.8 billion won, has been allocated to new 
arms procurement programs, the budget went to acquiring additional KF-16 fighter-
jets, ‘636 project’ (acquiring three kilo-class submarines from Russia – 20 billion 
won), and other ground and ship-based conventional strike capabilities (135.5 billion 
won) (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 1999d: 18-19). 
When the Sunshine Policy seemed to prevail in ameliorating tensions in 
inter-Korean relations by the turn of the landmark inter-Korean summit held in June 
2000, the Kim administration has shown continued cuts in force improvement 
expenditures throughout the term. While the first two years of cuts in 1998 and 1999 
                                           
80 Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil, see, ROK National Assembly Secretariat (2001a: 55). 
81 Then Defense Minister Kim Dong-shin, ROK National Assembly Secretariat. (2001c: 54). 
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were made for recovery in economy and cover the shortfalls in operating costs of the 
military, the years after June 2000 inter-Korean summit have shown further cutbacks. 
The 2001 force improvement expenses, for instance, reflected 2.4 percent decrease 
from the previous year, and the portion of total force improvement spending from 
GDP saw continued decline from 0.97 percent in 1998 to 0.84 percent in 2000, and 
further down to 0.72 percent by 2002, Table 22.82  
 
Table 22 Force Improvement Expenditures (FIB) under Kim DJ Administration, in trillion won 
Year 











1998 5.1 8.7 13.8 524.5 0.97% 2.6% 
1999 5.2 8.5 13.7 576.9 0.91% 2.4% 
2000 5.3 9.1 14.4 635.2 0.84% 2.3% 
2001 5.2 10.2 15.4 688.2 0.76% 2.2% 
2002 5.5 10.9 16.4 761.9 0.72% 2.1% 
Source: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, annual series. 
 
Also, in 2001, the actual force improvement expenditures – 5.3 trillion won 
– incurred about 11.2 percent of cutbacks in actual spending from about 5.9 trillion 
won originally approved by the National Assembly National Defense Committee in 
2000, Table 23 (Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea 2002: 146). Also, 
                                           
82 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, annual series. 
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2.4 percent of the FIB have been diverted to spending on enhancing labor conditions 
of the military personnel (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2000b: 8-9). 
 
Table 23 Cuts in Force Improvement Budget (FIB) during Kim DJ Administration, in billion won 
FIB 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Planned 5,309.2 5,799.6 5,660.6 5,875 5,701.9 
Cut 219.1 569.2 316.9 660.9 226.3 
Actual FIB 5,090.2 5,230.4 5,343.7 5,214.1 5,475.6 
Percentage 
of FIB Cuts 
(%) 
4.1% 9.8% 5.6% 11.2% 4.0% 
Source: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea (2002: 146). 
 
 Reconciling North Korea during the Kim Dae-jung administration also left 
the BMD question highly contingent to South Korea’s diplomatic relations with 
China and Russia. South Korean representatives, as anonymous interviewee recalled, 
repeatedly conveyed the Kim administration’s concerns during meetings with the US 
embassy delegates in Seoul in 1998, that South Korea’s joining of the “ongoing TMD 
program between the US and Japan” would trigger strong oppositions from China.83 
Considering China as critical pillar of successful implementation of the Sunshine 
Policy – bringing out North Korea from isolation and repeated patterns of military 
confrontation – North Korea’s incremental asymmetric threats and military 
provocations have not ensued with commensurate interests in BMD as it remained 
                                           
83 Anonymous interview by author, October 30, 2018. 
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politically thorny in ROK-PRC relations. As South Korea’s formal announcement in 
March 1999 stated, South Korea decision to not join nor acquire the US-led BMD 
systems was set upon not only the problems of economic and technological 
complexity of the weapons system, but the high likelihood of raising “concerns from 
neighboring countries.”84 Resisting the US’s call for South Korea’s participation in 
the US-led BMD (then TMD) architecture in the region, Defense Minister Chun 
Yong-taek urged “TMD” not effective in defense against immediate North Korean 
threats and prodded how “the USFK’s Patriot missiles can be used, when necessary, 
not only to protect the USFK but also entire Korean Peninsula including the 
metropolitan areas.”85  
 The administration’s reconciliatory pursuit towards North Korea also placed 
its BMD options under the influence of Russia. As the US President George W. Bush 
newly inaugurated in 2001, announcing determination to build networked BMD 
system that would include the “theater missile defense (TMD) system” with Japan 
and the region, the Kim administration’s main concerns lied in how President Bush’s 
hardlined approach to North Korea and outward pressure for B(T)MD system in the 
region would cripple the administration’s previous efforts to convince North Korea to 
give up their asymmetric arsenal. Preserving the Sunshine Policy at the forefront of 
the national agenda, President Kim in meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin 
in February 2001 came down to a joint statement that included the phrase that the 
                                           
84 Statement by the ROK Ministry of National Defense, announced by Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek, 
March 1999. 
85 Response by then Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek, see, ROK National Assembly Secretariat (1998: 70). 
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1972 US-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), was important for the 
“strategic stability” of the world.86 Considering that the treaty was striked to ban 
anti-missile weapons systems, the joint statement signaled South Korea’s opposition 
to the BMD system. Although President Kim Dae-jung in his first meeting with 
President George W. Bush in the following month, in March 2001, tried to dilute the 
significance of the statement, that the phrase “in no way reflects [South Korea’s 
position] on the National Missile Defense (NMD) issues,” and how South Korea 
“resisted to the very end” against Russia’s “very strong[…] wish to include such a 
phrase” (US Office of the Press Secretary 2001), it was clear how Kim 
administration’s determination in reconciling North Korea took precedent in both its 
armament and alliance options in BMD.  
Furthermore, reconciling North Korea’s missile problems through “dialogue,” 
as Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil stated (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2001: 
55), the armament priorities also became increasingly distant from meeting direct 
security threats from North Korea under the Kim Dae-jung administration. President 
Kim Dae-jung in his March 19 speech to graduates of the Naval Academy at Chinhae 
in 2001 put forth building the so-called “blue navy force” to protect South Korea’s 
national interests and international peace beyond the regional waters. As the 2001 
defense budget plan highlighted, the Kim administration began to shift the armament 
focus from North Korea to wider array of potential threats, highlighting arms build-
up in maritime and air forces beyond the Korean Peninsula. Demonstrating the 
                                           
86 February 27, 2001, the Blue House. 
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confidence that the Sunshine Policy will succeed, the most of the declining FIB went 
to naval and air force developments, spending about 4.9 trillion won in 2001 (out of 
5.3 trillion total force improvement expenditure) to continued investments in 
enhancing South Korea’s conventional capabilities, including the Korean Destroyer 
eXperimental (KDX) destroyers. The rest of the 2001 FIB – 335 billion won – went 
to newly initiated programs, including the AH-X program for next-generation 
helicopters (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2000b: 16-17).  
Signposts of how North Korean threats become intervened by the 
government’s reconciliatory North Korea policy can be further observed in other 
occasions, such as continued emphasis on engagement with North Korea despite the 
outbreak of first battle of Yeonpyeong in June 1999. Then Minister of Unification 
Lim Dong Won, keyman of President Kim’s Sunshine Policy, stated that despite the 
military clash, “the government finds it advisable” to continue its “reconciliation and 
cooperation together with the efforts to acquire North Korea’s pledge to prevent 
recurrence of provocations” – pursuit for more “contacts, dialogues, negotiations, and 
cooperation to alleviate such tensions” (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 1999a: 
16). According to Director of National Intelligence Service (NIS) Ko Young-koo’s 
briefing during closed intelligence committee meeting, leaked to public on July 9, 
2003, North Korea has conducted about seventy times of heavy bombing 
experiments since 1997 and South Korean government has been aware of it since 
April 1998. Yet, despite North Korea’s disclosure on its possession of uranium 
enrichment program in October 2002, Minister of Unification Jeong Se-hyon stated 
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“cutting-off inter-Korean relations is more likely to push the Korean Peninsula into 
crisis” (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2002: 20). 
 
 
2) Reinforcing Alliance-reliant Armaments  
 
(1) Alliance-reliant BMD from Resistance to Limited Concessions  
 
In brief, South Korea’s BMD capabilities against North Korea’s increasing 
asymmetric arsenal rested on the USFK’s Patriot batteries (PAC-2) throughout the 
Kim Dae-jung administration. As elaborated above, such alliance-dependence arose 
from the government’s initial resistance and refusal to acquire nor join the US-origin 
BMD systems.  
Yet, while the government’s reconciliatory policy lied at the foundation of 
its restraint in BMD, the Kim administration’s efforts to make the Sunshine Policy 
survive under the newly inaugurated Bush administration also pushed the South 
Korean government to make late concessions towards the US’s call for BMD 
systems. Opting for alliance-dependence in place of its own armaments in the BMD, 
with limited concessions in the latter years of the government, South Korea’s arming 
towards BMD, although subtle and reluctant, can be observed.  
To elaborate, in implementation of the Sunshine policy, the Kim Dae-jung 
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administration’s no-B(T)MD policy came across serious challenges when President 
George W. Bush came into the Oval Office in 2001. Even before the outbreak of 9/11 
in 2001 that led President Bush to designate North Korea as one of the “axis of evil” 
and “rogue” states, President Bush has been outward with his skepticism to 
reconciliatory policy in general. Seeing the Clinton Administration’s 1994 Agreed 
Framework as policy failure, President Bush in his first meeting with President Kim 
in March 2001 clearly delivered his “skepticism” on North Korea, that it is still 
“shipping weapons around the world” and “their ability to develop and spread 
weapons of mass destruction [have not] stopped” (US Office of the Press Secretary 
2001). The ROK-US relations at the meeting were also at unease from South Korea’s 
joint statement with Russia in the previous month that signaled South Korea’s 
support for the 1972 ABM treaty.  
Concessions seemed inevitable as President Kim Dae-jung strived to 
reconfirm the US’s continued support for South Korea’s Sunshine Policy during his 
first meeting with President Bush. President Kim Dae-jung, prior to the visit to 
Washington in March, announced that although limited, South Korea would develop 
its “own MD system” that are specific to South Korea’s “own conditions” and that 
the joint statement with Russia did not in any way signal South Korea’s opposition to 
BMD. In April 2001, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Han Seung-soo also 
rendered increasing support for the US’s BMD initiative, that “the government will 
closely cooperate with the US to make the US’s NMD provide positive influence on 
the security and peace of the Korean Peninsula and reconciliation and cooperation in 
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inter-Korean relations” (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2001b: 38). The 2001 
defense budget plan that outlined to newly build blue navy forces indeed included the 
acquisition plans to acquire standard-missile equipped aegis destroyers, which the 
Bush administration mostly welcomed as South Korea’s first step towards 
establishing maritime BMD system. During a closed meeting between the US and 
South Korean high-level officials from foreign and defense ministry in October 2002, 
convened by the support of the US’s Missile Defense Agency, both sides agreed for 
“incremental” construction of MD in cooperation. The 2002 budget bill in allocating 
FIB for SAM-X included deliberations for PAC-3 (ROK National Assembly 
Secretariat 2001d: 2). Juxtaposed to the government’s initial remarks that T(B)MD 
are ineffective to South Korea’s deterrence against North Korean threats, incremental, 
although implicit, changes in the government’s approach to BMD-related armaments 
are observable.  
Regardless of the concessions, however, actual investments in BMD 
remained distant. Out of the 2002 actual expenditures – 5.6 trillion won, 105.2 billion 
won have been redirected from FIB budget to make up for operating costs (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 2003c: 21). 1.1 trillion won went to equipment 
maintenance cost, 148.6 billion won of defense sharing budget for construction costs 
went to building non-military facilities of the USFK, and FMS repayment budget 
fifty-one billion won went to repay weapons system that have been in the roll out for 
the past twenty years. After the Second Yeonpyeong battle on June 29, 2002, 20.5 
billion of the FIB have been diverted to related expenses (ROK National Assembly 
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Secretariat 2003c: 24). Despite the Kim administration’s relative transition towards 
BMD acquisitions in 2001, the FIB budget for 2002 cannot be hardly said to have 
gone to implementing actual investments in the sector. From resistance to limited 
concessions under the US-reliant BMD capabilities, South Korea pursued reluctant 
armaments in the sector. 
 
(2) Alliance-reliant ISR Capabilities 
 
Although North Korea’s Taepodong-launch over Japan on August 31, 1998, 
renewed the Kim administration’s interest in ISR capabilities, the Kim Dae-jung 
administration’s armaments in the ISR remained within the parameters of the ROK-
US combined defense system. South Korea’s formal announcements after North 
Korea’s military provocations have, for instance, repeatedly stressed the ‘seamless’ 
ROK-US cooperation in response to the incidents. At the national assembly plenary 
session held on three days after North Korea’s Taepodong-launch on June 15, 1999, 
Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae claimed South Korea’s response and military 
readiness at sea have been “perfect than ever” upon “the ROK-US combined defense 
system” (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 1999a: 25). Alliance-reliance has been 
presented as pragmatic, considering how the ISR realms requires “enormous budget 
and time,” according to Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae. Thus although South Korean 
military is in pursuit of “long-term goal” in acquiring autonomous ISR capabilities, 
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there remains limitations” making the ROK-US combined defense system 
indispensable (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2000a: 14). His successors 
offered similar statements, as Defense Minister Kim Dong-shin reconfirmed that 
South Korea’s defense against North Korea’s military threats bases on “ROK-US 
combined defense system” – by “combined operation” of ROK-US intelligence 
assets, South Korea maintains “twenty-four hour precision surveillance” (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 2001b: 40). By the end of the Kim Dae-jung 
administration, Prime Minister Kim Suk-soo also testified at the National Assembly 
National Defense Committee, that reliance on the US’s security provisions remains 
vital to South Korea’s defense system as it is “very difficult” to fill the vacuum on its 
own and will be “economically severe” should South Korea try to do so (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 2002: 31). 
The Kim Dae-jung administration’s major ISR procurements in this 
backdrop have been restrained to the rollout of Baekdu and Kunkang aircrafts 
commissioned during the Kim Young-sam administration, and annual spending on 
acquiring tactical UAVs since the spending about 19.4 billion won as response to the 
first Yeonpyeong battle in 1999 (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2003c: 24). 
Shortfalls in funding remained as the enduring norm in South Korea’s ISR 
acquisitions. The budget for ISR capabilities in 1998, as exemplary, has been 
constrained to 82.8 billion won, about two percent of total FIB. Considering how two 
percent of the FIB in 1997, 76.1 billion won, were spent solely on meeting the loss 
arising from drastic fall in foreign exchange rates, South Korea’s investment in the 
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ISR remained meager at the outset of the administration. For the defense budget plan 
for 1999, only two new projects have been introduced for ISR capabilities with 4.2 
billion won – 0.1 percent of total FIB for 1999 (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 
1999d: 18-19). Maintenance of “24hrs surveillance” and preparation against North 
Korea’s missiles, according to Defense Minister Chun and Prime Minister Kim Jong-
pil, was allegedly provided by the “ROK-US combined intelligence forces” (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 1998: 70) such as the U-2 (ROK National Assembly 
Secretariat 1999b: 85). 
The sluggish progress in South Korea’s ISR armaments ran parallel to the 
administration’s reconciliatory policy towards North Korea, which afforded mid- to 
long-term policy in armaments than the need for immediate arms build-up. Partly it 
was the overall perception that South Korea has already acquired military superiority 
over North Korea as early as in the 1980s, according to Hamm Taik-young (1999; 
2005), as well as the remnants of the Asian Financial Crisis that restrained South 
Korea’s new investments in ISR realms slow and limited. The Kim Dae-jung 
administration’s national defense agenda, entitled building “new national defense for 
the twenty-first century” (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2002: 32-33), was in 
essence directed towards mid- to long-term policy goals to prepare for various threats 
beyond traditional North Korean military aggressions. Building upon the 1996 
National Space Development Plan which aimed for indigenous production and 
launch of small satellite by 2010, the Kim Dae-jung administration began to seriously 
engage in research and development for launch-rockets since 1999. In December 
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2000, the Kim administration revised the Space Development Basic Plan, laying out 
step-by-step plans to develop satellite launch vehicles (SLV) and construction plans 
for space center. Rather than procuring costly BMD and ISR armaments, the Kim 
Dae-jung administration placed emphasis on developing indigenous missile and 
space related programs. Negotiating with the US to revise the previous 1979 ROK-
US Memorandum of Agreement (MoA), which limited South Korean ballistic missile 
range to 180 kilometers and 500 kilograms in payload in exchange for the US’s 
provision of technical assistance for South Korea’s missile development, the Kim 
administration replaced the MoA with new ROK-US missile guidelines in 2001. The 
missile range extended to 300 kilometers. While the payload continued to be limited 
for 500-kilogram payload, the new missile guidelines lifted the cap on payload for 
cruise missiles as well as the range of cruise missiles under 500-kilogram payload.  
With extended range and payload under the new ROK-US missile guidelines, 
the Kim Dae-jung administration also agreed to join the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) in 2002, which the South Korean government has previously 
refused to do so from the fear that the MTCR will place bars to South Korea’s 
indigenous development of missile capabilities. Indeed, rather than advanced and 
costly BMD and ISR capabilities, missiles and other precision-strike capabilities 
have taken primacy in South Korea’s armament choices as cheaper alternative to the 
BMD and ISR capabilities. As Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil stated, South Korea’s 
response to North Korea’s missile threats included reinforcing the ROK-US 
combined defense system as well as procuring 300km-range missiles that can reach 
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up to Pyongyang and thereby function as cost-effective deterrence to North Korea’s 
missile attacks (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 1999b: 29).  
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2. Fleeting Pursuit for Self-reliant Armaments under Roh Moo-hyun 
Administration (2003-2008)  
 
1) Continued Reconciling with North Korea 
 
Despite the standoff in inter-Korean relations arising from North Korea’s disclosure 
of its HEU program in 2002 and withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003, the 
Roh Moo-hyun administration, coming into office in February 2003, put forth its 
‘Peace and Prosperity Policy.’ Inheriting Kim Dae-jung administration’s Sunshine 
Policy and placing primacy in inter-Korean reconciliation at the forefront of the 
national agenda, the Roh administration strived to seek peaceful resolution of North 
Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile problem through dialogue and engagement 
(diplomacy) than commensurate armaments.  
More explicit than Kim Dae-jung administration, such reconciliatory policy 
toward North Korea intervened in perceiving North Korea’s increases asymmetric 
capabilities. As one of the earlier remarks by the policy executives of the government, 
Prime Minister Goh Kun in response to questions on the government’s assessment of 
North Korea’s nuclear problem insisted that despite North Korea’s alleged 
announcement on its possession of uranium enrichment program, it remains unclear 
whether North Korea possesses de facto nuclear capacity (ROK National Assembly 
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Secretariat 2003b: 28). Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC)87 
Kwon Jin-ho’s remarks at one of the plenary session at the national assembly is 
particularly notable, as his response to the question, “is North Korea our main 
adversary,” stated that North Korea is “main threat than main adversary” (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 2004a: 25). To the same question, then Defense 
Minister Yoon Kwang-woong concurred, although ambiguously, that “the Ministry of 
National Defense may interpret [North Korea] as ‘main military threat’” (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 2004a: 25). During the National Defense Committee 
session held at the National Assembly on November 18, 2004, it became a heated 
debate whether or not the government perceived North Korea as main adversary. 
Although Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-woong again refrained from direct answer 
to the question, implicitly conveyed his position that the use of the term is more or 
less outdated or inappropriate as the defense white papers of other countries do not 
use terms like main enemy or adversary (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2004c: 
15).  
Inheriting the Kim Dae-jung administration’s perception that North Korea’s 
pursuit for nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities is in essence caused and to be 
resolved within the US-DPRK relations, Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young 
described that the second nuclear crisis erupted in 2002 was North Korea’s pursuit 
for leverage in negotiations with the new Bush administration and also before 
                                           
87 An executive branch for national security and foreign policy matters, which has expanded in size and 
authority from one-man post to multiple staff organization under President Roh Moo-hyun. 
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resuming to the Six Party Talks (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2005: 68). 
Despite North Korea’s announcement on February 10, 2005, that it has acquired 
nuclear weapons, the Roh administration planned to continue economic assistances to 
North Korea in development of the Kaesong Special Economic Zone. Also, when 
North Korea resumed in the following year to test-fire seven missiles, including four 
medium-range Nodong missiles, two short-range Scud-C based missiles, and one 
Unha SLV, followed by the first nuclear test in October 2006,88 the Roh Moo-hyun 
administration remained adamant in continued support of reconciliatory approach to 
North Korea, that “there should be no change to the principle and basis of the Peace 
and Prosperity Policy.”89 Despite North Korea’s breach of the agreement made under 
the Six Party Talks in the previous year in 2005, South Korea put through inter-
Korean summit in the following October 2007. The joint statement after the inter-
Korean summit only stipulated to “work together to implement smoothly the 
September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13, 2007 Agreement achieved 
at the Six-Party Talks,” and remained remote in discussion on North Korea’s nuclear 
test in 2006. 
Again, in continuity from the Kim Dae-jung administration, the sense of 
military superiority over North Korea lied in foundation to such reconciliatory take 
towards North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities. While North Korea may resume 
back and forth to brinkmanship, as Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-woong evaluated 
                                           
88 The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database. 
89 Remarks by then Minister of Unification Lee Jong Seok, see, ROK National Assembly Secretariat (2006b); 
in November 2006, Prime Minister Han Myung-sook made similar remarks that “We should not in any 
circumstances give up dialogues with North Korea.” See, ROK National Assembly Secretariat (2006c: 3).  
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in 2004, “the probability of war has decreased” (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 
2004b: 33). As Victor Cha (2004: 116) recalled his meeting with special envoys of 
the Roh administration in 2003, the policy leaders of the Roh administration 
perceived the threat from North Korea’s possible collapse to be greater than North 
Korea’s pursuit for asymmetric arsenal.90 
 
2) Fleeting Pursuit for Self-reliant Armament to Alliance-dependence 
 
With underlying reconciliatory policy to North Korea’s asymmetric threats, the Roh 
Moo-hyun administration launched its landmark security strategy in building 
“cooperative self-reliant defense” system, which placed emphasis on arms build-up 
for autonomous defense, and also mid-to-long-term planning in armaments. Also, as 
coming into office in tight election by appealing to the times’ strong anti-American 
sentiment arising from the accident involving the deaths of two middle school 
students by the US armored vehicle, the Roh Moo-hyun administration signaled 
South Korea’s departure from its traditional reliance on the ROK-US alliance in the 
defense posture.  
In numerical terms, the ambitious plan for “cooperative self-reliant defense” 
came with the administration’s increases in overall defense budget and FIB. 
Although the portion of defense budget in state finance continued to dwindle 
                                           
90 Victor Cha in meeting with special envoys of the Roh administration in 2003 found how they prioritized 
avoiding collapse of the regime even at the expense of proliferation. See, Cha (2004: 116). 
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throughout the post-Cold War era, the highest defense budget increases were 
observed during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, accumulating to an average of 
8.4 percent throughout the five-year term, reaching the highest 11.4 percent in 2005, 
Figure 31. In terms of FIB, allocated for arms procurement from the total defense 
budget, the Roh Moo-hyun administration has shown the highest rate of increase of 
about sixteen percent in year 2005, Table 24. 
 





DB Increase (%) DB/GDP (%) 
DB/Government 
Budget (%) 
2003 17.5 7 2.16 14.8 
2004 18.9 8.1 2.16 15.8 
2005 21.1 11.4 2.29 15.6 




























































































































DB Increase (%) DB/GDP (%) DB/Government Budget (%)
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2007 24.5 8.8 2.35 15.7 
Source: ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Papers, annual series. 
 




















2003 4.8 5.7 11.8 17.5 810.9 0.71% 2.2% 
2004 9.7 6.3 12.6 18.9 876 0.72% 2.2% 
2005 16.0 7.3 13.8 21.1 919.8 0.79% 2.3% 
2006 2.7 7.5 15.7 22.5 966.1 0.80% 2.3% 
2007 -10.9 6.7 17.8 24.5 1,043.3 0.64% 2.3% 
Source: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, annual series. 
 
(1) Reluctant Armaments in Pursuit for Korean Air and Missile Defense 
(KAMD)  
 
Setting out for ambitious plan to enhance ‘self-reliant defense system’ by 
2008, according to President Roh Moo-hyun’s response to question in meeting with 
CSIS expert, the administration at the outset of the term also showed increased 
interests and progress in acquiring both BMD and ISR related weapons system to 
improve the ‘self-reliant’ warfare capabilities of South Korea. For major armaments, 
the Roh administration announced in 2003 that South Korea will develop the KAMD 
by 2010 and acquire early warning aircrafts, high-altitude UAVs, and reconnaissance 
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satellites (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2003a: 8).  
Although the KAMD looked as if the administration has adhered to the US’s 
insistence, as observed in the latter years of Kim Dae-jung administration, the 
administration at the outset of KAMD conceptualization insisted on ‘separate’ and 
‘independent’ operation of the KAMD. When Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz came to Seoul in 2003, Defense Minister Cho Young-gil maintained South 
Korea’s position that it lacks enough “technological and military capabilities to 
participate in the MD” (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2003b: 8), and will 
therefore seek Korean-style, Korean-specific program.  
Whether self-reliant or US-joined BMD system, however, the initial plan out 
for KAMD was largely put to a halt in implementation at the beginning of the 
administration. First, the USFK’s upgrading of the Patriot batteries (from PAC-2 to 
PAC-3) stationed in Kwangju in 2004 stirred anti-US base and anti-BMD protests, 
which the Roh administration did not overlook. Second, the considerations of ROK-
PRC relations, as observed in the Kim Dae-jung administration, became more 
resonant as the government in reconciling North Korea’s asymmetric threats 
involved close engagement in the Beijing-led Six Party Talks. Also, China replaced 
the US as the largest trading partner since 2003.  
Interrelated, such politically thorny KAMD system was difficult to secure 
enough budgets. As the government set out for ambitious timeline and plan for 
enhanced ‘self-reliance’ in defense, the armament priorities and budget allocations 
swayed to low-cost, less-time consuming alternatives, as well as indigenous 
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development programs. In deliberation of the 2004 defense budget bill at the 
National Defense Committee session in November 2003, Lee Yeon-sook from Grand 
National Party, for instance, brought up the option of acquiring the second-hand 
PAC-2s from Germany as part of the SAM-X program to replace the aging Nike 
Hercules missiles (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2003d: 16). While progress 
in KAMD lingered, homegrown missiles again gained more emphasis in the Roh 
Moo-hyun administration. Particularly since replacement of new ROK-US missile 
guidelines in 2001 and joining of the MTCR in 2002, Roh Moo-hyun administration 
spent their defense budget on development of cruise missiles that began in the early 
2000s during the Kim Dae-jung administration. With “several” test-fires of cruise 
missiles since 2003, according to Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-woong,91 it was 
reported in media in 2006 that South Korea has developed cruise missile, known as 
‘Chunryong’ with about 500 kilometers range.92 With reported plans to also develop 
1,000 kilometer range cruise missiles, South Korea test-fired the missiles in March 
2006, and reportedly finished development of the missile by October 2007 (Korea 
Research Institute for National Strategy 2007: 296).93  
Time and budget constraints indeed aggravated for KAMD as the 
fundamental reassessment in the US’s strategic priories since 9/11 in 2001 ensued 
with the GPR in 2004 that laid out comprehensive transformations of the US’s 
overseas bases including relocation and reduction of the USFK. The realignment 
                                           
91 Yonhap News, July 7, 2006. 
92 Kyunghyang, October 24, 2006. 
93 Wikileaks, December 31, 2013. 
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included plans for one-third troop reduction, about 12,500 troops, removal of USFK 
camps along the DMZ down to Seoul, and dispatch one of two US combat brigades 
from South Korea to Iraq, transferring operational tasks and missions to South 
Korean military near or at the DMZ. In tandem, the ROK-US agreement in 2006 to 
transfer wartime OPCON back to South Korean military by 201294 further diverted 
the Roh administration’s armament priorities to filling anticipated vacuums in 
conventional air and maritime capabilities. In the final deliberation of FIB budget for 
FY2005 by the National Defense Committee, for instance, the programs for next-
generation precision-guided weapons system – SAM-X program – have not been 
reflected at all in the budget bill. Although the military initially requested for 34.8 
billion won for SAM-X program for FY2005, the budget requests have been 
overridden by armament priorities in conventional firepower and strike capabilities, 
arising from anticipated withdrawal of the Second Infantry Division to be dispatched 
to Iraq War. As response of budget cuts, national defense acquisition policy officer 
Won Chang-hwan visited Germany to inquire on second-hand PAC-2s in 2004 (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 2004c: 33).  
To put it simply, South Korea’s pursuit for self-reliant KAMD has seen only 
fleeting momentum in the first year of the administration. With armament priorities 
arising from more immediate security concerns against North Korea’s conventional 
capabilities (reconciling North Korea’s asymmetric threats through dialogue), 
transformation in the US’s military presence, OPCON transfer issue, not to mention 
                                           
94 The 38th ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting, 2006. 
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the government’s interest to maintain amicable relations with China, South Korea’s 
BMD capabilities throughout the Roh Moo-hyun administration relied on the USFK 
stationed patriot systems and aegis destroyers deployed outside of South Korean 
waters. Even after North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, South Korea’s reluctance 
for autonomous multi-tier BMD system has been manifested from its final 
acquisition of the second-hand PAC-2s from Germany in 2007 and request of 210 
SM-2 block interceptors for their expected KDX-III program, additional to SM-2 
equipped KDX-II destroyers acquired earlier.  
Considerations for advanced PAC-3 and upper-tier SM-3 capabilities, 
including joining the US-led BMD architecture have remained untapped and resisted. 
Even though North Korea’s nuclear test renewed the government’s interest in KAMD, 
the resilient reconciliatory policy of the government appears to have continued to 
intervene in South Korea’s armaments. In observation of the 2007 defense budget 
expenditures, the total rollover – defense budget used unspent – of 396.3 billion won 
constituted with the most from the above KDX-III program, about thirty-two percent 
(124.9 billion won), and also SM-II related expenditures, about 8.4 percent (33.2 
billion won) (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2008a: 25). As the statement by 
Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo highlights, “firm ROK-US alliance” became 
indispensable to “meet current changing security situation” and “prepare against 
North Korea’s nuclear threats” (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2006d: 2).  
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(2) Ambitious Venture for Self-reliance to Alliance-reliance in ISR  
 
Roh Moo-hyun administration’s efforts to enhance South Korea’s self-reliance in ISR 
capabilities have included ambitious ventures in acquiring reconnaissance satellites, 
advanced high-altitude UAVs, and early warning aircrafts. Unlike how the US’s 
reconfiguration of USFK bases limited South Korea’s investments in KAMD, the 
USFK’s relocation and reduction appeared to dovetail with the Roh administration’s 
emphasis on enhancing its ISR capabilities. As the reconfiguration involved transfer 
of operational tasks including search and rescue and surveillance near or at DMZ, 
South Korea government actively deliberated on plans to accelerate armaments in the 
ISR realms.  
However, as observations on South Korea’s actual defense expenditures 
illustrate, the US’s reconfiguration of bases under the GPR appears to have worked 
as again restraints than stimulus in South Korea’s ISR armaments. The ratio of arms 
spending for ISR realms remained meager in comparison to South Korea’s allocation 
of resources to KDX-III, helicopters, patrol frigates, artilleries, and other 
conventional air and maritime capabilities. According to available data from Defense 
Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), in 2006, the total expenditure for ISR 
related armaments reached only 6.5 percent (369.8 billion won) out of total FIB 
(5,647.1 billion won). In 2007, the expenditure fell further down to 3.2 percent 
(201.7 billion won) out of total FIB (6,373.4 billion won).  
Although acquisition plan for high-altitude latest model of Global Hawk was 
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first addressed at the National Assembly on November 10, 2006, following North 
Korea’s first nuclear test, the US remained highly sensitive in sales of the latest high-
end model to foreign entity. The growing wedge between the US and South Korea’s 
North Korea policy further contributed in the US’s stricter export control. Also, while 
South Korea has shown progress in enhancing general out post (GOP) and frontline 
related infrared surveillance and electronic equipment since 2004, beginning with 
allocation of about 33.2 billion won for FY2005 (ROK National Assembly 
Secretariat 2004c: 4), the propensity to cut or delay advanced ISR-related budgets 
aggravated, especially when North Korea resumed to series of ballistic missile tests 
and nuclear test in 2006.  
Instead, the Roh administration returned to reinforcing the ROK-US 
combined defense system as central to South Korea ISR capabilities. As Defense 
Minister Yoon Kwang-woong stated during the National Assembly session held on 
October 11, 2006, for emergency questions on North Korea’s nuclear test, due to 
“limited detection ranges of ISR,” South Korea cannot but depend on the satellite 
images provided by the ROK-US alliance (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 
2006a). Reconsideration on wartime OPCON transfer has been also implied in his 
statement. By the end of the last year of Roh Moo-hyun administration, South Korea 
remained without sufficient self-reliant capabilities in ISR, as Defense Minister Kim 
Jang-soo admitted, making the ROK-US combined defense system critical 
countermeasure (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2007: 16). 
Roh Moo-hyun’s self-reliant defense policy reiterated Kim Dae-jung 
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administration’s interests in space, as set out for the Defense Reform Plan 2020, 
released in September 2005. As the South Korean policy leaders anticipated the US 
to transform to more flexible and reduced force deployments under the GPR, in 
tandem with preparations for wartime OPCON transfer, the Roh administration found 
advanced communications and reconnaissance satellites critical to enable 
autonomous monitoring of North Korea. While Roh transcended South Korea’s 
pursuit for space-related technologies in cooperation with Russia, signing for 
instance the space technology cooperation pact on September 21, 2004, the progress 
remained limited arising from technological failures and delays in development 
process. The original plan to co-develop and launch the Korea Space Launch Vehicle-
1 (KSLV-1) by 2005 was delayed until October 2007, followed by another one-year 
postponement on October 12, 2006. In December 2007, revisions were made to the 
cooperative pact, setting a new launch date for late 2008. Limited progress in 
diversification has compelled the Roh administration, however reluctant, to resume 






3. Complacent Restraint under Lee Myung-bak Administration  
(2008-2013) 
 
1) Complacency despite Rivalry against North Korea 
 
With return to conservative regime under President Lee Myung-bak since 2008, 
South Korean government in the outset reveals more active pursuit for KAMD and 
also subtle changes in emphasizing cooperation with the US in the BMD system. As 
President Lee Myung-bak’s North Korea policy, came to be known as “Vision 3000 
through Denuclearization and Openness” plan during his presidential campaign, 
signaled shift from the decade of progressive governments’ reconciliatory approach 
to more hardlined policy towards North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities.  
Although the Lee administration did not forego engagement with North 
Korea until enactment of May 24 measure, which was enacted in response to North 
Korea’s torpedo attack on South Korean vessel in 2010, the conditionality has been 
strengthened in the outset of the government along its more hardlined, rivalry policy 
toward North Korea. Minister of Unification Kim Ha-joong in his first policy 
briefing to the President on March 26, 2008, stated that “the speed and scope of, as 
well as ways to push for any development in inter-Korean relations, will be decided 
according to progress in the North Korean nuclear issue” (Yonhap News 2008). 
Minister of Unification Hyun In-Taek, known as the key man in constructing the 
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condition-based Vision 3000 North Korea policy, stated that in order to hold a inter-
Korean summit, “substantial progress on the nuclear front” must be made in 
advance.95  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Kim Tae-young at National Assembly 
hearing held in March 2008 outwardly stated that South Korea’s contingency plan 
against possible nuclear attack from North Korea would involve “identify[ing] 
possible locations of nuclear weapons and make a precise attack in advance” (Kim, 
Min-seok and Jung Ha-won 2008). Comparing to President Roh Moo-hyun’s speech 
at the first anniversary of October 4 inter-Korean summit on October 1, 2008, 
wherein he recalled how the government “rejected the US’s proposal for operation 
plan 5029” that included preemptive nature of response in case of military 
contingencies with North Korea, the Lee Myung-bak administration set upon more 
confrontational stance on North Korea. 
With North Korea’s nuclear issue and restoring of the ROK-US alliance set 
as top priorities of the government’s security strategy, the policy advisors (transition 
team) of Lee administration conveyed how South Korea should be “flexible” to also 
consider the US programs in enhancing South Korea’s BMD capabilities. Kim Tae-
hyo in interview with media in December 2008, stated that the “President-elect Lee 
will be forward-looking in reviewing the participation in [US-led] MD” (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 2012a: 6). 
Yet, the first year of Lee Myung-bak administration has been largely 
                                           
95 Korea Herald, February 3, 2010. 
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forestalled in progress in KAMD, as the President Lee’s first state visit to 
Washington, DC, in April 2008, ensued with huge protests among South Korean 
public over President Lee’s agreement with the US to lift the sanctions on the US 
beef. Although President Lee’s visit to the US strived to restore the ROK-US alliance 
and upgrade the alliance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008b), the decision to reopen 
South Korean market for US beef, which has been banned since 2003 after the Mad 
Cow outbreak, almost paralyzed his presidency in 2008. While President Lee came 
into office with landslide victory, the largest margin of victory by the time in 
presidential election in December 2007, the huge domestic turmoil surrounding the 
US beef made his support rate to fall drastically to twenty percent.  
Moderation on BMD acquisitions were also driven by the government’s 
consideration for economic interests. With the outbreak of Global Financial Crisis in 
2008, the government remained reserved in large-bulk armaments. Although Lee 
Myung-bak administration began off with fifteen percent increase in FIB from the 
previous year, Table 25, the allocated budget for ballistic missile program in 2008 
saw only 0.4% in actual expenditure (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2009b: 41).  
 
















2008 7.7 19 26.7 1,104.5 0.70% 2.4% 
2009 8.7 20.3 29 1,151.7 0.76% 2.5% 
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2010 9.1 20.5 29.6 1,265.3 0.72% 2.3% 
2011 9.7 21.7 31.4 1,332.7 0.73% 2.4% 
2012 9.9 23.1 33 1,377.5 0.72% 2.4% 
Source: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, annual series. 
 
Also consideration of ROK-PRC relations also kept the Lee administration 
limited. Indeed, constructing South Korea’s ‘strategic cooperative partnership’ with 
China has been important pillar of the Lee’s new security policy as since the outset of 
the financial crisis, and the US’s relative faltering in international presence, soon 
ensued with escalation in the US-China rivalry. Caught in between China’s new 
assertiveness and the administration’s priority in mending the ROK-US relations, the 
Lee Myung-bak administration in continuity of President Roh could not overlook the 
importance in maintaining the relations with China amicable. The Lee Myung-bak 
administration has been clearly aware of how China has replaced the US as largest 
trading partner since 2003, as South Korea reached trade surplus of thirteen billion 
US dollars from China, as to about nine billion surpluses from the US. According 
KITA database, by the time of Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008, South Korea’s 
trade volume with China had grown more than twice the size of trade with the US, 
$178 billion and $85 billion, respectively (Sheen Seongho 2009).  
Despite the Lee regime’s clear turn to more confrontational, rivalry policy 
towards North Korea, the room for government’s economic and political 
considerations in 2008 appears to have founded upon the policy leaders’ perception 
on changes in North Korean threats at the time. Kim Jong-il’s health issues drew 
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special attention from his absence from North Korea’s major national ceremonies – 
the sixtieth anniversary of founding of the DPRK on September 9 and founding of 
the Korean Workers’ Party on October 10 in 2008. The US and South Korean 
intelligence agencies later confirmed their speculations that Kim Jong-il suffered 
from a stroke in August. Also, the government remained less convinced on North 
Korea’s progress in asymmetric nuclear capabilities. While the government 
recognized North Korea’s possession of plutonium (about forty kilograms) (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 2010: 37), and possibility to produce nuclear weapons, 
as stated by Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Kim Tae Young (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2008b: 22), it was unclear 
whether North Korea has acquired the capacity to miniaturize the nuclear warheads 
to be tipped on their ballistic missiles (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2008b: 
40). 
While keeping the politically thorny BMD acquisitions put aside in this 
context, however, the rapid deterioration of inter-Korean and US-DPRK relations in 
2009 and 2010 reinvigorated South Korea’s BMD procurement. In demonstration 
against South Korea’s North Korea policy, which set strong nuclear conditionality in 
implementation of inter-Korean exchanges and economic assistances, Pyongyang 
declared to nullify all agreements related to political and military confrontations in 
inter-Korean relations, including the 1991 Basic Agreement. On April 2009, North 
Korea launched long-range ballistic missile, although North Korea alleged the launch 
involved non-military, communications satellite. North Korea also announced its 
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plans to reactivate its nuclear facilities, and that it would “never” attend the six-party 
talks and also not abide by “any agreement” made at the six party talks including the 
2005 and 2007 joint statement that outlined North Korea’s denuclearization 
agreements.96 Escalated tensions have culminated as Pyongyang on May 25, 2009, 
conducted a large-scale underground nuclear test, immediately followed by test-firing 
of SRBMs. The 2010 sinking of South Korean ship, Cheonan, by North Korean 
torpedo and bombing of South Korean naval base in Yeonpyeong Island further 
invigorated the Lee government to advance its KAMD system and also deliberate on 
South Korea’s options for joining the US-led BMD.  
In addition to completing the purchase of second-hand PAC-2s and SM-2s, 
the Lee Myung-bak administration set out for phased acquisition plans for KAMD, 
considering the PAC-3 for lower-tier weapons system, as stated by Defense Minister 
Lee Sang-hee during National Defense Committee session held on April 5, 2009, 
after North Korea’s long-range rocket launch in the morning (ROK National 
Assembly Secretariat 2009a: 3). DAPA in 2009 decided to purchase two Super Green 
Pine radars from Israel, which were originally designed to work with the Israeli 
BMD system – Arrow – jointly developed by the US and Israel. Involving plans for 
indigenously produced systems, the Ministry of National Defense also announced 
plans to develop L-SAM, in addition to the M-SAM initially set out since 1998 under 
the Kim Dae-jung administration. The L-SAM was planned for upper-tier 
interceptive system, building a multi-tier defense system with the PAC-3 and M-
                                           
96 Washington Post. 2009, April 15, 2009. 
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SAM batteries for lower-tier (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2014: 62-63).  
Nonetheless, difficulties in securing enough budget in constructing such 
expanded scope of KAMD continued to be the problem throughout Lee Myung-bak 
administration as well. Although the total FIB increased, the portion of actual FIB in 
terms of GDP has shown continued fall. With limited increases in FIB, Table 26, 
tangible progress in KAMD construction has been far commensurate to North 
Korea’s increasing asymmetric threats. Although the Lee government renewed 
interest in acquiring new PAC-3 systems in the last of year his term in late 2012, the 
discussions remained without conclusive deal. South Korea’s formal notice to the US 
Department of Defense inquiring a possible purchase of the PAC-3 was made only 
coming into the Park Geun-hye administration in October 2013. Alliance-reliance is 
again continued phenomenon as the continued shipments of PAC-2s were shown to 
be outdated and the tracking radars on PAC-2s broke down frequently and cause 
difficulties in maintenance (Yun Sang-ho 2011). 
 









2000 457 12.8 4.7 1.0% 36.9% 
2001 422 11.9 4.0 1.0% 33.9% 
2002 546 13.2 4.4 0.8% 33.5% 
2003 608 14.6 4.8 0.8% 32.9% 
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2004 673 16.3 5.4 0.8% 33.2% 
2005 787 20.3 7.0 0.9% 34.6% 
2006 885 23.7 7.9 0.9% 33.3% 
2007 970 26.5 7.2 0.7% 27.3% 
2008 928 24.18 7.0 0.8% 28.8% 
2009 882 24.51 7.4 0.8% 30.2% 
2010 1010 25.5 7.9 0.8% 30.8% 
2011 1140 28.5 8.8 0.8% 30.9% 
2012 1160 29.3 8.8 0.8% 30.0% 
2013 1260 31.8 9.4 0.7% 29.5% 
Source: IISS, Military Balance, Annual series; Ministry of National Defense, ROK. Defense White Paper, 
annual series 
 
As Table 27 highlights, the majority of FIB during Lee Myung-bak 
administration went to acquiring conventional strike and delivery systems in ships, 
aircrafts (helicopters), firepower (artilleries). While the new special guided weapons 
system encompassed investments in KAMD related armaments, most portion of the 
bracket has been comprised of spending on the homegrown Hyonmu-3 cruise 
missiles, sea-based Haesung-II/III cruise missiles – the offensive missile arsenal. 
From the accumulated sum of thirty-four trillion won in force improvement 
expenditure from 2008 to 2012, armament priorities comprised of spending in 


















2007 314.0 539.7 998.3 1,621.0 732.2 201.7 589.1 4,996.0 
2008 438.5 605.9 1,273.7 1,576.1 864.4 258.8 1,199.0 6,216.4 
2009 300.7 916.6 1,287.3 1,520.7 1,001.0 512.7 1,522.7 7,061.7 
2010 231.8 1,056.2 1,411.7 1,295.6 1,115.1 435.0 1,279.5 6,824.9 
2011 43.2 1,025.3 1,595.9 1,575.1 1,466.2 681.0 980.6 7,367.3 
2012 14.4 1,062.4 1,685.8 1,421.0 1,469.6 420.5 561.7 6,635.4 
2008-
2012 
1,028.6 4,666.4 7,254.4 7,388.5 5,916.3 2,308 5,543.5 34,105.7 
3% 14% 21% 22% 17% 7% 16%  
Source: DAPA, Defense Acquisition Program Statistical Yearbook, annual series; DAPA, Fiscal Year 
Balance, annual series 
*Note: In DAPA database, the formal category is designated as “Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Intelligence, 
EW” 
 
As the process in KAMD lagged, the decision to postpone the wartime 
OPCON transfer to December 2015, during the ROK-US summit held on June 26, 
2010, marked the Lee administration’s shift back to alliance-reliance in BMD. 
Despite conservatives’ more hardlined, rivalry policy on North Korea, assessments of 
North Korea’s ballistic missile threats continued to be contested within the policy 
leaders as well. In response to North Korea’s long-range missile-launch on April 13, 
2012, Ministry of National Defense announced that “North Korean rocket did not 
trespass our territorial waters.” While questioned about trespasses on South Korean 
airspace, Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin mentioned that “because the missile flew 
above 151 kilometers from the ground,” which to “international norms not 
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considered as territorial sky,” “the missile did not trespass our airspace” (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 2012b: 11).  
By the latter years of the term, the Lee regime turned more pragmatic, 
enhancing alliance-cooperation in the BMD, while postponing heavy expenditures 
for autonomous, multi-tier construction of KAMD. Following President Obama and 
President Lee Myung-bak’s agreement for Joint Vision for the Alliance in June 2009, 
US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and ROK Minister of National Defense 
Kim Tae Young on October 8, 2010, in Washington, DC, at the forty-second Security 
Consultative Meeting (SCM), signed the “Strategic Alliance 2015,” setting out a new 
time plan and framework for OPCON transfer. They also established the “Extended 
Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) to enhance deterrence effectiveness, 
particularly in the area of missile defense.”97 At the forty-third SCM held in Seoul 
on October 28, 2011, US Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and ROK Minister of 
National Defense Kim Kwan-jin agreed to create the “Korea-US Integrated Defense 
Dialogue (KIDD),” a high-level channel and framework for policy dialogues, 
including the Counter-Missiles Capability Committee (CMCC).98  
 
  
                                           
97 Joint Communiqué of the 42nd ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting, October 8, 2010, Washington, 
DC.  
98 Joint Communiqué of the 43rd ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting, October 28, 2010, Seoul. 
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2) Alliance-reliance for Pragmatism  
 
Alike the Lee administration’s recurrence to alliance-reliant armaments in the BMD, 
the plans for ISR acquisitions similarly retroceded to restraints. At the outset of the 
government, the administration’s rivalry policy against North Korea accompanied 
introduction of new security concept, known as the Kill Chain. Following North 
Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009 and heightened military provocations including 
the sinking of South Korean Cheonan vessel and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 
2010, the Lee administration pledged to the construct the Kill Chain, a preemptive 
strike system against Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile facilities. In tandem with 
envisioning a multi-tier KAMD system and preparation for OPCON transfer at the 
outset of the government, as elaborated above, the Kill Chain signaled the Lee 
government’s active investments in autonomous ISR capabilities, including the 
HUAV Global Hawk. Nonetheless, as the actual spending on ISR realms in FY 2008 
indicated, only 9.6 percent of allocated budget for HUAV and early warning radars 
have been spent in FY 2008 (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2009b: 41). 
As the plan for wartime OPCON transfer has been put off on June 26, 2010, 
to December 1, 2015, the ISR budgets illustrated further cuts, showing recurrence of 
similar pattern observed in previous Roh administration. To highlight, after 
postponement of OPCON transfer by 2015, Lee Myung-bak administration remained 
at an average of five percent range of defense budget increase. While previous Roh 
Moo-hyun upon announcement of OPCON transfer rated about annually 8.8 percent 
203 
increase in defense budget. As shown in Table 28, the spending on ISR, which 
increased by almost double (98.1 percent increase) from FY2008 (258.8 billion won) 
to FY2009 (512.7 billion won), indicated about fifteen percent cuts in FY2010 (435 
billion won). Although the military contingencies involving Cheonan vessel and 
Yeonpyeong shelling revamped the Lee administration to increase the budget for ISR, 
with plans to improve existing fleets of Shinsegi UAV and acquire HUAVs like 
Global Hawk, actual progress in acquisitions remained limited. The Shinsegi UAV 
program, for instance, has been canceled upon considerations that South Korea 
should acquire rotary than fixed-wing UAVs (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 
2012c: 13-14). 
 
Table 28 Force Improvement Expenditure on ISR (2008-2012), in billion won 













2008 287.8 7,681.3 3.7% 258.8 7,793.1 3.3% 
2009 438.7 8,714.0 5.0% 512.7 8,809.8 5.8% 
2010 355.7 9,103.0 3.9% 435.0 8,737.0 5.0% 
2011 712.4 9,693.5 7.3% 681.0 9,605.3 7.1% 
2012 514.8 9,893.8 5.2% 420.5 9,432.2 4.5% 
Source: DAPA database. 
 
The Global Hawk was also put off by the Lee administration’s more 
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pragmatic approach to arms procurement (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2008b: 
60). Although the US congress granted sales of Global Hawk to South Korea in June 
2009, the price of Global Hawk has continued to increase. From the initial price of 
187 billion won in 2005, the unit price increased to 253.3 billion won in 2007, 326.3 
billion won in 2008, 453.8 billion won in 2010, to 485.4 billion won by 2011. As 
stated by Minister of DAPA Roh Dae-rae in September 2009, the US put forth 455.3 
billion won, making the Lee Myung-bak administration to postpone Global Hawk 
purchases, and instead consider investments in the ongoing indigenous development 
program for MUAV to upgrade to HUAV program (ROK National Assembly 
Secretariat 2011: 39). In this backdrop, out of total 25.1 billion won allocated for 
Global Hawk acquisition in FY2011, only twenty million won was spent. 4.6 billion 
won from the budget remained unspent, 0.4 billion won diverted to AWACS 
acquisition, and the rest was redirected to fund the government’s oil litigations at the 
time (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2012c: 28). Differently put, about ninety-
seven percent of budget allocated for HUAV acquisitions for FY2011, as exemplary, 
has been left unspent.  
Last but not least, another intriguing observation in the Lee administration’s 
approach to ISR armaments can be observed in its policy change in the space-related 
ventures. While previous South Korean governments have collaborated with Russia, 
the first and second satellite launches in 2009 and 2010 turned out to be unsuccessful. 
With repeated postponements in launch schedule and ultimate failures in the 2000s, 
the “Joint Vision of the Alliance” statement issued as part of the Lee-Obama summit 
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in June 2009, touched upon extending the ROK-US cooperation to the “US-ROK 
civil space cooperation.” While the initiative remained largely untapped, until it is 
redeliberated under the later Park Geun-hye administration, it is a significant turn 
away from previous efforts to work with non-US ally – seeking alliance-reliance and 
cooperation with the US in the prospective space realms, which are foundation to 
major powers’ increasing spree of armaments encompassing the state-of-the-art BMD 





4. North Korea’s Emergence as De facto Nuclear Power and Park 
Geun-hye Administration (2013-2017)  
 
During Park Geun-hye administration, from January 2013 to March 2017, North 
Korea has accumulated to a total of seventy-one missile tests. In 2013, North Korea 
test-launched six KN-02 SRBMs, followed by nineteen in 2014, ranging from nine 
Scud-C based SRBMs, four Scud-B based SRBMs, two Nodong MRBMs, and four 
KN-02 SRBMs. In 2015, North Korea tested ten KN-02 SRBMs, three Pukguksong-
1 SLBMs, and two Scud-C based SRBMs. North Korea further accelerated to a total 
of twenty-four missile tests in 2016, extending to test-firings of eight Musudan 
(IRBMs), three ER Scud-based MRBMs, five Nodong MRBMs, three SLBM 
Pukguksong-1, four Scud-C based SRBMs, and one Unha-3 SLV. Up to March 2017, 
North Korea further tested five ER Scud-based MRBMs, one Pukguksong-2 SLBM, 
and one unknown.99 
In this backdrop, the conservative Park Geun-hye administration shared 
continued emphasis on hardlined policy towards North Korea. Although the 
administration’s coining of the Trustpolitik at the outset of the government and 
‘unification jackpot’ discourse intermittently throughout the term shed light to how 
conservative regimes were no less bound to strategic interest in seeking inter-Korean 
reconciliation, the Park administration maintained the principles of May 24 measure 
and conditionality in nuclear-first approach in dealing with North Korea.  
                                           
99 The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database. 
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The 2014 defense budget bill, for instance, reflected the government’s initial 
momentum to enhance armaments in both BMD and ISR. In continuation of the plan 
to construct the preemptive Kill Chain system, the 2014 budget bill included the 
budget for not only the UAVs but also the plan to acquire military reconnaissance 
satellites – 720 billion won requested for FY2014, to acquire five military satellites.  
For KAMD, the Park administration also set to acquire early warning radar system 
and Patriot enhancement program. The new acquisition programs related to Kill 
Chain and KAMD included about fifty-three programs with budget of 387.2 billion 
won (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2013c: 2-3). Aside from Kill Chain and 
KAMD, the Park Geun-hye administration further presented another preemptive 
concept – the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) plan – as the third 
prong of South Korea’s commitment to retaliate against any North Korean threats.  
 However, the Park Geun-hye administration was no less rigged in actual 
implementation of arms acquisition plans. As shown in Table 29, the rate of increases 
in defense budget has shown continuous decline. From the rate of 4.7 percent 
increase in FY2013 from the previous FY2012, the rate of increase further dwindled 
to 3.5 percent in FY2014. In terms of the portion of defense budget in total GDP, the 
rate showed continuous fall from 2.4 percent in FY2013 to 2.33 percent by FY2017. 
The proportion of defense budget in total government expenditure also fell to 13.9 













2012 33.0 5 2.39 14.8 
2013 34.5 4.7 2.41 14.3 
2014 35.7 3.5 2.4 14.4 
2015 37.6 5.2 2.41 14.3 
2016 38.8 3.4 2.4 13.9 
2017 40.3 3.8 2.33 14.2 
2018 43.2 7 2.38 14.3 
Source: ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Papers, annual series. 
 
In terms of FIB, the Park Geun-hye administration’s declining defense 
budget allocated also cuts in the portion of FIB in total defense budget. From the 
average of 30.1 percent during previous Lee Myung-bak regime, the Park 
administration fell to 29.6 percent (during progressive Roh administration, 32.3 
percent), Figure 32.  
 
Figure 32 Rate of Force Improvement Budget out of Defense Budget (2000-2017) 
 






























As the following paragraphs would illustrate, without actual budget 
increases, recurrence to alliance-reliant armaments in the BMD and ISR is again 
observable from the four years of conservative Park Geun-hye administration. 
 
1) Towards Alliance-cooperative BMD within the Parameters of the 
Alliance 
 
As the Park administration emerged upon North Korea’s third nuclear test, on 
February 12, 2013, the government has set out for active armament plans in the BMD. 
The gist of the defense reform plan for 2014-2030, announced on March 7, 2014, by 
Ministry of National Defense, placed emphasis on constructing the multi-tier KAMD 
for newly conceptualized “proactive deterrence strategy.” Especially as Defense 
Minister Kim Kwan-jin admitted that South Korea’s ISR armaments including the 
Arirang-2, Arirang-3 multipurpose satellites could not and failed to capture before 
and after North Korea’s nuclear test (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2013b), the 
Park administration began with alerted interest in both BMD and ISR.  
 Aside from the renewed emphasis on BMD acquisitions, the Park Geun-hye 
administration at the beginning of the term also appeared to be more keen in 
expanding the realms of cooperation in BMD with the US. Since 2013, South Korea 
began to participate in the Nimble Titan, a training program for BMD. Beginning 
from the US’s unilateral BMD exercise, implemented by the US Joint Staff’s Joint 
Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) in the late 1990s, the 
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Nimble Titan officially launched since 2002, conducting war games using 
interceptors, combined early warning, and other command and control structures and 
tools at operational level. Close US allies like the UK entered the program in 2003 as 
observer, and later participated in 2004 and 2005 as classified event. Later in 2006, 
the Nimble Titan program has been executed by the US Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM), which is responsible for the Joint Functional Component 
Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD). Since 2006, Nimble Titan 
became unclassified to bring more allied countries and partners to join the training, 
growing to include twenty-six NATO and non-NATO countries (Joint Air Power 
Competence Center 2016). While South Korea remained as observer to the program, 
the Park Geun-hye administration began to participate in the training since 2013 
(ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2013a: 23). 
 Yet, aside from limited budget increases for armaments in BMD, the Park 
administration became further entangled in the US-China rivalry. As the Park Geun-
hye government strived to improve the ROK-PRC relations since inauguration in 
2013, the military cooperation and exchanges have indeed taken notable strides in 
progress. During President Park Geun-hye’s formal state visit to China from June 27-
30, 2013, the two sides agreed to reinforce “strategic cooperative partnership.” In 
military realms, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff visited China on June 4-5, 2013, 
for military talks with Chief of the General Staff of People’s Liberation Army, and 
agreed to activate regular high-level military personnel exchanges and other means of 
cooperation, including the establishment of direct hotline between the two militaries 
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(ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2013c). Flying over to China on South Korea’s 
military transport aircraft, C-130, for the first time during the visit, the ROK-PRC 
relations “at its lowest” during President Lee Myung-bak administration, was now to 
bound to better ground for cooperation under the Park administration (Hwang Jaeho 
2014). As the ROK-PRC relations improved, however, speculations increased on 
whether South Korean government has begun “tilting” towards China. More 
importantly, South Korea’s BMD choices including the THAAD deployment in the 
latter years of the term have become more constrained to unseen level of criticisms 
and oppositions from China as South Korea vacillated in their strategic priority 
between the US and China.  
Aside from vacillations between the US and China relations, the slow 
implementation of KAMD plans arose from how the discussions on armaments 
during the Park Geun-hye administration have become predominated by the 
controversy surrounding the purchase of forty F-35 fighter-jets from the US. The 
discussions and criticisms on technology transfer deals and procurement decision of 
F-35s have indeed overpowered previous discussions on long-term investments in 
both the BMD and ISR. Since 2015, Kill Chain or KAMD have been barely talked 
about at National Defense Committee sessions at the National Assembly – replaced 
with inquiries on why and how the anticipated transfer of four critical technologies in 
purchase of F-35s has been denied by the US congress.  
 When North Korea launched its fourth nuclear test, allegedly first successful 
hydrogen bomb test, on January 6, 2016, the Park Geun-hye administration could not 
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but curb its strategic focus back to restoring the ROK-US combined defense system 
as the utmost priority. Curtailing previous cautious approach to BMD in alleviating 
relations with China, Yoo Jehseung, head of the Ministry of National Defense Policy 
Office, for instance, announced that South Korea in response to North Korea’s 
nuclear test will “systematically enhance defense capabilities and military readiness 
against North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities [with the US].” On the basis of 
“ROK-US tailored deterrence strategy and operation concepts against missiles,” Yoo 
Jehseung further stated that the ROK-US will “develop operational plan, implement 
joint exercises, and establish operation implementation system,” and thereby strive to 
establish South Korea’s “Kill Chain and KAMD that can deter and respond at the 
early phase of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats (ROK National Assembly 
Secretariat 2016: 3). At the National Defense Committee session held on the next day 
of North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, questions have been also raised on diverse 
responsive measures including redeployment of the US’s tactical nuclear warheads, 
South Korea’s own nuclear option, as well as complete review of current Kill Chain 
and KAMD system to consider upper-tier SM-3 and THAAD. 
As North Korea further launched Kwangmyongsong-4 long-range ballistic 
missile on February 7, 2016, the US Department of Defense formally announced to 
begin negotiations of THAAD deployment under USFK on that day, drawing South 
Korea into political turmoil at home and also in their relations with China. Despite 
strong oppositions from China, the Park administration readjusted the strategic 
priority in again reinforcing its alliance-reliance and cooperation with the US. As 
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Defense Minister Han Min-koo stated, the Commander in Chief of Combined Forces 
Command (CINCCFC) requested to begin formal negotiations on THAAD 
deployment on February 2, 2016. North Korea’s missile launch also led to 
government’s attention to push for general security of military information 
agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2016). On 
June 30, 2016, a closed session on briefing on the progress in acquisition of Kill 
Chain and KAMD has been held by National Defense Committee at the National 
Assembly (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2016).  
During the forty-eighth ROK-US SCM held in Washington, DC, on October 
20, 2016, South Korean government strived to reconfirm the US’s commitment in the 
provision of extended nuclear deterrence. During the meeting, both sides reaffirmed 
“the US extended deterrent to continue to deter North Korean aggression and 
preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula and the region” as well as the need to 
“conduct combined exercises” to demonstrate “alliance readiness, particularly given 
the security environment following North Korea’s fourth and fifth nuclear tests, and 
the multiple ballistic missile launches under the Kim Jong Un regime.” South Korea 
and the US also agreed, “within the context of the 2+2 Extended Deterrence Strategy 
and Consultation Group, to examine options to take additional steps that further 
strengthen extended deterrence capabilities,” reiterating “the firm and unwavering 
US commitment to the defense of the ROK using US forces and capabilities postured 
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on the Korean Peninsula and globally available.”100   
On July 8, 2016, the ROK Ministry of National Defense officially announced 
its decision to deploy THAAD under USFK. In briefing by Defense Minister Han 
Min-koo at the National Defense Committee of National Assembly held on July 11, 
2016, Han Min-koo stated that deployment of THAAD will enable “multi-tier missile 
defense system, significantly enhancing the alliance’s missile defense capabilities 
against North Korea’s nuclear and asymmetric threats.” Describing THAAD as 
“effective deterrence and defense means against North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
threats” (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2016: 2), South Korean government 
began to push for alliance-reliant BMD system despite opposition from China and 
domestic public. The dialogue between Defense Minister Han Min-koo and Lee 
Jong-myeong is especially notable, how alliance-reliant BMD system became 
reinforced to fill the continued vacuum in autonomous BMD capabilities (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 2016: 34): In response to Lee Jong-myeong’s question 
on whether South Korea has enough weapons system to deter North Korea’s 
asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile threats, Defense Minister Han Min-koo 
replied that while South Korea lacks autonomous countermeasures, the ROK-US 
alliance provides “tailored deterrence strategy,” through which South Korea can deter 
North Korea.  
As alliance-reliance in the BMD has become restored as the strategic focus 
                                           
100 Joint Communiqué of the 48th ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting, Washington, DC, October 20, 
2016. 
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of South Korean government, overall complacency for autonomous BMD can be 
observed from how South Korean government moved back and forth in 
implementation of the acquisition plans. The DAPA, for instance, went into sudden 
review of the KAMD program, halting implementation of the Chulmae-II – 
indigenous M-SAM for KAMD. While Defense Minister Song Young-moo called for 
halt of the program in November 2016, Minister again called for resume in February 
2017, at 109th Defense Acquisition Program Committee meeting. Then in the 112th 
Defense Acquisition Program Committee meeting, held in May 2017, Minister again 
called for review, while again concluding on July 17, 2017, to implement the 
program as planned (ROK National Assembly Secretariat 2018: 12). 
As observable from Table 30, the non-BMD realms continued to be allocated 
with higher FIB throughout the Park administration. The new special guided weapons 
system, which encompassed the budgets for KAMD construction, did not saw the 
rate of increase that was observed in the early years of previous Lee Myung-bak 
administration. Also, most of the budget have been directed to continuous armaments 
in offensive missile capabilities, including the purchase of 170 Taurus cruise missiles 
















2012 14.4 1,062.4 1,685.8 1,421.0 1,469.6 420.5 561.7 6,635.4 
2013 31.6 946.3 1,612.5 1,775.8 1,402.9 382.6 766.8 6,918.5 
2014 41.5 1,045.4 1,615.0 1,949.6 1,515.2 215.2 808.6 7,190.5 
2015 76.6 929.9 1,699.9 1,079.2 1,608.2 232.3 820.7 6,446.8 
2016 334.1 685.2 1,510.7 1,148.6 1,668.7 187.5 785.0 6,319.8 
2017 355.9 649.4 1,393.7 1,040.0 1,759.4 215.9 691.9 6,106.2 
Source: DAPA, Defense Acquisition Program Statistical Yearbook, annual series; DAPA, Fiscal Year 
Balance, annual series 




2) Constraints under Accumulated Complacency in the ISR 
 
As mentioned earlier, North Korea’s nuclear test in 2013 served as another 
momentum to highlight how South Korea’s autonomous ISR capabilities remained 
restricted to “early warning radar and aegis ships.” As Chairman of Joint Chiefs of 
Staff General Jung Seung-jo admitted, South Korea’s military readiness against 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats did not provide “24hrs surveillance” (ROK 
National Assembly Secretariat 2013a: 25). 
Regardless of renewed emphasis on autonomous ISR capabilities, as Table 
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31 highlights, South Korea’s investments in the ISR have shown limited increases. 
The total volume of FIB and actual expenditures on ISR have indicated continuous 
fall in both absolute and relative terms. Beginning with 383.9 billion won allocated 
for ISR force improvement in FY2013, the volume soon fell to 229.5 billion won by 
FY2014, to the lowest at 213 billion won in FY2016. In terms of the portion of ISR 
armament in total FIB, the ratio fell from 3.8 percent in FY2013 to 1.8 percent and 
1.9 percent in FY2016 and FY 2017, respectively. 
 
Table 31 Force Improvement Budget (FIB) for ISR Capabilities (2013-2017), in billion won 














2013 383.9 10,174.9 3.8% 382.6 9,974.0 3.8% 
2014 229.5 10,509.7 2.2% 215.2 10,112.8 2.1% 
2015 265.7 11,014.0 2.4% 232.3 10,776.5 2.2% 
2016 213.0 11,682.7 1.8% 187.5 11,124.4 1.7% 
2017 236.0 12,197.0 1.9% 215.9 11,621.9 1.9% 
Source: DAPA, Defense Acquisition Program Statistical Yearbook, annual series; DAPA, Fiscal Year 
Balance, annual series 
 
Again, the postponement of OPCON transfer has been critical. Put off for 
indefinitely this time, under the Park Geun-hye administration, the FIB for ISR has 
shown further cuts in FY2016. 11.6 billion won was cut for budgets initially 
allocated for UAV, as well as the eight billion won set for acquiring the military 
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satellites (‘425’ project). Indeed, the ‘Project 425’ for acquisition of reconnaissance 
military satellites launched in 2016 have experienced repeated delays.  
While continuing complacent reliance on the US’s provision of ISR 
capabilities, South Korean government under Park Geun-hye administration has 
opted for more pragmatic options. According to official from the Ministry of 
National Defense, on the condition of anonymity, stated that given the limited 
progress in autonomous military satellite acquisitions, South Korean government 
began to consider the option of leasing of a reconnaissance satellite, possibly from 
Israel, as the ministry’s initial plan to deploy five surveillance satellites between 
2021 and 2022 lagged behind in schedule.101  
The Park government’s purchase of low-cost alternatives in ISR aircraft is 
another support case for pragmatism, purchasing the French model of Falcon 2000 
from Dassault to be refurbished and replace as the new Baekdu ISR capabilities of 
South Korean military. Furthermore, building upon the initiative to seek “US-ROK 
civil space cooperation,” first mentioned during the Lee-Obama summit in June 2009 
(The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2009), the Park Geun-hye 
administration tapped more onto the US-ROK space cooperation that remained far 
underdeveloped in comparison to the depth of bilateral alliance in other areas. On 
October 14, 2015, President Park Geun-hye visited the US NASA Goddard Space 
Flight Center as an effort to build space partnerships with the US (Spacenews 2015). 
By the end of the regime, South Korea’s satellite capabilities for strategic 
                                           
101 Anonymous military official. Interview by author, April 13, 2019. 
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intelligence gathering have been conducted by three multipurpose satellites, known 
as the Arirang series. Yet, while the three satellites can monitor the ground about 
every eight hours, two-to-three times a day, they are insufficient in offering military 
information. Although military satellites have long been a central element in Seoul’s 
defense plans and feature in the seven sections of the most recent defense white paper, 
published in May 2017 – for early detection of North Korean provocations; 
battlefield awareness; command and control intelligence systems; enhancement of 
combat mission training; and as a critical component in the Kill Chain system – 
South Korea remained confined to asymmetric division of force structure and 
reliance on the US’s ISR capabilities. 
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5. Summary of Findings 
 




While progressive regimes have been deemed more reconciliatory to North Korea 
and seek more autonomous policy towards armament and alliance-reliance, when 
conservatives were seen as more hardlined to North Korea, favorable to pro-alliance 
armaments as means for security, ideological divide mattered less when it came to the 
BMD and ISR capabilities.  
Although such ideological/policy differences did alter the government’s 
armament goals in the BMD and ISR at the outset of the administration, both 
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progressive and conservative regimes recurred to reliance on the ROK-US combined 
defense system in BMD and ISR, while maintaining restrained growth in self-reliant 
capabilities. Such continuity arose from how both progressives and conservatives 
regardless of policy differences, preferred lower-cost, possibly homegrown, offensive 
missiles and strike capabilities that were seen as adequate in deterring North Korea’s 
asymmetric threats in addition to their shared premise of the US’s continued military 
presence. Both progressive and conservative regimes looked out for political 
connotations of their armament choices (pull between alliance-revisionist versus pro-
alliance) between China and the US, and also at home for regime stability. Also, 
North Korea’s repeated escalation of threats worked as common pull factor to the 
ROK-US combined defense system.  
 Under Kim Dae-jung administration (1998-2003), South Korea remained 
largely ‘reluctant’ for autonomous BMD and ISR capabilities. With reconciliatory 
take on North Korea – the Sunshine Policy as landmark agenda of the government – 
the policy leaders of Kim administration found non-nuclear North Korea’s ballistic 
missile tests less imminent than military skirmishes across the border. While political 
considerations for improving inter-Korean relations restrained South Korea’s 
armaments, particularly in the BMD, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis economically 
restrained investments in ISR capabilities.  
While the progressive Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008) came into 
office with more pronounced calls for self-reliant armaments, the reconciliatory take 
on North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities have kept autonomous armaments in the 
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BMD “reluctant.” Although Roh Moo-hyun administration pledged for acquiring 
autonomous advanced ISR capabilities, ‘proactive’ armaments that can enhance 
South Korea’s autonomous defense capabilities, the US’s stringent export control 
against South Korea at the time thwarted the regime’s initiatives. When the US 
withdrew part of their troops and military equipment from South Korea to be 
dispatched to fight their war in the Middle East, the fear of abandonment from the 
US and domestic oppositions against the government’s revisionist take on the 
alliance have again curtailed resource allocation for big-ticket items in the ISR 
capabilities. With North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, the Roh administration by 
and large, however “reluctant,” could not but maintain alliance-reliance in both BMD 
and ISR capabilities.  
Although conservative regime under Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-
2013) resumed power with pledge for more ‘active’ and ‘proactive’ armaments in the 
BMD and ISR capabilities, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and North Korea’s 
military provocation at sea have redirected the resources to meet more pressing needs 
than the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR capabilities. Forging alliance-reliance as 
politically strategic to reinforce the US’s continued military presence, the 
conservative regime cut and postponed plans to procure indigenously produced 
multi-tier KAMD system, US’s advanced BMD system, and ISR capabilities such as 
the Global Hawk. South Korea recurred to “complacent” armaments in both BMD 
and ISR capabilities despite rivalry policy against North Korea. 
Despite North Korea’s unprecedented frequency in asymmetric nuclear and 
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ballistic missile since 2014 and Park Geun-hye administration’s (2013-2017) rivalry 
policy against North Korea, the government reinvigorated South Korea’s alliance-
reliance as pragmatic, resuming to “complacent” armaments in autonomous BMD 
and ISR capabilities. 
This study’s cross-regime and -temporal exploration on South Korea’s 
armaments largely disconfirms the conventional view that the progressive and 
conservative regimes’ arms choices have been ‘split’ and ‘sharply divided,’ 




V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
1. Limits of Arming South Korea Complacently and Moon Jae-in 
Administration’s Perilous Venture 
 
Despite North Korea’s emergence as de facto nuclear power, South Korea has 
retained restrained armaments in both the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR capabilities. 
While the US allies under asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile threats including 
Japan and Taiwan strived for active armaments in both BMD and ISR, as interrelated 
conventional means to detect, prevent, preempt, or at least hit-to-kill incoming targets 
in advance, South Korea revealed inherent tendency to recur to alliance-reliant 
armaments. Despite overall latency in direct asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile 
threats, the US allies in Europe, including the UK and Germany shed light to how 
their armaments in the BMD and ISR – whether proactive or passive – engaged in 
diverse joint and multilateral frameworks as the means for alliance management and 
opportunities for technology accumulation. Placed in this context, South Korea’s 
relative restraint appeared to be an intriguing ‘complacency’ for autonomous 
armaments against increasing threats, lukewarm interest in pursuit for technology 
acquisition, and also alliance deepening as means for ‘additional security.’  
As the cross-regime explorations into South Korea’s BMD and ISR 
acquisitions illustrated, such restrained armaments have been of an ‘accumulated 
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complacency’ across both progressive and conservative regimes. Unlike the 
conventional depictions on how South Korea’s restrained armaments have been the 
outcome of policy inconsistency arising from power transfers between two political 
coalitions with deep ideological schisms on North Korea and the ROK-US alliance, 
this research found that the restraint arises from overall continuity than change in 
arms acquisition patterns across the regimes. Caught in between the increasing 
emphasis on inter-Korean reconciliation, considerations for China’s oppositions 
against South Korea’s BMD systems, and repeated delays in OPCON transfer, both 
progressive and conservative governments have been limited in allocating resources 
for the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR ventures. As North Korea resumed and 
accelerated in becoming de facto nuclear power, both domestic political stripes 
recurred to alliance-reliance. ‘Accumulated complacency’ is becoming a newly 
institutionalized feature of South Korea’s armaments against de facto nuclear-capable 
North Korea. 
The newly inaugurated Moon Jae-in administration since May 10, 2017, has 
restored the progressive regime in South Korean leadership, after ten years of two 
conservative Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations. In reflection of the 
research’s cross-regime analysis, the Moon government appears to repeat previous 
progressive regimes’ restraint in armaments under the names of self-reliance and 
inter-Korean reconciliation.  
The Moon administration, indeed, came into office upon unprecedented 
level of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests. Accruing to the fourth and 
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fifth nuclear tests in January 2016 and September 2016, respectively, North Korea 
has conducted over thirty-seven ballistic missile tests only within the months from 
January 2016 to May 2017. Four days after President Moon’s inauguration in May 
2017, North Korea tested its newly developed Hwasong-12 IRBM, followed by test-
launch of the Pukguksong-2 SLBM on May 21. On July 4 and July 28, North Korea 
launched its first two flight-tests of the Hwasong-14 ICBMs. As the US President 
Donald Trump’s “fire and fury” remarks on August 8, 2017, escalated the tensions in 
the US-DPRK relations, North Korea ensued with its sixth, the most powerful 
nuclear test to date (allegedly hydrogen bomb designed to be loaded on the ICBMs) 
on September 3, 2017, followed by test-launch of Hwasong-15 ICBM on November 
29. The Hwasong-15 reportedly travelled about 960 kilometers and reached 4,500 
kilometers in height, signaling North Korea’s operational range of ICBMs up to 
13,000 kilometers that would place Washington DC within the target range.  
As North Korea emerged as de facto nuclear power in the first few months 
into the office, President Moon set out with adamant pledges to enhance South 
Korea’s autonomous deterrence capabilities against North Korea’s asymmetric 
threats. With announcement of plans in November 2017 to expand South Korea’s 
Nuclear and WMD Response Center established within the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 
January 1, 2017, under the Park Geun-hye administration, President Moon also 
pledged on July 19, 2017, to newly establish a strategic command to counter nuclear 
and missile threats from North Korea by the end of the term (The State Affairs 
Planning Advisory Committee, Blue House 2017). President Moon also expressed his 
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commitment to continue and accelerate the acquisition of South Korea’s three-
pronged Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR system, regardless of the preemptive nature 
of the concepts crystalized in the former two conservative administrations. Increasing 
the defense budget for 2018, by seven percent increases from the previous year (40.3 
trillion won in 2017 to 43.2 trillion won in 2018; 2.33% of GDP in 2017 to 2.38% of 
GDP in 2018) (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2018), the Moon administration 
announced that the government will allocate 14.5 percent increases in budget for the 
Kill-Chain-KAMD-KMPR systems, to be completed by 2022 (The State Affairs 
Planning Advisory Committee, Blue House 2017). With emphasis on both BMD and 
ISR capabilities, deliberating on South Korea’s SM-3 and SM-6 acquisitions, as well 
as military satellites (‘425’ project), JSTARS, the first year of Moon administration 
signaled South Korea’s possible departure away from restrained BMD and ISR 
capabilities.  
However, in resemblance to the patterns from progressive, and also 
conservative regimes, alliance-reliance appears to have recurred by the second year 
into the administration. Resonating especially how former progressive governments 
placed reconciliatory policy on North Korea at the forefront of the national agenda, 
the Moon Jae-in government’s initial pledges for armaments have come to again halt 
along the landmark inter-Korean summits since 2018.  
The Inter-Korean Military Agreement signed on September 19, 2018, after 
the summit between President Moon and Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang, at the foremost, 
included a “no-fly zone” near border areas as a new “confidence-building measures” 
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between the two Koreas.102 Effective since November 1, 2018, the no-fly zone have 
banned fighter-jets, helicopters, as well as UAVs over forty kilometers north and 
south of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) in the east and twenty kilometers in 
the west for fixed-wings. While the no-fly zone significantly diminishes South 
Korea’s existing ISR capabilities that have relied on limited tactical UAVs and lower-
end reconnaissance aircrafts, as Air Force Chief of Staff General Lee Wang-geun 
acknowledged, the Moon administration indicated a clear shift back to alliance-
reliance in the ISR capabilities. The Ministry of National Defense in response to 
increasing controversy on how the no-fly zone would curtail South Korea’s existing 
autonomous ISR capabilities, argued that the “gap” can be met by the advanced ISR 
assets of the USFK (The Strait Times 2018). As retired Lieutenant General Shin won-
sik evaluated, prominent critique of the 2018 Inter-Korean Military Agreement, such 
no-fly zone would only rescind South Korea’s past efforts to “offset” North Korea’s 
asymmetric capabilities by enhancing “advanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and 
precision-strike capabilities,” wherein alliance-reliance again becomes indispensable.  
 Reversals in plans for BMD and ISR armaments can be more explicitly 
illustrated from how the force improvement budget (FIB) have transformed within 
the Moon administration. According to the database provided by DAPA, South 
Korea’s FIB since 2007 has newly established separate spending category for 
“precision-guided/new special weapons system,” which encompass both advanced 
                                           
102 President Moon's special adviser Moon Chung-in told The Korea Herald at a security forum in Seoul in 
October 2018. 
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missiles and missile defense equipment. Coming into 2018, however, the category 
has changed to “guided weapons.” Likewise, while the budget has been allocated for 
“surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, electronic warfare systems” category, 
separate from the “command, control, and communications” category from 2007 to 
2017, the 2018 plan changed to combine and compress the two separate sectors under 
“command reconnaissance” programs (Defense Acquisition Program Administration 
2018). 
 By February 12, 2019, the Ministry of National Defense further announced 
to withdraw the initial plans to establish the new strategic command for North 
Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile threats, as well as the plans to expand the 
existing nuclear and WMD response center within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 
announcement of the new Medium-term Plan for 2019-2023 in January 2019, the 
Moon administration further decided to replace the names of the three-pronged Kill-
Chain-KAMD-KMPR system, discarding the previous ‘preemptive’ and ‘offensive’ 
connotations embedded in the terms, Table 32.  
 
Table 32 Summary of Moon Jae-in Administration 
First Year of Moon JI Admin (2017): Pledge for Active & Proactive Armaments 
 
- Expand Nuclear & WMD Response Center under Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jan 2017) 
- New Strategic Command for nuclear and missile threats (July 2017) 
- Commitment to Kill-Chain, KAMD, KMPR 
- Ambitious Armaments: SM-3 to SM-6, 425 Project, JSTARS 
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Second Year (2019): Reconciliatory North Korea Policy 
- Since Panmunjom, Inter Korean Military Agreement (Sep 2018) 
Third Year (2018): Reversals to Previous Pledge for Active & Proactive Armaments 
 
- Scraped plans for new strategic command and expansion of nuclear-WMD response center 
- Renaming of the three-pronged defense system 
- “precision-guided/new special weapons”(2007-2017) => “guided weapons” 
- “surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, electronic warfare systems” & “command, 
control, and communications” => “command reconnaissance” 
 
 
 While the Moon administration’s emphasis on inter-Korean reconciliation, 
tied with repeated setbacks in OPCON transfer, have again forestalled initial plans to 
enhance South Korea’s autonomous BMD and ISR capabilities, North Korea appears 
to resume to military tactics in 2019. As North Korea has reverted to military 
provocations and enhancements in nuclear and ballistic missile threats in the past two 
decades, North Korea in 2019 conducted twenty ballistic missile tests. In contrast to 
zero accounts in 2018, North Korea in response to limited progress in US-DPRK 





Table 33 North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Tests in 2019 (as of November 2019) 
Missile Name Date Missile Type 
Test Range 
(Altitude) 









Jul 25 600km (50km) 2 
Aug 6 450km (37km) 2 
KN-24 
Aug 10 SRBM 400 km (48km) 2 
Aug 16 SRBM 230km (30km) 2 
KN-25 
Aug 25 SRBM 380km (97km) 2 
Sep 10 SRBM 330km (50-60km) 2 
Oct 31 SRBM 370km (90km) 2 
Nov 28 SRBM 380km (97km) 2 
Pukguksong-3 Oct 2 SLBM 40km (910km) 1 
Total Number of Tests 20 
Source: NTI Database; CSIS Database, Missile Threat. 
 
Indeed, the Pukguksong-3 SLBM launch on October 2, 2019, is a clear 
manifestation of how North Korea’s advancements in the ballistic missile capabilities 
have not halted regardless of the series of historic Panmunjom declaration and US-
DPRK summit meeting in 2018. First hinted in August 2017 by releasing a picture of 
poster, showcasing the new Pukguksong-3 in development, North Korea’s first 
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successful test-launch in 2019 illustrates this point. When launched in normal 
trajectory, analysts project that the new SLBM will reach a maximum range of some 
1,900 kilometers, placing all of South Korea and Japan’s four main islands (CSIS 
Missile Defense Project 2019a).  
By December 2019, the Kim Jong-un regime again announced during a 
plenary meeting that North Korea will “continue to develop strategic weapons 
without interruption.” Although Kim did not designate the exact weapons in 
development, Kim clearly implied North Korea’s continued aspirations to beef-up 
their ICBM, SLBM, and other asymmetric capabilities, as the North Korean Central 
Television on the day of announcement showed the Hwasong-15 ICBM, 
Pukguksong-3 SLBM, which Kim Jong-un referred to as “strategic weapons” 
Despite North Korea’s resort back to missile tests, the Moon administration 
appears to repeat how South Korean government’s emphasis on inter-Korean 
reconciliation has distorted the threat levels imposed from North Korea. At a plenary 
meeting of the Steering Committee of the National Assembly, held on August 6, 2019, 
Blue House National Security Office Director Chung Eui-yong responded that North 
Korea’s missile launches are “no” violation of the 2018 Inter-Korean Military 
Agreement, and that this is the “official position of the South Korean government.”103  
Proponents of inter-Korean reconciliation have also put out more 
reconciliatory interpretation of North Korea’s recent missile tests, that North Korea’s 
                                           
103 Blue House National Security Office Director Chung Eui-yong, at a plenary meeting of the Steering 
Committee of the National Assembly, held on August 6, 2019. 
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restrictions to SRBM-tests are reflection of North Korea’s ‘continued commitment’ 
in the 2018 agreements, while using the means to express North Korea’s business-as-
usual discontent on the ROK-US joint military exercises. Yet, such assessments 
considerably underestimate how the SRBMs are the immediate threat concerns for 
South Korea. The 2019 SRBM tests, ranging from KN-23, KN-24, KN-25, have 
involved all “newly-developed” types of SRBMs. Accumulating to seven test-flights 
since the first one on May 4 (as of November 2019), the KN-23 is North Korea’s new 
ballistic missile with maximum range of 690 kilometers. The KN-24, first launched 
in August, has demonstrated the range of 400 kilometers, falling into the East Sea 
between South Korea and Japan. The new KN-25 is reportedly “super-large” rocket 
between MLRS and SRBM, reaching about 380 kilometers to the East Sea (CSIS 
Missile Defense Project 2019b). From at the least 230 kilometers flight range to 600 
kilometers, the three new SRBMs of North Korea place South Korea under direct 
target range, Table 33. 
While the renewed hope for inter-Korean reconciliation in 2018 continues to 
linger under President Moon’s determination to keep the dialogues alive, this study’s 
look into the past twenty decades appears to imply rather grim projections. As North 
Korea recurred to military tests by the latter years of South Korean government and 
the Presidential elections in both South Korea and the US, North Korea appears more 
likely to resort back to more military tests in 2020. Should North Korea return to 
military brinkmanship along the upcoming election cycle in the US in 2020, 
President Moon, as South Korean leadership has in the past, will have not much 
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option but to reinforce alliance-reliant defense capabilities under the ROK-US 
combined defense system. As the Ministry of National Defense after 2018 Inter-
Korean Military Agreement, called for bridging South Korea’s gap in ISR 
capabilities by the USFK’s weapons system, North Korea’s reescalation of threats 
will recall South Korea’s reliance on the US’s strategic weapons system. In forecast 
of North Korea’s return to military provocations in 2020, Shin Beomchul (2019) has 
proposed, for instance, reinitiating the former ROK-US Extended Deterrence Policy 
Committee (EDPC), first coined since the forty-second ROK-US SCM in 2010. Shin 
also deliberated on possible ‘nuclear sharing agreement’ with the US.  
As this dissertation finds, however, the perils of alliance-reliance lie in 
reinforcing South Korea’s path-dependent limitations in autonomous deterrence 
capabilities, Figure 34. Should South Korea recur to limited investments in the BMD 
and ISR and reliance on the USFK under the progressive Moon administration, 
diverting armament priorities to short-term, conventional, offensive missile and strike 
capabilities in case of renewed North Korea threats, the asymmetric division in force 
structure within the USFK-ROK military will deepen.  
Another five years with complacent armaments, without paradigm shift to 
alternatives, South Korea is more likely to be continuously beset by military threats 
from de facto nuclear-capable North Korea, troubled position between the US and 
China, and increasing antagonism at home against the foundational pillars of the 








2. South Korea’s Alternatives to Restrained Armaments 
 
 
South Korea needs to break away from its accumulated complacency in alliance-
reliance, and shift to active and proactive armaments. While Shin Beomchul(2019)’s 
suggestions to seek ‘nuclear sharing agreement’ and reinstatement of the former 
ROK-US EDPC may be sound interim measures, this research confirmed that such 
“autonomy-security simultaneous promotion model” (Park Min-hyoung and Kwang 
Ho Chun 2015) can easily fall prey to limited investments and recurrence to alliance-
reliance.  
 Serious reformulation of South Korea’s defense posture is demanded, if 
South Korea is to bring back the wartime OPCON and replace, as planned, much of 
its resilient alliance-reliance with autonomous armaments. Strategic reconsiderations, 
operational conceptualizations, and incorporation of new technologies in rapid 
transformations are demanded to newly set South Korea for active and proactive 
armaments in defense against North Korea’s de facto nuclear capabilities. In place of 
resource-driven armaments, investing in lower-cost and offensive strike capabilities, 
South Korea’s arms acquisitions should be strategic-oriented. 
 South Korea also needs to resolve its resource-allocation problems 
embedded in the existing military structure. As Park Young-june observed, the 
chronic problem in limiting South Korea’s investments in the BMD and ISR arises 
from the competition for armaments and defense budgets within the South Korean 
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military services – Army, Navy, and Air Force. As South Korea’s decision-making 
process for arms procurement begins from each military’s submission of Required 
Operational Capabilities (ROC), which is then deliberated under the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Ministry of National Defense, finalized under the National Defense Committee 
at the National Assembly, each military services inclined to submit cheaper, 
affordable, and short-term armaments.104 Also, given the ambiguous division in 
command structure in operating the interrelated ground-, air-, sea-based BMD and 
ISR capabilities, the military services refrained from the BMD and ISR acquisitions 
that may be squeezed into their limited defense budget.105 To enable independent and 
concentrated resource allocation, South Korean military demands reform and 
construction of separate entity that oversees and submits separate ROC for the 
interrelated BMD and ISR operations. The plan to newly establish the ROK Strategic 
Command, scraped by the Moon Jae-in administration in 2019, for instance, can be 
reinstated.  
 At the Eighth KRINS-Brookings Institution Joint Conference, held on 
January 15, 2020, in Seoul, the majority opinion of South Korean experts and 
militaries gathered at the event appeared to be again placing emphasis on the ROK-
US alliance in dealing with nuclear North Korea. As former Minister of National 
Defense Han Minkoo stated in his opening remarks (2020), “strengthening the ROK-
US alliance” and cooperation with other states are the “only one answer” to resolving 
                                           
104 Park, Young-june. November 6, 2019.  
105 Lee, Yong-dae, former Deputy Minister of Office of Military Force and Resources Management, Ministry 
of National Defense, interview on January 11, 2019. 
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North Korea’s nuclear problem. Former Minister of National Defense and Chairman 
of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lee Sanghee (2020) also conveyed similar position, calling 
for transforming the ROK-US alliance from “a conventional forces alliance into a 
nuclear capable alliance.” The idea of “nuclear alliance” implied revisiting the 
options of redeploying the US’s tactical nuclear weapons, strengthening the 
interoperability between the US’s extended deterrence and South Korea’s 
conventional precision strike capabilities, as well as upgrading to the “high-level” 
integrated mechanism of nuclear sharing found between the US and five NATO 
countries – sharing storage, maintenance, delivery systems, and operation of tactical 
nuclear weapons (Yoo Jehseung 2020). While the findings of the study concur in how 
the ROK-US alliance will continue to be both strategic and cost-effective pillar for 
South Korea’s defense posture, this study also found that such resilient alliance-
reliant approach to armaments has also lied at the foundation in prolonging the 
asymmetric division of force structure between South Korean military and the USFK. 
To ensure security and peace against asymmetric threats, especially in times when the 
ROK-US alliance is becoming more tested, South Korea’s aspirations for self-reliant 
armaments need to be more active. “Korea First” armaments should be assured first, 
while strategic and diplomatic use of major power relations, upgrading of the ROK-
US alliance become the next building blocks in pursuit of security against North 
Korea’s asymmetric threats.106 
                                           
106 In reference to Yoo Jehseung’s use of the term, “Korea First” (2020), Vice President of Korea Research 
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한국의 동맹안주적 무기획득패턴 연구:  
제한적 미사일방어망과 정보감시정찰체계 획득을 중심으로 
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서울대학교 국제대학원 국제협력전공 
 
북한은 탈냉전기 이래 핵과 미사일이라는 비대칭 전력의 개발을 통해 사실상
의 핵보유국으로 자리잡게 되었다. 미국의 주요 동맹국들은 비대칭 위협에 대
한 재래식 억제·방어전략으로 위협을 사전에 탐지·예방(prevent)·선제
(preempt)·요격(intercept) 할 수 있는 미사일방어망 (Ballistic M issile 
Defense, BM D)과 정보감시정찰체계 (Intelligence, S urveillance, and 
Reconnaissance, IS R) 분야의 무기획득에 적극적인데 반해 한국은 이 두 분야
에 대한 자체전력증강에는 제한적이고 미국과의 동맹관계로부터 제공되는 핵
우산(nuclear umbrella)과 같은 미국의 확장억제전략 (extended nuclear 
deterrence)과 주한미군에 배치된 미국의 첨단자산에 의존하는 양상을 나타내
고 있다. 북한의 비대칭 전력증강에도 불구하고 한국이 미사일방어망과 정보
감시정찰체계에 보다 동맹의존적인 이유는 무엇인가? 
     기존의 선행연구들은 한미동맹의 특수성에 입각하여 한국의 동맹의존적 
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무기획득, 제한적 자체전력증강을 한국에 주둔하고 있는 미국의 전력, 한미연
합방위체제(ROK - U S  C ombined Defense S ystem) 등에 대한 합리적, 구조적, 
제도와 같은 경로의존적인 현상이라고 본다. 하지만 본 논문은 이러한 결정론
적이고 한국의 사례에 국한된 분석은 한국이 북한이라는 비대칭 위협에도 불
구하고 유사한 안보환경 및 동맹관계에 놓인 다른 미국의 주요 동맹국들보다 
제한적인 전략증강양상을 설명하기에는 불충분하다고 판단한다. 특히 이스라
엘과 대만과 같은 미국의 동맹국들은 한국보다 현저히 낮은 국방비와 무기의 
구입·개발과 관련된 방위력개선비에도 불구하고 한국보다 적극적인 자체 미
사일방어망과 정보감시정찰체계를 확보하였다. 동아시아내 미국의 주요 우방
국인 일본은 한국 보다 최첨단의 미국의 전략자산을 배치하고 있음에도 불구
하고 미국이 제공하는 핵우산과 주일미군의 첨단자산에 '유용한 중복자산
(useful redundancy)'이라고 불릴 정도의 미사일방어망과 정보감시정찰체계에 
대한 자체전력을 확보하였다. 한국의 국방비는 1990년대부터 2019년 현재까지 
최소 3배까지 증가해왔고, 2018년에는 세계 국방비 지출 상위 10위를 기록하
면서 미국 무기의 최대수입국으로 사우디아라비아와 호주 다음으로 상위 3위
로 자리매김하였다. 2015년부터는 방위력개선비 부문에서 일본을 능가하였다. 
이런 배경에서 한국이 북한이라는 비대칭 위협에도 불구하고 여전히 다른 동
맹국들보다 자체전력증강에 제한적인 양상은 흥미롭지 않을 수 없다. 
     본 논문은 국가들의 전력증강(armament)이 외부위협과 환경이라는 독립
변수가 어떻게 정책결정자들의 위협인식(threat perception)과 국내환경
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(domestic context)이라는 개입변수에 따라 변용된다고 주창한 신고전적 현실
주의(neoclassical realism)를 적용하여 한국의 미사일방어망과 정보감시정찰체
계 획득에 대한 포괄적인 국가교차(cross- national) 및 시계열(cross- temporal)
의 비교연구를 하였다.  
논문의 전반부분인 제3장에서는 한국을 미국의 주요 동맹국인 일본, 
대만, 영국, 독일의 사례와 비교하여 한국의 케이스를 보다 객관화, 일반화하
여 설명하고자 하였고, 후반부분인 제4장에서는 한국의 첫 진보정부였던 김대
중 정부(1998- 2003)부터 박근혜 보수정권(2013- 2017)까지의 정권별 비교를 하
여 한국이 소위 북한과 동맹에 대한 시각이 대립적인 진보-보수의 정권교체
에도 불구하고 미사일방어망과 정보감시정찰체계라는 첨단자산 분야에는 동
맹안주적인 자체전력증강이라는 지속성이 나타났다고 보여준다. 본 논문을 이
와 같은 현상을 한국의 안일한 (complacent), 동맹안주적인(alliance-
complacent) 전력증강이라고 명명한다. 
 
 
주제어: 무기획득, 한미동맹, 신고전적 현실주의 (Neoclassical Realism), 탄도미
사일방어망 (BMD), 정보감시정찰체계 (ISR), 진보-보수 분열 (Progressive-
Conservative Split) 
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